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4 Prussia 18 Sweden
5 France 19 Venice
6 Switzerland VD Milan
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11 Holland
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13 Hanover
14 Oldenburg
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22 Prince Bishopric
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23 Prince Bishopric
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24 Austrian Netherlands
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25 Republic of Ragusa
26 Bishopric of Munster
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PUBLISHED FOR THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE
FOREIGN OFFICE. cNo.K ?*~f ,
THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA
1814-1815
BT
C. K. WEBSTER, M.A.
Professor of Modern History in the University of Liverpool
Captain, General Staff, War Office
SEEN » I
PRESERVATION
SERVICES
HUMPHREY MILFORD
Oxford University Press
London Edinburgh Glasgow New York
Toronto Melbouene Cafe Town Bombay
Be
W4
PREFACE
This monograph was written at the request of the
Librarian of the Foreign Office in eleven weeks of this
year, extending from May to August. It is purely a
piece de circonstance, and will be followed, 1 hope, by a
larger work on the same subject when I am released
from my present duties. No one could be more con-
scious of its faults and omissions than its author; and
the only justification for its publication is the fact that
it may be of some interest to the general public in view
of recent events and present conditions.
It is a surprising but none the less authentic fact
that there is no standard history of the Congress of
Vienna. We thus stand on the threshold of a new
Congress without any adequate account of the only
assembly which can furnish even a shadowy precedent
for the great task that lies before the statesmen and
peoples of the world. This small book makes no pre-
tensions to fill that gap, but it may serve to show how
much still remains to be done before the history of
the Congress of Vienna is fully known.
I have written for the information of officials and
men of action rather than historians, but I have tried
to give them some authorities for my conclusions.
Throughout I have avoided any reference to or com-
parison with present circumstances, such applications
being outside the province of the historian as such.
So far, indeed, as any precedents are provided by this
period of history, they may probably be considered
useful rather as warnings than as examples; and the
book will have served its purpose if it draws attention
to some errors of statesmanship, which we may hope
will be avoided at the present day.
T285— 69] b
It PREFACE
Fortunately for Englishmen, though no complete
work yet exists on this subject, the brilliant mono-
graphs of Professor Alison Phillips in the Cambridge
Modern History, as well as his lectures published in
the " Confederation of Europe," have already estab-
lished Castlereagh's position as a diplomatist; while
Sir Adolphus Ward's chapters on the "Congress of
Vienna," also published in the Cambridge Modern
History, are the most impartial and authentic account
that at present exists of the Congress itself.
The acknowledgements, which I owe to a large
number of foreign historians and archivists, I must
reserve till the publication of my larger study. I can-
not forbear, however, from paying here a tribute to the
scholarship and learning of Professor August Fournier,
which he placed unreservedly at my disposal ; and, like
all students of the modern papers at the Record Office,
I have experienced the great kindness and patience of
Mr. Hubert Hall and Mr. Headlam.
Nor could this little work, produced at such short
notice at a time of great pressure, have ever seen the
light at all, had it not been for the help and encourage-
ment of friends in London. To Mr. Alwyn Parker, the
Librarian of the Foreign Office, who suggested my
writing this work; to Dr. G. W. Prothero, the Director
of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, who
brought into some shape and form my hastily con-
structed pages; and to Mr. Moreton Macdonald, Cap-
tain C. R. M. Cruttwell, and Dr. Headlam-Morley, who
gave me much valuable advice at a time when they were
overwhelmed with other important duties, I owe mv
most grateful thanks, as well as to Major H. W. V.
Temperley, who, at considerable inconvenience to him-
self, procured me an interval in which to write.
The Bibliography merelv gives a selection of a few
useful authorities. The documents in the Appendix
have been read with the original texts, and should
prove to be accurate. CHARLES K. WEBSTER.
London, December 1918.
EDITORIAL NOTE
This book is one of a series of Handbooks on countries
and subjects likely to come under discussion during the
peace negotiations, which have been or are being edited,
under my general supervision, by the Historical Section
of the Foreign Office, with the aid of expert scholars,
and that of the War Trade Intelligence Department,
the Intelligence Division of the Admiralty, and the
Geographical Section of the General Staff. It is hoped
to publish other volumes in the series which are likely
to be of use to the reading public interested in inter-
national affairs.
G. W. PROTHEEO.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Chronological Table ... ... ... v
Section
1 Introductory ... ... ... ... 1
Part I. The Preparation of the Congress
2 Situation of Europe at the end of 1813. /
The policy of the Continental Powers ... 3
3 The policy of the British Government:~~The " /
character and aims of Castlereagh ... 10
4 The memorandum of December 26, 1813, on
the negotiations for peace ... ... 14
5 First conferences at Bale and Langres ... 19
6 The conference of Chatillon ... ... 24
7 The maintenance of the Alliance ... ... 26
*<^S&t The Treaty of Chaumont. The construction
of the Quadruple Alliance ... ... 31 ~V
9 The problem of the conquered territories ... 33 ^
10 The Allies and the restoration of the Bourbons 36
11 The overthrow of Napoleon and the first
Peace of Paris ... ... ... 38 f
** 12 The attempt at Paris to settle the disposition
of the conquered territories ... ... 42 '
13 The preliminary discussions in London.
Diplomatic preparations ... ... 46
Part II. Organization of the Congress
14 The problems and personalities of the Congress 54
15 First discussions as to the organization of the
Congress ... ... ... ... 60
16 The second attempt to constitute Congress.
Further postponement ... ... 68
17 The constitution of the Committee of Five.
The real Congress ... ... ... 73
18 The functions of the Committee of Eight
and of the German Committee ... 76
19 The preparation of the form of the Treaty .... 77
viii TABLE OF CONTENTS
pn Page
Project of a Special Guarantee of the Vienna
Treaty .... ... ... ... 83 *
The method of transacting business. The
functions of the Committees. The Statis-
tical Committee ... ... ... 86
22 Espionage. The social life of the Congress .. . * 91
0 23 Attempts to influence the decisions of the
Congress through public opinion arid /
the home governments ... .1. 93 v
Part III. Work of the Congress r
■^ 24 The Polish-Saxon problem. The failure of
Castlereagh's first plan ... ... 98
25 The deadlock over Saxony. The Secret Treaty
of January 3, 1815, between Austria, Great
Britain, and France ... ... ... 106
^y 26 The final settlement of the German and Polish
/^ Territorial questions ... ... ... 115
27 The Italian problem. Spain and Portugal ... 123
28 The making of the German Confederation.
The Swiss Constitution. General questions 128
.Constitution. General questions 12<
Part IV. Completion of the Congress
29 The return of Napoleon and the second Peace
of Paris (Nov. 20, 1815) ... ... 136
<^>FS§ The renewal of the Quadruple Alliance. The
f " Holy Alliance » ... 142 ^
31 General observations ... ... ... 145*"
Appendices
I. Despatch of Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of
Liverpool, Vienna, September 24, 1814 ... 149
II. " Memorandum upon the measures to be adopted
preparatory to the meeting of Congress in
form for the despatch of business." Vienna,
September, 1814 ... ... ... 151
III. Two Projets of Viscount Castlereagh on the
method of opening Congress, September, 1814 152
IV. Baron Humboldt's Projet for the regulations of
Congress. Vienna, September, 1814 ... 155
V. " Proposal of Baron Humboldt to publish a
declaration." Vienna, September, 1814 ... 162
TABLE OF CONTENTS ix
Page
VI. Projet of Baron Humboldt : Mode of publishing
the declaration of the opening of Congress... 164
VII. Viscount Castlereagh's Projet for the formation
of a Commission to verify statistical calcula-
tions ... ... ... ... 165
VIII. Memorandum on the Treaties of 1814 and 1815
submitted by the British Plenipotentiaries at
the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, October
1818 ... .... ,.. ... 166
List of Authorities ... ... 172
[285—69]
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE
1813.
February 28
March 16
June 4
June
27 ..
August
12 ...
September
9 ...
October
8 ...
October 16-
-19 ...
November
9 ...
November
16 ...
December
26 ...
1814.
January
11 ...
January
January 1
18 ...
29 ...
February 5 to
March 19
Treaty of Kalisch between Russia and Prussia.
(An offensive and defensive alliance against
France, which included a secret Russian
guarantee for the restoration to Prussia of
the political position of 1805.)
Prussia declares war against France.
Napoleon concludes the Armistice of Pleswitz
with Russia and Prussia.
Austria concludes the Treaty of Reichenbach
with Russia and Prussia, and undertakes
to enter the war if Napoleon refuses the
terms offered by the Allies.
Austria declares war on France.
Treaty of Toeplitz between Austria, Russia,
and Prussia.
Treaty of Ried between Austria and Bavaria.
Battle of Leipzig, after which all Central
Europe joins the Allies.
The " Frankfort Proposals," offering France
the Rhine boundary.
Napoleon returns an evasive answer.
(Caulaincourt's attempt to revive the pro-
posals is rejected by the Allies in the
beginning of December.)
Castlereagh's Cabinet Memorandum on the
British policy towards the Allies and
Napoleon.
Treaty of Alliance between Austria and
Naples (Murat).
Castlereagh arrives at Bale.
The "Langres Protocol." in which the four
Allied Powers formulate their peace
proposals.
The abortive Conference of Chatillon between
the representatives of the Allies and
Caulaincourt.
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE
XI
March
March
April
April
May
May
9 ...
31 ...
11 ...
23 ...
3 ...
30 ...
June and July . . .
September 15 ...
September 22 ...
September 23 ...
October to
November
October 14 ...
November 1 ...
November to
December
December 24 ...
Treaty of Ohaumont (dated March 1 ) between
the four Allied Powers — the "Quadruple
Alliance."
The Allies enter Paris. Provisional Govern-
ment under Talleyrand set up.
Treaty of Fontainebleau :
Napoleon.
Armistice between France
Abdication of
and the Allies
signed.
Louis XVIII enters Paris.
First Peace of Paris.
The Allied Sovereigns and Ministers visit
England.
Informal Conferences begin at Vienna between
the Ministers of the " Four."
Protocol of the " Four," keeping affairs in their
own hands.
Arrival of Talleyrand.
Eefusal of France and Spain to accept the
propositions of the " Four." Discussions of
the Polish Question. Failure to reach
agreement.
Meeting of the German Powers (Austria,
Prussia, Bavaria, Hanover, Wiiittemberg) to
discuss the German settlement.
Verification of the full-powers of the
Plenipotentiaries begins.
Deadlock on the Polish-Saxon Question.
I ■
Peace concluded
U.S.A.
between Great Britain and
1815.
January 3 ...
January 9 ...
January 12 ...
January to
February
February 3 ...
February 15 ...
March 1 ...
March 13 ...
Secret Treaty between the British, Austrian,
and French Plenipotentiaries at Vienna.
France admitted to the Directing Committee.
First meeting of the Committee of Five.
Adjustment of the German and Polish
territorial problems.
Wellington arrives at Vienna.
Castlereagh leaves Vienna. Wellington first
English Plenipotentiary.
Napoleon lands in France. The F
Days begin.
The Allies declare Napoleon a public
xii CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE
Eenewal of the Treaty of Chaumont.
Wellington leaves Vienna. Clancarty first
English Plenipotentiary.
Austria declares war on Murat.
Final Act of the Congress of Vienna.
Waterloo.
The Treaty of the " Holy Alliance " between
Prussia, Eussia, and Austria.
The second Peace of Paris. Allied troops to
occupy the northern provinces. Eenewal
of the Quadruple Alliance.
March
March
25 .".
28 .
April
June
June
September
11 .
9 .
18 .
26 .
November
20 .
THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA.
1814-1815
Section 1. Introductory.— A. general account of the
formation of the last alliance against Napoleon and of
the organization of the Congress of Vienna has been
given in two other papers of this series.1 The object
of the present paper is to describe in some detail the
course of the negotiations in the years 1814 and 1815.
and especially to show the motives which determined
the policy of British statesmen during the period and
the methods by which they tried to obtain their ends.
During these years, by a series of treaties concluded at
Paris and Vienna, thg_j rontWs of almost, every
country in Europe were to be redrawn, and the over-
seas possessions of the CohtTriehtal "Powers were
to be reallottecTc^ despotism,
rVf~TTapoleon had completely transformed Europe,
while the French, Dutch, and Danish colonies had b,een
conquered by Great Britain. Thejiestruction o,f thej
Na poleonic Emp^^irj^ t^ref ore, hecessllafeor" bo* cE th~e,i
construction of a new Europe andTaTnew distribution!
of CQhymaT power: the "parallel betwrwi the I
p roblemTof_that age and those of the present , day is m
some" respects an exceedingly close one. Th:^ Congress
met irrTSe^autumri of 1814; but it was tlfie result of
diplomatic transactions of the earlier part /0f that year
at Paris and elsewhere, and its work was completed by
the second Peace of Paris, which was r nade after the
return and second defeat of Napoleon. ^ ,: An attempt
Sas been made, therefore, to review events from the
Coalitions, Alliances, and Ententes of mc -^rc i}xan two Powers
ince 1792 (No. 158) and International Congre „ Sses (No. 154).
[285—69] t B
CONGRESS OF VIENNA
\
entrance of Lord Castlereagh into the council of the
Allies in January 1814 until the final conclusion of
peace in November 1815.
Though an authoritative history of the Congress of
Vienna is still to seek, the plans and motives of the
Continental Powers have been studied by many his-
torians, and it appears probable that almost all the
available evidence of importance has been published.
Less attention has, however, been paid to the policy of
Great Britain, and there is still much unpublished
material in the Foreign Office papers. This material,
as well as some from other archives, has been used in
the preparation of the present work.
*&r
PART I: THE PREPARATION OF THE
CONGRESS
Section 2. Situation of Europe at the end of the
year 1813. Policy of the Continental Powers. — By the
end of 1813_all Europe north of the Alps was in arms
a^a^sTl^apoIeoh ; and^lEiigFTrench troops still held
out~in many of the great fortresses of Central Europe,
the armies of Blucher and Schwji^^
the Rhihe.'rThis coalition was something very di.f - £jJ
ferent Trrmf all previous combinations against
Napoleon. It was a coalition of peoplelTlts well as
C^ernments. J The national movement, which~~hacl
caused the failure of Napoleon in Spain and Russia,
had also arisen in Germany, and the great empire of
Napoleon, which had stretched from the Douro to the
Niemen, had been dissolved in the course of a single
year. After Napoleon's disastrous failure in Russia
in 1812, Prussia, and then Austria, had joined forces
against him; and, as his power declined, all the minor
States of Germany had, more or less willingly, gone
over to the Coalition. \ Sweden, Holland, and Portugal
were also members, while in Italy Murat was about to
conclude an alliance with Austria against his brother-
in-law. Spain had been liberated, and Wellington had
already entered France in the south. Nothing_could
save Napoleon from cc^r£lete_defeat^_JJie Coalition^
against him held together.
J?ut it was doubtful, to say the least, jf the Allies
would remain united. Having driven Napoleon from
Central Europe, they were in no sort of agreement as
to how they would deal with the problems raised by
his defeat. The three principal Continental
Powers had already made it clear that their
interests conflicted as to the divisions of the
[285—69] B 2
4 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
spoil. LTheir political dissensions had been made
more serious by personal friction, while their
/; \ generals ^were no more in agreement than their
'{ ^ statesmen^ They had not yet even decided whether
their ultimate object was to capture Paris and over-
throw Napoleon completely, or merely to compel him
to accept a peace which might still leave him the
master of a France possessing its " natural " boun-
daries of the Pyrenees, the Rhine, and the AJpsZ3
/ l_ The three great Continental Powpts w^rea]] Rnt.n-
cratrc^mongrchies, ajidjtheir policy was in each case
decictecT mainly by one man! Alsxjtnder 1, the Tsar of
Russl^rpeTsTm^^ the affairs of his country.'
After the defeat of Napoleon in Russia, he had en-
gaged his people in the war of liberation much
against their wish; but from the first he set himself
the task, not only of freeing Europe from the domina-
tion of Napoleon, but of leading his armies into
Napoleon's capital. The great successes of 1813, cul-
minating in the overwhelming victory of Leipzig, had
strengthened this resolve; and 'the Tsar had already
begun to be influenced by the religious emotions which
were greatly intensified in the course of this period.
The extraordinary vanity of Alexander, as well as his
persistence, may be partly explained by his belief that
he was the instrument of God. But he was also a man
of great intelligence and imagination, with a
keen eye for the interests of his country. ^ He had
learnt from close intercourse with a number of gifted
individuals much about the new forces of nationality
and democracy which the French Revolution had
liberated, and "of which Napoleon had been in succes-
sion the instrument, the master, and the victim. Alone
of all the statesmen of the Great Alliance, he appre-
|j ciated their strength and possibilities, and to a certain
extent he sincerely believed in them and wished to give
them expression. But he was never prepared to sacri-
fice to them his desire to increase his personal
reputation or what he conceived to be the interests of
his country.
CONTINENTAL POLICY 5
Besides the dethronement of Napoleon, the Tsar had
one main object in view. He was now in possession of \
^"Ke" Duchy of Warsaw, which Napoleon had created
out of the Prussian and most of the Austrian share of
the Polish partitions of the eighteenth century. It
was his fixed resolve to create from this conquest (to
which might possibly be added some parts of the Rus-
sian share of the partitions) a lirjjj&d, flntnrimmnn^ hnt, ^
not independent, kingdom of Polran4^-X]ffiexjvvhich the
Tsar of_Ru^ In this design he was
supportedTby thePolish nobility, whom the defeat of
Napoleon had left to the mercy of their former con-
querors; and the pose of generosity towards them was
as precious to him as the increase of territory which
^the plan would give to his dominions." /His Russian*
subjects were as much opposed to this plan, at any rate
to the political aspect of it, as they had been to the
prosecution of the European war. But his Ministers
now and throughout the period were nearly all of non-
Russian blood. Stein, the German patriot; Czarto-
ryski, the most influential of Polish nobles; Capo
dTstria, a native of Corfu; together with Laharpe, the
Swiss republican, were the; men to whom he turned for
advice on affairs of State*. Anstett, an Alsatian with
Polish possessions, who had long been in the Russian
diplomatic service, was often used for delicate negotia-
tions. Nesselrode, the Foreign Secretary, also of
German blood, was just beginning to be known.
His ideas were very different from those of his
master, but his influence was small. He was a
secretary, and not a Minister. His real importance,
soon came to lie in the fact that he became a medium
through which Metternich and Casfclereagh attempted I
to thwart the wishes of the Tsar, They supplied him
with facts and arguments, with which he endeavoured,
at this period more often than not in vain, to influence
the policy of his master. jt
, Next to Alexander, Metternich hadnSe^n the prin-
cipal figure of the Alliance in 1813. In a sense, he
had controlled its decisions tnore than any other single
6 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
man. The doubtful issue of the first conflicts between
Napoleon and the Eusso-Prussian forces had given him
a. position as mediator of which he had made skilful
use, and he maintained in some sense this role to the
end of the year. As Iha complete defeat of Napoleon
was seen to be more and more probable, Met-
,% ternich had become increasingly alarmed at ^tfte
v-' plans of Alexander, and sought already for somel
combination to" keep him in check v A_ jnmid
i statesman, though fertile in diplomatic expedientsTTie
was an opportunist pure and simple. The^ilesigns of
/Russia, on Poland, as well as those of Prussia on
Saxony, he was determined to frustrate if~he could ;
^ but Tie regarded the first as by far the more dangerous
* of the two. Though he did not yet see his way clear,
his policy was to awake every possible suspicion^
against Alexander, and gradually to build up an alli-
ance against him. For this purpose he was using every
expedient to detach Prussia and other German States
from Russian influence. The dynastic connection
between the Habsburgs and Napoleon provided him
with another weapon which he was prepared to use if-
necessary; while, more than any other Continental
j statesman, he realised the strength of Great Britain,
and the possibility that her influence wrould determine
the character of the settlement. Metternich was in
almost complete control of Austrian policy. Schwarzen-
berg, the nominal generalissimo of the alliance,
for the most part agreed with him at this time; but
an opposition group was forming which looked to
Stadfon, a former Chancellor, but now subordinate to
Metternich, to lead them. The Emperor, Francis II,
however, a colourless, though occasionally obstinate
man, was, on the whole, under his influence, and
Metternich was generally at liberty to act as he thought
fit.
Prussian policy was directed, by the Chancellor, H#r-
denberg; but, partly owing to his physical infirmities,
he never obtained such an ascendanev as that
of Metternich. Humboldt, who acted as his second.
CONTINENTAL POLICY 7
had necessarily to transact much business, and
his influence greatly increased in the course of the
year. The weak and sensitive King of Prussia;
Frederick William III, was devoted to Alexander;
while the Prussian generals, especially Gneisenau, had
views and objects of their own. Hardenberg came
under the influence of Metternich, and later of
Castlereagh; and, if his position was much stronger
than that of Nesselrode, he was used to a certain
extent in the same way. Still, he had a considerable
power of transacting business, and was one of the prin-
cipal figures of the Great Alliance. Like all Prussians, &-")
he expressed always, and without abatement, an un-
dying hatred of France, which no victories or
conquests could assuage.
Of the minors-Powers, Sweden was now ruled by the
French Marshal Bernadotte, who obtained notoriety
by his designs on the French throne', which were sup-
ported by Alexander. Denmark had suffered like
Saxony, though not in the same degree, for her support
of Napoleon. Hanover was represented by Count Mini-
ster, who was the trusted confidant, not only of the
Prince Begent of England, but also of Castlereagh.
But, though a skilled and shrewd observer, he did not
contribute very much to decisions except those affect-
ing the interior politics of Germany. Bavaria, who
changed sides in the nick of time, Baden, and Wiirt-
temberg hoped to gain as much from the destruction of
French power in Germany as they had obtained by
their subservience to Napoleon. Holland was
controlled by British policy. Spain, with her colonies
in open revolt, and impotent outside the Peninsula,
was too proud to admit her weakness, and hoped
to re-establish her influence in Italy. Portugal,
whose Court was in Brazil, depended, like Holland, on
Great Britain. Sardinia-Piedmont had a policy of
its own ; but Sicily was, at this date, controlled by
Great Britain. , The minor States, both of Germany yf
and Italy, were, in fact, pawns at the disposition of
the Great Powers. The Pope had only just recovered
8 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
his personal liberty, and had lost practically all in-
fluence. The Sultan also had been, to a great extent,
outside the orbit of European affairs since the Peace_ of
Buc^rest (1812) with Russia. lAllthe minor States knewj
that the Great Powers cou1cl3o what they liked with,
the Napoleonic Empire iJLonly they remained united.*
l/l'' But, as has already been indicated, the Great Powers
fvere far from being united. Their rivalry and sus-
picion increased as it became clear that the Napoleonic
Empire was completely dissolved. The various treaties
concluded in the course of the year 1813 had been made
purposely vague, except on a few points, and provided
neither a specific object to pursue nor machinery by
which to pursue iC\ Thus by the Treatvjjf Kalisch of
February 28, 1813, concluded after much hesitation on
the part of Frederick William, Russia had guaran-
teed by a secret article to restore Prussia to the
political and financial position she occupied prior to
J 806. The restoration of Polish territory necessary to
join Silesia to Old Prussia was specifically mentioned,
but, apart from this, it was clear that Russia intended
to retain all Prussian Poland. The Treaty of Reichen-
Jiacli, however, concluded between Austria, Russia, and
Prussia during the armistice of Pleswitz, and signed
on June 27, 1813, immediately after Napoleon had
rejected Austria's mediation, had laid down that the
fate of the Duchy of Warsaw should be decided by the
three Powers in concert, without the concurrence of
France. These two treaties were reinforced by the
Tr^aJi£a_oiJ^ej2litz, concluded on September 9, 1813.
by which Russia agreed with Austria and Prussia that
their States should be reconstructed on the scale of
their possessions in 1805, while the Confederation of
the Rhine and all Napoleon's other creations beyond
the Rhine or the Alps were to be dissolved. Hanovep
was to be restored, an amicable arrangement was to
be made as to the Duchy7rf~WaTslLwTynd Austria was
to recover her provinces on the Adriatic. Thus but
little had been definitely settled as to the disposal of
Napoleon's Empire, except that Prussia and Austria
CONTINENTAL POLICY 9
were to be at least as big as in 1805. Other treaties
which were concluded with the minor Powers, such as
the Treaiy__ojLBied, between Bavaria and Austria
(October 8, 1813), by which the latter Power obtained
the promise of Jjxol, had not been accepted by all
the members of the Alliance, since it was impossible to
decide the fate of the conquered territories while the
claims of the Great Powers themselves were still un-
satisfied. Sweden, who had received the promise of
Norway from Russia in 1812 (subsequently confirmed by
Great Britain in a subsidy treaty of 1813), was in a
sense the only Power which had been granted a specific
extension of territory that satisfied its expectations.
Nearly all the rest of the reconstruction of Europe was
still a matter of dispute.
After Leipzig the aims of the Treaties _of Toeplit,z
seemed to have been attained; and Metternich per-
suaded both the Tsar and Lord Aberdeen, — then
the British representative accredited to the Aus-
trian Court — that an answer should be made
to Napoleon's recent offer of negotiations. This was
done on November 7, through the intermediary of St.
Aignan, whom Metternich informed, in the presence
of Nesselrode and Aberdeen, that the French territories
must be reduced to the " natural limits " of the Ehine,
the Alps, and the Pyrenees. An offer based on these
terms was sent to Napoleon on November 9. This offer,
which is known as the " Frankfurt proposals," was L
made with the concurrence of Alexander as well as of
Aberdeen; and the latter had even promised to
restore some of the French colonies, and neglected to
make any effective protest against the British maritime
law being brought into the discussion. Jj How far the
offer was sincerely meant has been ddubted by some
historians:1 but, in view of the grave dissensions
between the Continental Powers, it is probable that
1 Sorel, L'Europe et la Revolution frangaise, VIII, 200; but
see Fournier, Napoleon /, Eng. edn., II, 330. The other British re-
presentatives, including Stewart, were furious with Aberdeen.
Diaries and Letters of Sir George Jackson, II, 360, 368, 376*.
10 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
Napoleon could have had peace on these terms had he
accepted the offer at once; and Great Britain, committed
to a certain extent through Aberdeen's imprudence,
would have been powerless to prevent it, however much
she might have objected. But Napoleon already saw
opposition rising to his power in France, and he could
not accept such terms except at the risk of his throne.
He still hoped to better his position, and therefore re-
turned an evasive answer (November 16) ; and, when a
fortnight later Caulaincourt, his new Foreign
Minister, declared himself ready to accept the terms, it
was then too late. The Allied armies were in march
towards the Rhine, and the opportunity was lost.
Before he could again enter into negotiation Castle-
reagh was at Allied Headquarters. J
Section 3. The Policy of the British Government.
The Character and A ims of Castlereagh. — Throughout
the year the British Government had acted as the pay-
master of the Coalition, and had endeavoured to
combine all Europe towards the common end. But lit
had exercised little influence-QnJJie diplomatic transac-
tiffl^^tween_the_Powers or on their .negotiations with
Napoleon. Its representatives on the C out merit with
tneHG^eaFTowirs were not men of sufficient weight to
obtain a commanding influence, and only imperfectly
understood the problems with which they had to cJgaL
Of these, Viscount Cathcarc and Sir Charles Stewart
(Castlereagh's half-brother), attached to the Russian
and Prussian headquarters respectively, .were soldiers
rather than diplomatists^ The Earl of Aberdeen, sent
out in August as Ambassador to Austria, then a young
man, was not subtle enough to cope with Metternich,
though not so simple as the Austrian diplomatists
thought him. He had certainly not played the part
expected of him at the time of the Frankfurt pro-
posals. Hrhese ambassadors had been specially ;iv
structed to make an offensive and defensive alliance
with the European Powers but thfir perianal
jealosies and the rivalries of the Pow ^rs to which they
BRITISH POLICY 11
were accredited made it impossible for them to do soj
The treaties between the Continental Powers were
drawn up and generally signed before the British re-
presentatives were informed ; while the British treaties
were almost entirely confined to subsidies and the
conduct of the warj Only the reconstruction of
Hanover, a point which affected the Royal Family,
had been promised to Great Britain. Her interests in
Spain, Sicily, and, most important of all, in Belgium,
jhad not been considered; and how far she was from
obtaining security for the last was seen in the Frank-
furt proposals, which would have left Antwerp in
French hands.
Thus at the end of 1813 the Alliance appeared to J^l
be -.dissolving into fragments. It had neither military
nor diplomatic unity. It had neither decided to over-
throw Napoleon nor devised any method either of
obtaining peace or of prosecuting war. The task of 7 t
reconciling the differences of the Allies, of binding
them closer together, of creating machinery by which .
they could act in unison against Napoleon, and of pro-
viding some plan by which Europe could be re--/'
organised so as to obtain a period of stability after a
generation of warfare, was largely the work of Great
Britain, and more especially of her Minister forj
Foreign Affairs, Lord Castlereagh. - Wr~""
The character and achievements of Gastkr-e&gh,
Foreign Minister since 1812, were long misunder-
stood, owing to party prejudice and the lack of
scientific research. More recently justice has been
done to his career by historians, as the Foreign Office
papers have been more closely studied; and, if the
favourable estimate which Lord Salisbury formed in
1861 has not been entirely confirmed, yet it has been
clearly proved that for courage and common sense he
has rarely been equalled among British diplomatists,,
and that h'is influence over £he settlement of 1814-15
was greater than that of any other European states- ^-
man. By working with intense energy, and utilising
to the full his unique opportunities, he acquired a
12
CONGRESS OF VIENNA
great knowledge of Continental affairs, and became
one of the least insular of British Foreign Ministers.
Brought up amidst the passions roused by the conflict
with the French Eevolution and Napoleon, his domi-
nating idea was naturally security against France, to
obtain which he had in his mind various schemes,
partly inherited from Pitt, partly devised by himself
to suit the exigencies of the time. He was now to
endeavour to bring these into operation with a large
measure of success ; and it will be seen that in the nego-
tiations of these years it was on many occasions
Castlereagh who provided the plan of action and even-
tually secured its acceptance by the Allies.
By obtaining at the earliest possible opportunity the
recognition in treaties by the other Powers of the special
interests of Great Britain, he^was left free to act
throughout 1814 and 1815 as mediator in the
disputes between his Allies^ He suffered some
grave defeats, but on the whole the main outlines of
his policy are clearly apparent in the treaties which
governed Europe for over thirty years. This work he
did almost entirely in the council chamber. He was
no orator, though he could marshal facts clearly, and
he never had any hold on the imagination of his con-
temporaries. He knew how to manage the House of
Commons ; but, associated as he was with and approv-
ing, as he did, of a reactionary domestic policy, he was
hated and despised by the growing liberal forces in
England. He failed,' as almost all his contemporaries
failed, to see the strength of the national and demo-
cratic forces which the French Kevolution _had
liberated. He had not^that sympathy with#liberal and
national ideas which Canning acquired and used later
to the great advantage of England and Europe. But
within his limits he was clear-sighted and courageous,
a real statesman in that his policy was founded on
\ principle, a real diplomatist in that he was fertile in
[expedients to put his principles into action.
Throughout his career he found little support in
his Cabinet. The Tory Ministry of Liverpool con-
CASTLEREAGH 13
tained few men of much intelligence; and they knew
little, and cared less, about the affairs of Europe. The
Earl of Liverpool had, indeed, to concern himself
closely with foreign policy, which the English Prime
Minister must always, in a sense, direct and formulate
in the Cabinet. But he was a man of only moderate
parts; and, while nearly always loyal to Castlereagh,
he had little real sympathy with anything which did not
concern a purely British interest. It was only the
Foreign Minister who saw that the interests of Great ^
Britain were bound up with those of Europe. Welling-
ton, owing to his intercourse with Continental states-
men, came to share and support this view ; but the only
other prominent Minister ever associated with Castle-
reagh who had a knowledge of Europe was Canning,
who had no influence on events at this time. The
Prince Regent himself, who had a shrewd knowledge
of men and affairs, was also conversant with European
politics. But he was influenced largely by personal
motives, was not to be depended upon in a crisis, and,
owing to his own unpopularity, was not in a position
to give much, assistance. His vanity, moreover, often
made him interfere in affairs in a most inopportune
manner; and his co-operation was often more embar-
rassing than ^helpful, and in many cases intended to
secure objects which Castlereagh had no wish to obtain.
The British Cabinet had already been informed by
their representatives of the growing disunion amongst
the Allies. The discussions of Frankfurt, with their
references to British maritime rights and surrender of
colonies, and the absence of any guarantee of her
special interests, showed how little England could
expect unless she were better represented in the coun-
cils of the Alliance. Castlereagh was in sympathy
with the growing desire in Great Britain that
Napoleon should be dethroned, and already hoped for a
peace which would coT^ne France within her " ancient
limits. W He was determined, above all, that Antwerp
should not be left in French hands: and this was the
main point that he pressed on Aberdeen in the autumn
14 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
of 1813. 1 But the problems were so difficult and press-
ing that it was decided that Castlereagh himself must
proceed to the Continent. His representatives were
not in agreement amongst themselves, and it was im-
possible to ascertain from them clearly the policy of
the different Courts to which they were accredited.
Some special effort was necessary to weld more closely
together the Alliance, in which the elements of dis-
ruption were already to be clearly discerned, and to
endeavour to make it the instrument of British policy
on the Continent of Europe.' Thus, at the end of
December, Castlereagh set out for the Allied Head-
quarters, taking with him Robinson, the Vice-
President of the Board of Trade, as his assistant. His
instructions, contained in the form of a Cabinet
Memorandum written in his own hand, were dated
December 26, 1813. They contain the policy which
he was, on the whole, to carry out to a successful con-
clusion during the next two years.
Section 4. The Memorandum of December 26, 1813.
on the Negotiations for Peace.— The instructions2, were
written from inadequate information as to the inten-
tions of the Allies. They had to provide for various
contingencies which depended on the military situa-
tion and the persistence of the Powers in pursuing
their ends. They were naturally dictated mainly by
purely British interests, but these were brought into
relation to the general scheme of reconstruction of the
Continent, and it was clearly recognised that the one
depended on the other.8 Before the instructions were
1 Castlereagh to Aberdeen, Nov. 13, 1813, Castlereagh Corre-
spondence, IX, 75 : — " The destruction of that arsenal is essential
to our safety. To leave it in the hands of France is little short of
imposing upon Great Britain the charge of a perpetual war
establishment."
2 F.O. Continent Archives, I. See an article by Mr. S. F.
Ormond in the Nineteenth Century, Mar. 1918.
3 Castlereagh had discussed the whole question with Prince
Lieven, the Eussian Ambassador, and Pozzo di Borgo, who had
been sent over by Alexander specially for the purpose. — Martens,
F., Recueil des Traites conclus par la Bussie, XI, 198.
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 15
drawn up, and before it had even been decided to allow
Castlereagh to go to the Continent, the Ambassadors
of Austria, Prussia, and Russia had been induced to
agree that the question of British maritime rights
should not even be discussed during the negotiations,
Aberdeen's negligence at Frankfurt thus being re- ^
paired. But this fundamental condition of the
peace negotiations was to be again secured from
the Allied Ministers themselves at headquarters
immediately on Castiereagh's arrival. The British
doctrines on this subject, which had been so
often challenged by France, with the sympathy of
many other nations, and for which England was even
then at waHvith the United States, were to be accepted .
in full, both by the Allies and France, as the law of
nations without further question before any negotia-
tions with the enemy could be begun.
When he had fully secured this point, Castlereagh
was
" to establish a clear and definite understanding with the
Allies, not only on all matters of common interest, but upon
such points as are likely to be discussed with the enemy, so
that the several Allied Powers may in their negotiations with
France act in perfect concert, and together maintain one
common interest."
For this " common interest " Great Britain was pre-
pared to cede a large portion of the French and Dutch
and Danish colonies which she held. - If, however, a
peace were made which failed to obtain the cardinal
points of British policy, these conquests were to be
retained as a security against French power. The
objects which were made specific conditions of the
restoration of the British conquests were : — (I) The 4
absolute exclusion of France from any naval establish- \
ment on the Scheldt, and especially at Antwerp. (2)
The establishment of the security of Holland by giving
to that Power a barrier in the Netherlands which should
include Antwerp. (3) The complete freedom of Spain
and Portugal, and the guarantee of their European
territory by the Continental Powers against attack
from France. Under these conditions Great Britain
16 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
was prepared to consider as " objects of negotiation "
all her conquests from France except Malta, the Mauri-
tius and Bourbon Isles, and the Saintes Islands, as also
Guadeloupe, which had already been promised to
Sweden in 1813. This last, however, might possibly be
given to France, and Sweden compensated.
The fate of the whole of the Netherlands, however,
could not yet be definitely settled, since the extent to
which the whole could be wrested from France was yet
uncertain. If Austria wished to resume her old pos-
session she was to be supported, but this was not
expected. The really essential point was Antwerp
and the barrier round it, which was Jbeld to be
as essential to the security of the Continenr as to that
of Great Britain. Only if this point was secured were
the colonial conquests to be surrendered. The instruc-
tions were explicit on this question : —
" As the barrier for Holland is an object most deeply in-
teresting to all the Allies, Great Britain is willirlg to purchase
it by a double sacrifice, by cessions both to France and to
Holland. If the Allies should not carry this point, so impor-
tant to their own security, as well as to that of Great Britain,
the latter Power will, in that case, have no other alternative
than to preserve her colonial conquests as a counterfoil to the
dominion of the enemy, and on these grounds to withhold these
cessions, which she would otherwise be prepared to make to
France. The cession of the conquests by Great Britain bein£
declared to-be contingent upon equivalent securities to result
from the Continental arrangements, and especially on the side
of Holland and the Low Countries, any general stipulation
which does not expressly declare the principle by which it is
to be regulated, and connect it pointedly with these object?,
appears objectionable."
It was also the intention of the British Government
to obtain a dynastic connection with Holland by a
marriage between Princess Charlotte of Wales and the
Prince of Orange. For this Castlereagh was first to
obtain the assent of the Prince himself, and then open
the matter confidentially with the allied sovereigns at
headquarters.
Other matters were indicated as desirable, but not
made conditions sine quibus nqn. Thus the restoration
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 17
*
of the ancient States of Italy was recommended as
''highly expedient," especially that of the King of
Sardinia, who, it was suggested, should receive Genoa.
British mediation was offered to help to settle internal
German affairs. She was also to declare herself ready
to sign a peace with the United States " without in-
"volving in such treaty any decision upon the points
" in dispute at the commencement of hostilities." Sub-
sidies were to be granted to the Continental Powers;
but here again opportunity was to be taken to insist
on " the signing of such engagements, especially as to
" Holland and the Peninsula, as may justify so great
'c an exertion on the part of Great Britain." ,
Lastly, a point of great importance, the alliance
against France was to continue after peace had been
made. The construction of a defensive and offensive
alliance had been vainly pressed on the Powers in the
autumn of 1813. It was now intended to make an
alliance whose objects 'should not be limited to the
present emergency.
" The Treaty of Alliance," ran the instructions, " is not to
terminate with the war, but to contain defensive engagements,
with mutual obligations to support the Powers attacked by
France, with a certain extent of stipulated succours. The
casus foederis is to be an attack by France on the European
dominions of any one of the contracting parties."
.Both Spain and Holland were to be included in the
Alliance, as well as the Great Powers, but it was the
latter whom it was especially meant to bind. This
project was the origin of the Quadruple Alliance^
/ created at Chaumont by Castlereagh as a special safe-
guard against French aggression in the future. It will
be noticed that it was limited to this special object,
and differed widely from other schemes of alliance
brought forward by Alexander at a later stage. Castle-
reagh had his own ideas as to a wider application of
the ideas of " alliance " and " guarantee," but these %
were always subordinated to the special alliance against
France, which must first be secured at all costs.
He had also other objects which were not so suscep-
tible, of being made into definite instructions. There
[285— 69]* C
18 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
is no hint in this Memorandum of the dethronement of
Napoleon. Yet most of the Cabinet, supported by
public opinion in England, were desirous of attaining
this object. Castlereagh himself appreciated, how-
ever, the dangers of such an attempt, and as yet he was
prepared to make peace with Napoleon if he could
obtain a satisfactory one, though he was ready to work
for the restoration of the Bourbons if an opportunity
\/ presented itself. Secondly, it was his desire, and that of
his Cabinet, if possible, to confine France strictly to
her " ancient limits," those of pre-Revolutionary
France. But here again he could not, as yet,
press for too much. Part of Belgium and the
left bank of the Ehine, als"well as Savoy, might have to
be surrendered. The extension of Holland was to
depend on the wishes of the Great Powers. The desire
that France should give up all her conquests is, how-
ever, clearly indicated in a " Memorandum on the
^M^ntjjO[ie^Pe^£^,> which is contained in the same
fc'voTmneas the instructions. In this it is clearly stated
that the restoration of the French colonies should
depend, if possible, upon the reduction of France to
her " ancient limits " as well as on an amicable arrange-
ment among the Allies as to their own possessions, j
This last point was one of special importance.
Castlereagh knew that the peace of Europe de-
pended as much on an amicable arrangement
among the Allies touching their own possessions
as on the treaty to j be made with France. He
was well aware of the dissensions between Austria_and
Russia on the subjects^of^PP^fl p^d-S&sony, and he
"w^^sufeequentiy forced to devote himself as much to
the solution of these difficulties as to the treaty of peace
with the enemy. It was his opinion that ajj£ting_p£ace
_J*Ccould only be obtained if «■ real balance of power were
. ' es&ribfehexLin. Europe; and he was afraid that the
plans of Alexander might make this impossible. These
were objects, however, on which he did not find it
possible at the moment of the final conflict with
France to lay down express conditions. He reserved
FIRST CONFERENCES 19
them to be dealt with as circumstances might dictate.
His first task was to attain the objects of special
interest to Great Britain, but at the same time he knew
that it would be necessary for him to act as mediator
between the Allies on the points of dispute between
ithem. -* |u — ^ * c^a^w - v>*«-vjl » S H^ -
Section 5. First Conferences at Bale and Langres.
—The relations between Alexander and Metternich/
had been still more embittered by a dispute as to the
passage of the Allied troops through Switzerland. The
Tsar was now also actively supporting Bernadotte's pre-
tensions to the throne of France ; and no plan had been
made either for carrying on military operations
against Napoleon or for discussing with him a treaty
of peace. Castlereagh's arrival was awaited with the
keenest anxiety by the rival Powers, for they knew that
on his decisions their future conduct would depend.1
Having at the Hague settled to his satisfaction with
the Prince of Orange the delicate matters of the marri-
age, the^Dutch barrier, and the colonies, Castlereagh
proceeded to Bale,where he arrived on January 18, 1814.
Alexander had been obliged to leave, but Castlereagh
found a note awaiting him entreating him not to make
up his mind until he had met the Emperor. Castle-
reagh had, however, immediately interviews with
Metternich, Stadion, and Hardenberg. The Austrian
Ministers were loud in their complaints of Alexander's
intrigues with Bernadotte, and Metternich declared
point-blank that the Austrian army would refuse to
march unless the Tsar's project was abandoned; while
the Prussians were on his side in this matter. Metter-
nich further declared that, while Austria was prepared
to renounce all the advantages of her dynastic connec-
tion with NapoleOn in favour of the Bourbons, if cir-
cumstances permitted, neither her pride nor her
interests could allow a French general to be placed with
1 Cathcart to Castlereagh, Jan. 8, 1814, Correspondence, IX,
249; Metternich to Schwarzenberg, Jan. 16, 1814; Klinkowstrom,
Oesterreichs Theilnahme an den Befrciungskriegcn, p. 797.
[285—69] • • » C 2
20 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
the help of Alexander on the throne of France. With I
this point of view Castlereagh was in full agreement;!
but he subsequently won Metternich's consent to the!
proposition that there really existed no middle course
between Bonaparte and the Bourbons, thus using the,
Austrian objection to Bernadotte to bring about the
abandonment of the idea of a regency under Marie-
Louise.1
Castlereagh then proceeded to consider with Metter-J
nich and Hardenberg the method of negotiation with
France. After a delay of nearly a month, Caulain-
court, the French Foreign Minister, had been invited j
to Chatillon, where a conference with the enemy was
to take place ; and the Allies were already pledged to a j
discussion of peace terms. The Ministers in this dis-
cussion at Bale had therefore immediately to consider
how far France was to be allowed to influence, or even
to be informed of, the disposition of the conquered
territory. At previous discussions at Prague and at
Frankfurt Napoleon had clearly shown that it was his
intention to claim a voice in the shaping of Central
Europe, and he hoped to use the rivalries of the Allies
for his own purposes, and thus to produce a peace much
more favourable to France. At Prague such a demand
could not well be refused, but after Leipzig the Allies
were resolved to keep these matters in their own hands.)
Castlereagh now found that it was determined to.
" exclude France practically, but in the least offensive wajl
from any interference in the arrangements beyond her own
limits,' '
and that the Tsar was especially insistent on this
point, and even wished that Napoleon should be
refused all information on the subject. To Castle-
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Jan. 22, 1814, F.O. Continent
Archives, 2.
In a private letter to Liverpool of the same date, Gastlereagn
pointed out that, while Great Britain could not take up the cause
of the Bourbons without prejudicing her position in other matters,
yet it might be possible for the Bourbon Princes to make efforts on
their own behalf in order to make their cause more prominent.—
Correspondence, IX, 186.
BALE CONFERENCE 21
reagh, however, this proposal appeared to be too great
m insult to French pride. He therefore hoped that
" the relative shape of Europe, at least in outline, as proposed
by the Allies, might be presented to the enemy at the same
time as the proposition as to his own limits was tendered to him."
\Tapoleon might then fairly be called upon to
xive an answer within a specified time. This, of
bourse, meant that the Allies must at once settle their
)Wn differences, and Castlereagh hoped to achieve
:his end at once, so that a complete scheme
might be presented to France. That this view was far
too optimistic was soon to become apparent, but as yet
none of the Powers realised that the problems before
them were so complex that they would take eighteen
months to solve.1
With regard to the boundaries of France, Castle-
reagh made considerable progress in the direction of
reducing the terms to be offered to the " ancient limits."
He induced Metternich to agree that both Luxemburg )
and Mainz must be taken from France, and the erec-
tion of a barrier in the Netherlands was also agreed
to, though its exact extent could not yet be determined. \
| Austria had decided to abandon the Netherlands and
I to refuse any compensation on the left bank of the
Ehine.2 Castlereagh, who wanted effective support^
I for Holland by a Great Power, therefore began to look
■to Prussia to act as the guardian of the western
frontier of Germany.3 The chief importance of this j
Castlereagh to Liverpool, Jan. 22, 1814; Wellington, Sup-1
Iplcmentary Despatches, VIII, 537. ,.','*, -, i -.
2 Metternich had already refused Alsace, which Alexander had
proposed that Austria should take in exchange for Galicia.— Four-
nier, Napoleon I, Eng. edn., II, 340.
* Castlereagh to Liverpool, Jan. 22, 1814, W.S.D., VIII, 537
" I was induced to throw out the idea of thus bringing forward
Prussia, as I recollected it was a favourite scheme of Pitt. . . .
I doubt much the policy of making Holland a Power of the first
order, to which she would approach if she possessed the whole of
these' territories." Hanoverian interests were not without in-
fluence in this decision. Miinster was much afraid lest Holland
should become a dangerous rival to Hanover. Miinster to the
Prince Eegent, Feb. 19, 1814. Hanover Archives.
22 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
first meeting lies, however, in the harmonious relations
V/ Established between CastiereagjhanTTvletterninh. The
latter was completely won ov^r/trlough heTmcTbut just
declared that the objects of the Coalition were already
achieved, and had refused to allow the Austrian armies
to march. His despatches to his trusted sub-
ordinate, Hudelist, were full of praise of
Castlereagh;1 and, feeling now less afraid of
Alexander, he was ready to continue the war
against Napoleon. He also flattered himself that
Castlereagh had fallen under his influence. In this,
however, he was mistaken. Castlereagh's view, ex-
pressed to Liverpool a month later, showed that, while
he wished to co-operate with Metternich, whom he
regarded as the most practical of the European states-
men, he was not blind to his demerits.2
The two Ministers, having thus established a pre-
liminary agreement, proceeded from Bale to head-
quarters at Langres, where the whole matter had to be
thrashed out with Alexander. It was Castlereagh
who immediately took the lead in the discussions. His
first task was to attack Alexander on the question of
the candidature of Bernadotte. Alexander, while he
asserted that he would take no steps in favour of
Bernadotte, revealed an intense hostility to the re-
storation of the Bourbons, and expressed his intention
of leaving the French to choose whom they liked. The"
Tsar was also at first determined to press on to Paris
at all costs; while the Austrians, diplomatists and sol-
diers alike, held the view that, as complete victory was
not certain, it was better to get a good peace while they
could. It was Castlereagh's object to harmonise these
points of view by insisting both on the forward march
1 Metternich to Hudelist, Jan. 17, 20, 21, 1814. Fournier.
Congress von Chdtillon, pp. 250 ff.
2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Feb. 26, 1814. F.O. Continent
Archives 2. " He is constitutionally temporising; he is charged
with more faults than belong to him, but he has his full share,
mixed up, however, with considerable means for carrying forward
the machine, more than any other person I have met with at
headquarters." See an article on their relations in Transactions
Royal Hist. Soc, 3rd series, vol. VI.
LANGRES CONFERENCE 23
of the operations and the opening of peace discussions.
If Napoleon refused terms which would now be con-
siderably more stringent than those offered at Frank-
furt, then he felt sure of persuading Metternich to go as
far as was necessary. ' Meanwhile, Alexander must
consent to negotiate.
On January 29 the Ministers of the four Powers met
to endorse these decisions by a written agreement, which
is known as the Langres Protocol. It was agreed that
there should be no suspension of operations, and that
Sehwarzenberg should have a free hand to direct them
as he liked. With regard to the offer to be made to
France, Castlereagh insisted that the progress of the
Allied armies and the defection of Murat entitled
them to demand a peace which substantially reduced
France to her "ancient limits."1 He carried his point
after much discussion, and was able to report that " we
" may now be considered as practically delivered from
" the embarrassments of the Frankfurt negotiations."
He also insisted that France must be informed, so far
as possible, of the method by which the Powers in-
tended to dispose of their conquests, though she was
to have no right to interfere in their disposal. His
insistence that all question of maritime rights must be
entirely excluded from discussion, and France so
informed at the outset, was at once accepted. * Finally,
he made it clear that, while he was ready to make peace
with Napoleon, this disposition depended on the latter
retaining the support of his subjects, and that the
restoration of the Bourbons was regarded by him as the
inevitable consequence of Napoleon's fall, This frank
conference, which was resumed on three succeeding
days, produced an immediate diminution of the tension
between the Allies "owing to the natural vent which
" this species of Cabinet has afforded to the diverging
1 Protocol of Jan. 29, 1814. The " ancient limits " were to be
offered, but modifications of them were to be discussed. Oncken,
Lord Castlereagh und die Minister conjerenz zu Langres, His-
torisches Taschenbuch, VI, 3, p. 34; Sbornik of the Russian
Imperial Historical Society, XXXI, 360.
24 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
" sentiments of the respective Governments."1 Their
decisions were embodied in the instructions drawn up
for the representatives they intended to send to
Chatillon to meet Caulaincourt, in which the " ancient
limits," with possible modifications, were laid down as
the basis of negotiation.2 Less satisfactory was the
explanation to be given to Caulaincourt as to the
future arrangement of Europe, which was in the
vaguest terms. [The restoration of Holland, " with an
increase of territory and a suitable frontier," was,
however, specially mentioned; and this had been the
main point in Castlereagh's instructions. All discus-
sion of the maritime code was also, of course, to be
excluded from the peace negotiations. Castlereagh
had thus made great progress in obtaining what he had
set out to win. He had also succeeded in obtaining
some sort of harmony in the Alliance by at once taking
the lead in all diplomatic and even, military questions,
and forcing, so far as possible, a decision on his Allies.'
Section 6. The Chatillon Conference. — At th£
Chatillon Conference, which extended from February 4
to March 19, Napoleon was represented by the sincere
and devoted Caulaincourt, whose eager desire for *
peace stands out in marked contrast to the cynical
attitude of the Allied plenipotentiaries. But his
master never yielded entirely to the entreaties of his
Minister ; and thus the exact course of the negotiations
need not be entered into, since for the most part the '
conferences were without real substance. This Con-
ference, however, provides an interesting precedent for
a Peace Conference sitting while hostilities are still
proceeding. The disposition of one side or the other
to compromise depended to a great extent on the posi-
tion in the field. The two sides were, however, so far
from agreement at the outset that no peace could have
possibly resulted. Napoleon, the heir of the Bevolu-
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Feb. 1, 1814, F.O. Continent 2.
2 Fournier, Congress von Chatillon, p. 306.
8 Oncken, Historisches Taschenbuch, VI, 4, p. 36.
\
CHlTILLON CONFERENCE 25
tion, could not sign a peace which brought back France
to the boundaries of the ancien regime. His victories
in the middle of February made him obdurate; and
even in March, when these successes had been shown to
be only ephemeral, he could not bring himself to sign
a peace which would leave France smaller than he
found it. For Castiereagh the Conference was mainly
important in the effect which it was likely to produce
on France and on Europe. He wished the onus of the
continuance of the war to be thrown on Napoleon and
not on the Allies. That he attached considerable im-
portance to the method by which the negotiations were
conducted is shown by the fact that he alone of the
principal Ministers attended any portion of the con-
ferences, though he left the actual conduct of the
negotiations to his subordinates. The delegates nomi-
nated by the other Powers were all men of second rank.
.It was soon apparent that some central con-
trol was needed. The Russian plenipotentiary,
Razumoffski, had received orders from the Tsar to
delay peace as long as possible,1 this being Alexander's
method of escaping from the obligations of the Langres
Protocol; and the other plenipotentiaries were, for one
reason or another, not likely to keep him in check.2 As
a result of Blucher's success at La Rothiere on Feb-
ruary 1, Alexander, without consulting his allies, sent
a peremptory order for the negotiations to be sus-
pended. Castiereagh, at the urgent request of
Metternich, hurried back to re-establish the concert,
and on his return had again to leave when the suc-
cesses of Napoleon had produced a new crisis. In
these circumstances, the negotiations were largely a
duel of words. Caulaincourt demanded in vain to
know the plans which the Allies had made for Ger-
1 Sbornik of the Russian Imperial Historical Society, XXXI.
370.
2 Stadion, the Austrian, was opposed to Metternich 's plans,
Humboldt, the Prussian, simply wanted revenge on France, and
none of the English plenipotentiaries were men of diplomatic
ability. ; ,j
26 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
many and Italy. This was just what the Allies could
not tell him, since they had not agreed amongst them-
selves. They were only decided that such matters
were no concern of France, and reiterated the question.
Would France accept or not the return to the " ancient
limits," or something like them ? These terms Caulain-
court could not get his master to accept; and, as soon
as the Treaty of Chaumont, which was signed on
March 9, had terminated the internal difficulties of the
Alliance, the negotiations were ordered to be broken off.
" I wish it had been possible," reported Gastlereagh, " with
less sacrifice in point of time to have ascertained, in a manner
that would satisfy the world of the fact, the impracticability of
concluding peace with the existing ruler of France ; but it has,
at length, been accomplished in a manner which I am per-
suaded can leave no reasonable doubt in the view even of the
French nation."1
■" Section 7. The Maintenance of the Alliance. —
;Castlereagh's principal task was to keep the Alliance
together while the issue was still in doubt, and to con-
V Jstruct a treaty which should provide for the security
of Europe after the war. There were two occasions,
at least, when it seemed that he had failed, in spite
of the promising opening of his negotiations at
Langres. The first was on the suspension of the nego-
tiations at Chatillon on February 8. Alexander
thought he could march straight to Paris, dethrone
Bonaparte, and set up any claimant whom he regarded
as likely to win the support of the French. Gastle-
reagh hurried to headquarters, and had two long and
very stormy interviews with the Tsar, in which he
stressed the dangers of making the fall of Napoleon
the direct object of the war.2 He pointed out that it
'was one thing to take Paris as a natural result of
military operations; it was another to go there to set
up a new government the character of which was not
yet determined. In Castlerea^h's view, such a new
government could only be the Bourbons, but he urged
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Mar. 22, 18U, F.O. Continent 3.
2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Feb. 16/31, 1814, F.O. Continent 3.
MAINTENANCE OF ALLIANCE 27
that there was. as yet, no sign that the French wanted
them back, in spite of the fact that Allied armies were
on French soil. He asked the Tsar : —
how long he would undertake to keep his army in France to
fight the battles of a Bourbon against Bonaparte, and whether
his Allies would engage for theirs,"
and what would be the attitude of the French people
towards a sovereign whom the Allies, rejecting a peace
on their own terms, had forced on them at the point
of the bayonet. He told the Emperor that the Minis-
terial Council had considered the matter that morning,
and that they felt that Alexander's idea was
full of hazard, at direct variance with the principle upon
which the confederacy had been cemented amongst the Allies
and supported by Europe, and that they feared it might lead
to failure, disgrace, and disunion. "«.
Alexander could make no reply to this attack; but
he attempted to refute Castlereagh by denying that he
really represented the opinions of his Government or
his people. The Tory press was, as he knew, loud
against Bonaparte and in favour of the Bourbons.
But, further than this, the Prince Regent and the
Prime Minister had been indiscreet in their conversa-
tions with Lieven, the Russian Ambassador. Alex-
ander now endeavoured to use the wishes of the Prince
Regent, as reported by Lieven, as a means of weaken-
ing Castlereagh's opposition.1 It was not the last
occasion on which this game was played, but it made no
impiession, either now or later, on the Foreign
Minister. He claimed full powers to act as he wished,
denied Alexander's right to question it, and sent
Robinson home post-haste to bring back definite in-
structions that he had full support, and to stop all such
intrigues in the future. He told his Cabinet plainly
that he would never support a war prolonged merely to
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Feb. 18, 1814, enclosing Lieven to
Nesselrode, Jan. 26, 1814, Correspondence, IX, 266. See also
Princess Lieven's account in her diary in the Grand Duke
Nicholas Michaelovitch's Correspondance de VEmpereur Alexandre
avec sa Soeur la Grande-Duchesse Catharine , p. 226.
28 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
dethrone Bonaparte if other objects were secured,
however much he would welcome his fall if it were
brought about by the natural sequence of events.
Liverpool, of course, gave him full support,
and though there was some difficulty with the
Prince Regent and some members of the Cabi-
net, instructions such as Castlereagh had requested
were sent to him to strengthen his position.1
The result was that he secured a continuance of the
negotiations with Napoleon which the Allies had, as
yet, no excuse for breaking off. New instructions were
sent from Allied Headquarters to Chatillon which went
still further in the direction of the " ancient limits,"
with corresponding cessions of colonies, while France
was to be expressly excluded from intervening in the
disposition of the conquered territories*2
" What will be the fate of the whole, I cannot guess," wrote
Castlereagh, " but we have acted consistently and honourably;
and if we are still exposed to Bonaparte, with a defensive alli-
ance (upon which I have made useful progress) and such a
peace we need not trouble for the future."
V The second occasion on which Castlereagh had to
intervene to save the Coalition from dissolution was
almost immediately after this decision. Napoleon's
victories of February 8-10 over Bliicher had had the
effect of making Alexander more reasonable. Those
of February 17, 18, and 21 against Schwarzenberg,
which forced the main Allied army to retreat, turned
1 Bathurst to Castlereagh, Feb. 27, 1814, F.O. Continent
Archives 2. Liverpool spoke very strongly to Lieven on the use
that had been made of the Ambassador's letter. According to the
Kussian Ambassador, Bathurst, Harrowby, and Eldon were
strongly against a peace with Napoleon. Lieven to Nesselrode,
Mar. 1, 1814, Petrograd Archives. The Prussian Ambassador re-
ported that it was only with the greatest difficulty that the Prince
Regent's predilections for the Bourbons were overcome, and that
the Cabinet was very divided. Jacobi to Hardenberg, Feb. 3 8,
1814, Berlin Archives. Liverpool and Sidmouth, however, threat-
ened to resign if the Prince Kegent persisted. Wessenberg to
Metternich, Feb. 15, 1814, Vienna Archives.
3D'Angeberg, he Congres de Vienne, p. 111.
MAINTENANCE OF ALLIANCE 29
his self-confidence into something like panic. On the
18th Schwarzenberg, with the assent of Alexander and
the King of Prussia, thought it well to ask for an armis-
tice rather than risk a decisive battle. Castlereagh
learnt of the fact at Chatillon, whither he had returned
to set the negotiations in train on the basis of the new
instructions, by a letter from Metternich to Stadion
which hinted that peace must be made.1 Lie made im-
mediately an indignant protest in a letter to Metter-
nich.2 He then hurried to headquarters, where he found
an alarming situation. The recriminations between
Austria and Russia were at their height, and Castle-
reagh confessed that his patience was almost worn out
in dealing with them both. Austria, in the depths of
despair, was eager for peace ; and Alexander, who con-
sidered that he had been betrayed by the Austrians,
was now also ready to give way.3 Each Power, indeed,
1 Metternich to Stadion, Feb. 18, 1814. Metternich had,
however, not been consulted before the offer was made. Fournier,
Congress von Chatillon, p. 324.
2 Castlereagh to Metternich, Feb. 18, 1814, F.O. Continent
Archives 2 : "I cannot express to you how much I regret the
proposition of armistice. . . . An offer so inconsistent with the
proceedings here, and of so little dignity in itself, cannot fail to
invite the enemy to assume a tone of authority, fl feel it more
than ever necessary to conjure you and your colleagues at head-
quarters not to surfer yourselves to descend from the substance
of your peace.t^You owe it, such as you have announced it to
the enemy, to yourselves and to Europe, and you will now more
than ever make a fatal sacrifice, both of moral and political
impression, if, under the pressure of these slight reverses, which
are incident to war, and some embarrassments in your Council
which I should hope are at an end, the great edifice of peace was
suffered to be disfigured in its proportions. ... If we act with
military and political prudence, how can France resist a just
peace demanded by 600,000 warriors ? Let her if she dare ; and
the day you can declare that fact to the French nation, rest
assured Bonaparte is subdued." See also Oncken, Die Krisis der
letzten Friedensverhand'hmg mit Napoleon I , Historisches Taschen-
buch, VI, 5, 48.
3 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Feb. 26, 1814, F.O. Continent 3:
" The Emperor was the first to descend from the project of Paris
to that of armistice, and I received last night a message from His
Imperial Majesty by Count Nesselrode, probably, embroidered by
30 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
suspected that the other was trying to keep its army
intact in order to influence future decisions as to the
division of the spoils.1 Castlereagh only succeeded in
reuniting the Alliance by a great effort. He told the
Allies that Great Britain would never restore her con-/
quests unless she got a peace on the Continent such as
she desired.
" Nothing keeps either Power firm but the consciousness
that without Great Britain the peace cannot be made. They
have all been lowering their tone to me, but I have explicitly
told them that if the Continent can and will make a peace
with Bonaparte upon a principle of authority, for such a peace
Great Britain will make the greatest sacrifices. But if they
neither will nor can, we must, for their sake as well as our
own, rest in position against France. . . Whatever may' be
the issue,. I have thought our line, to do any good, must be a
decided one, and I have represented to them all the hopeless-
ness of their future security against France re-established if
they shrink now from the contest when they are reunited."
At the same time, he took energetic measures to
strengthen the military position. At his suggestion
troops were detached from Bernadotte's force and
given to Bliicher, " who is too daring to be trusted with
a small army, but a host at the head of 100,000 men,''
and an attack on Antwerp by the Swedes was ordered.
He also proposed that a Military Commission should
be formed to investigate the exact numbers of the
Allied forces and prepare a plan of campaign.2 In short.
1 Minister to the Prince Begent, Feb. 25, 1814: " Je ne doute
pas que les Autrichiens songent a tenir leur armee intacte, afin de
conserver leur influence sur les affaires de Pologne : de l'autre
cote, on accuse les Eusses de menager leur belle cavalerie." Four-
nier, op. cit., p. 303.
2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Mar. 4, 1814, F.O. Continent 3.
the bearer, to urge the expedience of an early peace. S But I do
not altogether despair of his perseverance, and if I can get him
to speak out to Austria and allay all her alarms, real or pretended,
T am confident she could not leave us upon the main question.
The Emperor of Russia, not quite satisfied with himself,
is loud against the Austrians for not giving battle, and told me
that Schwarzenberg had secret orders from his Court not to fight
a general action jn the then state of the negotiations."
TREATY OF CHAUMONT 31
by pointing out to the Allies the real strength of their
position, by allaying their mutual suspicions, and
especially by showing them that he held the key to
peace in the colonial conquests, which he^ would only
use if he was satisfied with the Continental position,
he succeeded in reconstructing- tne Alliance and
bringing it once more to energetic action.
Section 8. The Treaty of Chaumont. The Construc-
tion of the Quadruple Alliance. — A treaty had, how-
ever, yet to be made; and these two incidents had shown
how necessary it was. Castlefeagh had already sub-
mitted his proposals for a defensive alliance to the
Ministers of the Great Powers, and secured their
general approval.1 Now he wanted to complete this
treaty, which should give complete security against j
France in the future, and at the same time obtain the
objects which Great Britain had most at heart. He
had already made his subsidy proposals conditional on
the separation of the Netherlands from France. For
on Antwerp he knew that Napoleon would insist to the
very last ; and it was therefore all the more important
to bind his Allies to go on until this object were
attained.2 At last, on March 9, the Treaty of Chau-
j mont was signed. The four Powers bound themselves X
■to continue the war until their objects were attained. iL
These objects were, as denned in secret articles, a con-
t derated Germany, an independent_-&wjtzerland, an
aly comprised of separate independent States, a free
3ain Tftider the Bourbon Hou^seT^rld""^11 enlarged
oiland, of which the Prince of Orange was "tobe
Sovereign. All the other articles except this last were
^matters, of course, on which there was no dispute.
The aggrandisement of Holland was the main instruc-
tion given to Castlereagh, and he here obtained it by
treaty from the Allies. For this he had Mdeed to pay
heavily. In money and men combined England's con-
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Feb. 18, 1814, F.O. Continent 3.
2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Mar. 4, 1814, F.O. Continent 3.
r-\\\ \ uwj
32 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
tribution was to be twice as large as that of each
Continental Power.
But Castlereagh also secured the other point of his
instructions, on which, perhaps, he laid more stress than
on anything else. The Alliance was to continue for
twenty years after war had ceased, and the Powers were
to protect one another against any attempt by France
to upset the arrangements made in the forthcoming
peace. This was the origin of the Quadruple Alliance
which was to dominate European politics for thirty
years and far outlast its purpose. It was made uudei
the strain of the o?er whelming military superiority
which France had obtained under the Napoleonic
regime, and the helplessness of all the rest of Conti-
nental Europe against her, except in combination.
The object, therefore, as laid down in Article XVI of
the treaty, was to secure " the balance of power " ; and,
though there were to be many changes. in the attitude
of the various Powers during the next eighteen months,
this idea persisted to the end of the European settle-.,
ment, and on the whole may have been said to have
been achieved. The treaty was intended, as Castle-
reagh told his Government, to be regarded
" not only as a systematic pledge of persevering concert
amongst the leading Powers, but a refuge under which all the
' minor States, especially those on the Ehine, may look forward
to find their security upon the return of peace ^relieved of
the necessity of seeking a compromise with France."1
It was, in fact, to be a League of Nations against
France, to which all Powers, great and small, could
look for protection. This device, invented by Castle-
reagh himself, and forced by him on the Allies, is
perhaps his greatest achievement and title to fame.
How hard it was to construct it has been shown in the
preceding pages.
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Mar. 10, 1814, F.O. Continent 8.
Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Holland were to be invited to
accede.
CONQUERED TERRITORIES 33
Section 9. The Problem of the Conquered Terri-
tories.— But, though he had secured the Alliance, the
barrier in the Netherlands, and practically the left bank
of the Rhine — though, that is, the boundaries of France
had been largely determined — little progress had yet
been made in settling the claims of the three Conti-
nentaJ_J^owers, which had been at the bottom of all
their recriminations and disputes. Ceaseless negotia-
tions had taken place amongst the Ministers of the
Powers on this point, and a plan was already being
drawn up ; but nothing definite had yet matured. The
exact course of events is not easy to trace, since there
are few, official transactions, and each Minister was
moving with extreme caution, uncertain alike of the
course he ought to pursue and what were the real
intentions of his Allies. The only point on which the.
Great Powers were really in agreement was that they
were to settle these matters among themselves, and that
neither France nor the smaller European States were
to do more than acquiesce in their decisions. It had
already been arranged at Langres) that a Congress(
should be held at Vienna, which the three Sovereigns
promised to attend in person; and a formal invitation
was procured from the town of Vienna for that pur-
pose.1 But this Congress was meant merely to ratify
decisions previously made by the Great Powers, and
these decisions it was intended to make at the earliest
opportunity. They were, at any rate, to be incor-
porated in the peace treaty with France, so that her
signature might be obtained before the meeting of the
Congress.
Castlereagh was exceedingly anxious to settle
these questions, which he could perceive were
1 Miinster to the Prince Begent, Feb. 2, 1814, Hanover
Archives. As to why Vienna was chosen for the meeting-place of
the Congress see the paper on International Congresses. Details
as to the discussions on this point are lacking. Not only, how-
ever, was Vienna in a convenierU central position, but the attitude
of mediator which Metternich had assumed in 1813 had caused
the Austrian capital to be considered as the natural locality for
such an assembly.
[285—69] ™
Ty ift^V^. \&u-+ Qsj/* '
34 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
exercising a profound and dangerous influence on the
progress of the war, and he was at no loss to decide
where British interests lay. The_ Jqundation of all
the subsequent negotiations lies in a verbal agreement
between Metternich and Hardenberg, made early, in
January, that Austria would agree to Prussia's claims
on Saxony if Prussia would unite with Austria to
defeat Alexander's plans for the creation of a Polish
kingdom.1 Castlereagh, who had inherited from Pitt
an extreme distrust of Russia, from the first made this
agreement the foundation of his diplomacy. It suited
his policy in two particulars. He was anxious to make
Prussia a strong and united State, so that she might
play her part in re-establishing the territorial
equilibrium which it was his main object to produce,
and he wished to keep Russia as far as possible from
Central Europe.
Alexander, however, regarded the creation of a King-
| dom of Poland as already settled. In January, indeed,
he promised Cathcart that he would not press his claims
on Prussian Poland, but this promise was not seriously
meant.2 To Austria he first proposed that she should
take Alsace from France, and cede him the whole of
Galicia.3 In February, it is true, he was prepared to
accept only Western Galicia, over which he declared
Austria had no claim ; but beyond this he would not go.
Czartoryski was received at headquarters, and there
were rumours that he would replace Nesselrode.
\Castlereagh threw his whole weight on the other side.
He told the Austrians that he was in entire agreement
with them on th^fcbjeet of Poland.1 and at the begin-
1 Harde^B^s Tagebuch .'jan^^KK^. Fournier, Congress
von Chdtillon, p. 361. See also Cathcart to Castlereagh, Jan. 16,
1814, Correspondence, IX, 171.
2 Cathcart to Castlereagh, as above.
3 Minister to the Prince Kegent Feb. 23, 25, 1814. Fournier,
Congress von Chdtillon, pp. 302^03.
4 Stadion to Metternich, Feb. 9, 1814. Fournier, Zur Tor-
geschichte de§ Wiener Kongresses : Hist. Studien und Shizzen, II,
297.
CONQUERED TERRITORIES 35
ning of March he had an interview with Czartoryski
and Radziwill.1
" I hope I have succeeded," he wrote, " in discrediting
their views, considering them in truth a diversion in favour of
France; the former, who is a person both of principle and
merit, promised to absent himself from the headquarters if
his presence was considered as calculated to create disunion,
which I ventured with every possible sentiment of regard to
assure him was the fact."
No impression was, however, made on the Tsar, who
remained in constant communication with Czartoryski,
and no progress could be made towards an agreement.
Other points were under constant discussion among
the Allied Ministers. As has been seen, the aggran-
disement of Holland and the independence of Switzer-
land and Spain had been put into treaty form. As to
Germany, all that had been decided was that it should
be composed of independent States united in a " lien
federatif."2 This federal Constitution had, however,
been already much discussed, and the bases of it laid
at Langres in January ;s and a draft scheme was drawn
up on March 10 by Stein, with the assistance of Hum-
boldt. In this matter Castlereagh himself took little
part, either now or later, Miinster being used to repre-
sent the British Government as well as Hanover. More
important from the present point of view was, how-
ever, the territorial distribution. But though the
outlines of a scheme gradually appeared, everything
depended on the Saxon question, and, as the settlement
of this depended on the Polish one, no decisions could
be made, x As to Italy, it had been generally agreed
that Austria should be compensated there, but, though
the treaty with Murat had, temporarily at least, settled
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Mar. 3, 1814, F.O. Continent 3.
2 Miinster, p. 160.
3 In Oct. 1813 England ha^ urged Austria to assume once
more the Imperial Crown, but Metternich had refused. Oncken,
Aus den Ictzten Monalen des Jahres 1813. Historisr.hes Taschen-
buck, VI, 2, p. 66.
[285— •»] D 2
36 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
the south, the disposition of the States of the north j
could not yet be decided.1 Here again, then, Anly a •
vague principle had been recognised. v
Section 10. The Allies and the Restoration of the
Bourbons. — The question whether Napoleon was to
remain on the throne of France, and, if not, who was to
succeed him, had always underlain all these discus-
sions. Cajstlereagh's position, as has been shown, was
that peace must be made with Napoleon if he would
consent to the " ancient limits." But he did not expect
him to do so, and in that case he wished the Bourbons
to return, — He would not be a party, however, to any
* overt attempt to set up the Bourbons while the Allies
were still in negotiation with the Emperor, and he was
confirmed in this view by the absence of any signs that
the French people were ready of their own will to
dethrone Bonaparte or welcome back the ancient
family.2 His Cabinet were, reluctantly for the most
part, forced to support this point of view, but they
grew more and more restive as time went on and peace
and final victory were still delayed. Public opinion in
England grew more and more vehement in favour of the
overthrow of Napoleon, though Liverpool himself dis-
trusted the Bourbons, and took all steps to prevent the
imprudences of the^rinee Regent from committing
British policy.3 *pPne Bourbon Princes at last began
to act, and the Comte d'Artois went to Switzerland in
1 The Cabinet were dissatisfied that Castlereagh had not made
the establishment of Sardinia a special point of the Chaumont
Treaty, but the latter pointed out that the omission was inten-
tional on his part, " the object of that instrument not being to
declare a comprehensive arrangement for the Continent, but to
secure on the part of Great Britain the points most essential to her
honour and interest." He had, therefore, wished " to avoid
swelling the catalogue of special concessions by including in it-
objects otherwise secured." Castlereagh to Liverpool, Mar. 5,
1814, F.O. Continent 3.
2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Mar. 4, 1814, F.O. Continent 3.
1 Liverpool to Wellington, Feb. 9, 1814, Wellington : Supple-
mentary Despatches, VIII, 580. %.
BOUKBON PRINCES 37
February, i while the Due d'Angouleme went to the
south and the Due de Berri to Brittany. At Paris
also Talleyrand and others were already thinking of
the Bourbons; but no communication with the Allies
was established until the Chatillon Conference was
dissolved and Napoleon had refused the terms offered.
Thus it was not until March 22 that Castle-
reagh was able to report the appearance of a secret
envoy at headquarters. This envoy, Baron Vitrolles,
had set out in March, but was not received until after
the Chaumont Treaty had been signed. He had then
interviews with Metternich, who welcomed him, and
Alexander, who told him that the Bourbons were unfit
to govern France. Castlereagh, as soon as he knew of
the definite breach of Chatillon, supported Metternich,
and made preparations to bring the Bourbon Princes
to headquarters, a confidential mission being sent to
the Comte d'Artois in Switzerland for this purpose.
NBy now Bordeaux had proclaimed its adhesion to the
Bourbons ; and Castlereagh thought the time had come
to act. On March 28, at a dinner at Dijon, at which
Castlereagh, Metternich, and Razumoffski were
present, the Bourbons were publicly toasted by the
Allied Ministers. Castlereagh did not wish, however,
to play a very prominent part in this movement, but to
leave the initiative to the Ctf^nental Powers.2 In
all this he only anticipated the mictions of the home
Government. On March 19 instructions had been sent
that the negotiations should be brought to an imme-
diate close; while, on the receipt of the news that
Bordeaux had declared for the Bourbons, Castlereagh
1 See the correspondence of the Comte .d 'Artois — " Monsieur *'
■ — with Alexander, in Wellington : Supplementary Despatches,
VIII, 619.
2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Mar. 22, 30, 1814, F.O. Continent
3: " The object I have in view ... is to bring Great Britain
forward in whatever may regard the interior of France rather as
the ally and auxiliary of the Continental Powers than as charging
herself in chief, and making herself responsible for what cannot
be conducted under the superintendence of her own Government "
38 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
was ordered not to be a party to any treaty with
Napoleon.1 The Cabinet were prepared to back the
Bourbons now that part of France appeared to be on
their side.
Section 11. The Overthrow of Napoleon and the
V First Peace of Paris. — Thus at the final stage of the
fight with Napoleon, England and Austria were eager
that the Bourbons should be brought back, though
Alexander was still hostile. The Allies were linked
together by the Treaty of Chaumont; their different
claims on the Napoleonic Empire, though unsettled,
were postponed for the moment; their military
machinery had been overhauled and improved. In
short, under the energetic leadership .of Castlereagh
the Coalition had survived, and even profited from, a
period of defeat. The Allies knew from intercepted
letters the desperate plight of Napoleon. Peremptory
orders were sent to Chaumont that the negotiations
must be terminated.2 Caulaincourt was even yet not
able to obtain from Napoleon instructions that
authorised him to make any approach towards the
terms offered by the Allies. While he was still offering
counter-projects which discussed the fate of Saxony
and Italy, the farce was terminated ; and on March 19
the Conference of Chatillon broke up, a mani-
festo to the Fre<fch nation being issued on the 25th by
the Allies, which laid the blame for the continuance of
the war entirely on Napoleon. Five days later the
Allies were at the gates of Paris; and Napoleon's last
desperate effort to stave off his ruin was frustrated by
the defection of his generals. On March 31 Alex-
ander, accompanied by Frederick William, realised his
long-cherished1 wish, and entered Paris as a conqueror,
or, as he would have preferred to phrase it, as
liberator.
1 Bathurst to Castlereagh, Mar. 19, 22, 1814, F.O. Continent
Archives 1.
2 Instruction envoyee a Chatillon, Mar. 11, 1814. Fournier.
Congress von Chdtillon, p. 343.
OVERTHROW OF NAPOLEON 39
Both the Emperor of Austria and Metternich,
together with Castlereagh, remained at Dijon,
Francis II was not eager to appear as conqueror in the
capital of his son-in-law. Nor was Castlereagh anxious
to take part in the negotiations at Paris. He was
convinced that the steps taken by himself, in conjunc-
tion with Metternich and Hardenberg, would result in
a declaration for the Bourbons. Nesselrode was on \
their side and, in communication with Talleyrand,
ready to check any move of Bernadotte or the Bona-
partists.1 Thus-Alexander, who entered the city con-
vinced that the Bourbon cause was without support,
found there a vigorous and active Bourbon party,
which Talleyrand, the most astute head in Europe, was
leading. He had no alternative but to bring back to
the French throne the Bourbons whom he detested and
despised. He insisted, however, on the promise of a
Constitution, and prevented the exiled King from re-
turning as an absolute monarch.
Castlereagh from the first had intended to keep
apart from these arrangements. A Convention between
x\ustria, Russia, and Prussia had been signed so long
ago as February 14 for the regulation of the procedure
of the Allies in the event of a march to Paris, by which
the Bourbons were to be proclaimed if there was suffi-
cient popular support.2 Alexander had seen, but not
signed, this document; but he was now, much against
his will, the instrument by which it was to be put into
force. Castlereagh, though cognisant of all these
matters, and largely inspiring them, refused to give
any signature. He did not reach Paris till April 10,
when the whole affair was over. His subordinates,
who objected to Alexander playing the leading role,
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Dijon, Apr. 4, 1814, F.O. Conti-
nent Archives 2. A more general view is that Talleyrand planned
the whole matter and convinced Alexander, but the evidence of
the British Archives shows that Castlereagh and Metternich were
quite assured as to the result.
2Oncken, Das Zeitalter, &c, p. 769, from the Foreign Office
Records.
40 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
were urgent he should appear on the scene. But he
had no wish to take a prominent part in a transaction
which might give a considerable opportunity to the
Opposition in the British Parliament. Similarly, he
wanted to be not more than an acceding party to the
Treaty of Fontainebleau, by which Napoleon was made
sovereign of Elba; indeed, he seriously objected to the
chivalrous terms which Alexander granted to his con-
quered foe.
These matters being settled, the Allied Ministers
could proceed to draw up the Treaty of Peace with the
Bourbon Government. The first step was to arrange
for a cessation of hostilities which would free France
from the Allied troops. Operations had now ceased
except in the south of France, and by a convention of
April 23 the Allies engaged to withdraw their forces
from France in return for the surrender of the for-
tresses which were still held by French troops in
Germany and Italy.1 Louis XVIII returned to France
on April 24, but the negotiations for the Treaty of
Peace lasted till the end of May. Castlereagh, who
was being ^constantly pressed to return home, was
anxious to come to a conclusion as soon as possible, but,
as he confessed to Bathurst, Paris was " a bad place
for business," and the balls, dinners, reviews, and fetes
did much to distract the Sovereigns and their Ministers
from more serious work, a situation w^hich pleased
Talleyrand, who hoped to profit by the prolongation of
the discussions. Eventually it was only by a threat to
transfer the negotiations to London that Castlereagh
obtained his signature to the treaty by the end of May.
The construction of the treaty with France raised,
however, big problems which could not be disposed of
without considerable expenditure of diplomatic energy.
A Bourbon King could readily accept the ancient fron-
tiers of France ; but Talleyrand was anxious to obtain
as much prestige as possible, both for himself and the
restored monarchy. Castlereagh, who considered that
1 See the paper in this series on International Congresses,
where the text is given.
TREATY OF PEACE 41
he had obtained from France the main securities neces-
sary for the peace of Europe, was inclined to be liberal.1
In this view he was supported to a considerable extent
by Liverpool, who, like Castlereagh, had an eye to using
French influence in the European settlement.2 Thus,
in refusing to demand a monetary indemnity from \
France such as Prussia desired (presenting for herself
a bill of over one hundred million francs), or to allow
the works of art of which Napoleon and his generals
had plundered Europe to be restored to their owners,
and in giving France a substantial increase on her
1792 boundaries, Castiereagh's influence was, in com-
pany with that of Alexander, on the side of generosity.
When, however, Talleyrand attempted to take advan-
tage of this attitude to refuse the cession of St. Lucia
and Tobago, and to avoid all reference to the abolition /
of the slave trade, he was met with a peremptory nega- *
tive. Still more indignant was Castlereagh when a
strong movement arose, supported not only by the
Napoleonic generals but even by the King, to extend the
French frontier on the side of Belgium.3 He told
Talleyrand that no peace could last unless the French
people gave up " this false notion of Flanders being
necessary to France ' ' ; and it made him the more deter-
mined to secure a full recognition of the frontiers of
the kingdom of the Netherlands in the Treaty of
^Peace.V^
With regard to the slave trade, both Castlereagh and
his Cabinet were urged on by an almost fanatical
public opinion in England. The trade had been
abolished in the colonies which we were now handing
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Apr. 19, 1814: " I am myself in-
clined to a liberal line upon subordinate questions, having secured
the Continent, the ancient family, and the leading features of
our own peace." Correspondence, IX, 474.
2 Liverpool to Castlereagh, May 19, 1814, W.S.D., IX, 89.
3 Castlereagh to Liverpool, May 19, 1814, F.O. Continent 4.
4 Castlereagh to Liverpool, May 23, 1814: " I felt it of the
first importance not to go to a Congress without having this most
essential point acquiesced in by that Power." F.O. Continent 4.
i
42 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
back to France. The French view was that England,
having stocked her own colonies with labour, was
anxious to prevent those of other Powers obtaining
a similar advantage. Castlereagh was anxious to get
the abolition recognised by all Europe; but it was more
difficult to refuse a term of years of delay if the prin-
ciple was conceded, since the British abolition was so
recent. Eventually France agreed that the trade should
be abolished after five years' delay, and undertook to
support the general principle at the Congress.
The final result of the treaties, which were signed on
May 30, was that France received the boundaries of
1792, with certain additions which extended her north-
eastern frontier so as to include districts round
Philippeville and Saarbruck, the fortress of Landau,
and a considerable portion of Savoy. Further terri-
tories belonging to other Powers and enclaves in
France, such as Miilhausen and Avignon, of which
there were also many on the north-eastern frontier,
were now incorporated in her territory under her full
sovereignty. She regained also most of her colonies
except Tobago, St. Lucia, and Mauritius and its de-
pendencies; while she was restricted to commercial
^ privileges in India, giving up all sovereign rights.
She also recognised the British possession of Malta.1
Section 12. The Attempt at Paris to settle the Con-
quered Territories. — These treaties, however, besides
regulating the relations of France with Europe, mark
also a stage in the discussion of the problems that still
divided the Allies. Castlereagh had at first intended
that the future of Europe should be decided in London
after the signature of the treaty with France.2 But it
1 Separate treaties were signed between each of the belligerent
Powers and France. Including that with Spain, who did not
sign until July 20, 1814, there were thus seven treaties, which
were identical as regards the main instrument, though they varied
to some extent in the secret and additional articles, in which the
stipulations as to the rest of Europe were recorded.
2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Apr. 13, 1814, Correspondence,
IX, 460.
SETTLEMENT 4:3
was later decided that the main points of the European
settlement should be settled in Paris; and, if the
Powers could have come to an agreement, the main
provisions would have been incorporated in the treaty
with France and the future Congress have been merely
concerned with the ratification of these decisions. In
this, however, as at Larigres and Chaumont, those who
hoped to effect a settlement proved to He over-sanguine.
But a determined and serious effort was now made.
HaVcfedfrfcrg and Metterhich, secure in the knowledge
that Castle>§agh would support them, wished to bind
Russia to the recognition of their scheme before the
treaty with France was signed.1 Hardenberg, after
long conferences with Stadion, who represented Met-
ternich, produced a plan for the future arrangement of
Europe. By this scheme all Saxony was to go toj
Prussia, as well as the left bank of the Rhine; while
Austria received Tirol and compensation in Italy.
The Duchy of Warsaw was to be partitioned in such a
manner that, while Russia obtained the largest part,
both Prussia and Austria received substantial shares,
the latter especially retaining Cracow and the Tar-
nopol district, which had been ceded by her in 1809.
Compensations for Bavaria, Baden, and Piedmont
wrere all indicated, and the plan of a German Constitu-
tion, such as had already been prepared at Langres,
was added.2
On May 5 Hardenberg submitted this plan to
Alexander, but met with a peremptory refusal. Not
only was the Tsar unwilling to cede territory to Austria,
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, May 5, 1814: " A strong desire
felt by Prussia and Austria to bring both Kussia and France to
some understanding upon the main principles of the Continental
arrangements in a secret article or otherwise previous to our
stipulating away our conquests has led to a tedious and elaborate
examination of this very complicated and arduous question."
F.O. Continent 4.
2 Hardenberg 's plan " pour l'arrangement futur de
l^Europe " in F.O. Continent 4. Described by Minister, Political
Sketches, p. 159, and Treitschke, History of Germany (English
edition), I, 661.
44 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
but he persisted in pressing for an extension of the
western frontier of Poland, soi as to include Thorn
and a large rayon beyond it. The Polish question
thus reached a deadlock. The agreement between
Austria and Prussia was also an uneasy one; for,
though Metternich was prepared to give Saxony to
Prussia, he insisted that she should not obtain Mainz,
jthe great fortress of Southern Germany, which was
greatly coveted by the Prussian generals. Prussian
troops now took possession of this place, a proceeding
at which Austria was highly indignant; and the ques:
tion of Mainz was to be a great stumbling-block to
j peace until the end. A final settlement as to Germany
had, therefore, to be postponed until the London Con-
ferences, though Stein was eager to get all signed at
Paris, and attempted to get Alexander to insist on it.1
The uncertainty of the territorial settlement was,
indeed, felt by all to be a great disadvantage, j All
Powers were eager to enter into provisional occupation
of the countries which would fall to their share; and
meanwhile in the territories that were likely to change
hands there was the utmost confusion and grave acts
of tyranny on the part of masters who felt that their
reign of power was to be brief.
On May 21 Metternich, Hardenberg, and Miinster
again attempted to come to a settlement, but in
vain. On the Polish question also, at the last moment,
Alexander urged that a decision should be made;1 but
Metternich and Castlereagh by this time thought it
more likely that settlement on these lines would be
reached in London, where Polish influence was not so
strong as in Paris, and this matter was also postponed.2
When the Peace of Paris was signed it contained,
therefore, only the recognition of a small part of the
i European settlement. The incorporation of the Low
Countries with Holland was agreed to, as well as tlje
restoration of the King of Sardinia to Piedmont, with
which was to be incorporated Genoa (to remain a free
1 Miinster, pp. 169, 171.
2 Miinster, p. 184.
SETTLEMENT 45
port), while the frontier of the Austrian possessions
in Italy, which gave her Lombardy and Venetia, were
defined; as regards the territories ceded on the left
bank of the Rhine it was simply stated that they
should serve as compensations to Holland, Prussia,
and other German States. The only articles devoted
to general interests were those which recognised the
principle of free navigation of international rivers,1
and one containing a promise by France to support the
abolition of the Slave Trade at the Congress. All the
rest of the matters in dispute had to be postponed. It
was agreed by Article XXXII of the public treaty
that . v
" all the Powers engage^ on either side in the present war
shall within the space of two months send plenipotentiaries
to Vienna for the purpose of regulating in General Congress
the arrangements which are to complete the present treaty."
But the four Powers, though unable to make express
stipulations in the treaty, made it clear that they had
no intention of allowing the decisions to be made by a
general assembly of the European States. By a secret
article France agreed that the disposition of the ter-
ritories ceded by her, and
" the relations from whence a system of real and permanent
balance of power in Europe is to be derived, shall be regulated
at the Congress upon the principles determined upon by the
Allied Powers amongst themselves."
The Treaties of Paris were made with Portugal,
Sweden, and Spain as well as the four Great Powers;
but the latter did not intend the three smaller to have
much share in the decision. It was still hoped to settle
these matters before the Congress met in London,
whither the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia,
and their Ministers, as also Metternich, were now pro-
ceeding. It cannot too often be insisted on that,
throughout the whole of these negotiations, -the future
Congress was intended to he only a ratifying instru-
ment of i'7&i$vm$ioitr-df the four Great Powers. The
signing of the first Peace of Paris marks, however, a
1 Fournier, Zur V org eschi elite des Wiener Kongresses, Hist.
Studien und Skizzen, II, 299.
46 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
very definite stage in the transactions. In spite of all
their endeavours, the Powers had not been able to come
to an agreement before France secured liberty of action
by signing the treaty. They had thus been unable tip
bind her to recognise the distribution of the spoilsl
Had Hardenberg's plan resulted in agreement, it is
certain that the territorial arrangement of Germany
would have been included as a secret article in the
treaty in the same way as the reconstruction of Holland
and Sardinia, and the subsequent proceedings of
Talleyrand at Vienna would have been impossible. As
it was, the Powers could only bind France by the first
secret article to recognise that they had the ultimata
decision. It was, indeed, already apparent to some
that a Bourbon France could not be treated as a quart-
tite negligeable.1 If, however, the four Powers, as
they hoped, could conclude their preliminary arrange-
ments, they did not expect to have much trouble from
Talleyrand at the Congress.
Section 13. The Preliminary Discussions in London.
Diplomatic Preparations. — The Tsar and the King of
Prussia and their Ministers accepted the invitation of
the Prince Regent to England, while Metternich repre-
sented the Emperor of Austria. - It had been
Castlereagh's intention to utilise this opportunity to
complete the arrangements for the settlement of/
Europe.2 Though this expectation was not fulfilled, a
'very profound effect was produced by this visit on the
political situation. The attitude which Castlereagh
had adopted in France towards the Powers by no means
1 Minister to the Prince Kegent, May 5, 1814, Political
Sketches, p. 162 : " The existing Government of France cannot be
excluded from taking any part in the arrangements made to
settle the relations of the different Empires of Europe as it was
formerly intended that Bonaparte's should be."
2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Apr. 13, 1814: " That the three
great monarchs . . . proceeding there accompanied by their re-
spective Ministers, our conferences might be continued in London
and all essential points arranged for the ratification of Congress.*'
Correspondence, IX, 460.
DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON 47
represented the opinions of the Cabinet. Both the
Prince Regent and the Prime Minister were at this
time well disposed towards Alexander, and they dis-
trusted Austria, and especially her Foreign Minister.1
Had the Tsar played his cards well, he might have
made the position of Castlereagh an exceedingly diffi-
cult one. As events fell out, however, he permanently
lost the friendship, not only of the Prince Regent, but
also of the Tory Ministry. The Tsar's sister, the
Grand Duchess Catharine, with whom his relations
were of the most intimate kind, had preceded him to
London. Despite the entreaties and protests of the
Russian Ambassador and his wife, she flouted all social
conventions, and, what was even worse, cultivated the
Whigs rather than the Tories.2 She even threatened to
visit the unhappy Princess of Wales, with whom the
Prince Regent had now publicly broken off relations,
while to her influence on the Princess Charlotte was
later ascribed the latter 's refusal to marry the Prince
of Orange. These strange proceedings were thoroughly
approved of and closely imitated by Alexander. He won
the plaudits of the mob and the half-hearted support of
the Whigs at the cost of the hatred of the Prince Regent
and the dislike of his Ministers. So far as his motives
were political and not personal, he seems to have
thought that he could best win support for his Polish
schemes by an alliance with the leaders of the
Opposition,3 while the unpopularity of the Prince
Regent and some of his Ministers may have
given him the idea that the Tories would1 not
remain long in power. If these were his motives, never
was a greater political mistake committed. The
* Merveldt to Metternich, Apr. 12, 1814, Vienna Archives.
• See the diary of Princess Lieven in the " Correspondance de
VEmpereur Alexandre avec sa Sosur," edited by the Grand Duke
L Nicholas Michaelovitch.
fc 3 Merveldt to Metternich, July 9, 1814: " Lord Castlereagh
Hne parla du mouvement que se donnaient ici les Princes Tzar-
^toriski et Radziwill pour engager des membres de l'opposition a
porter devant le Parlement la question sur l'avenir de la Pologne."
Vienna Archives.
48 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
Prince Kegent and a Tory Ministry controlled British
policy during Alexander's lifetime, and the effects of
this visit were never eradicated. Metternich mean-
while paid assiduous court to the Prince Regent, and
avoided all intercourse with the Opposition.1
This situation, while it brought Castlereagh ana
Metternich more closely together, prevented that settle-
ment before the meeting of Congress which all the four
Powers desired. The Polish and Saxon questions
were, indeed, discussed by the four Ministers, but the
Tsar showed himself even less conciliatory than at
Paris. No formal consideration of these questions
could, therefore, take place, and it was agreed to post-
pone it until the meeting at Vienna.2 It had been
originally intended that the Congress should meet at
the beginning of August. But Castlereagh found that
he could not get through his Parliamentary business in
time; and, as Alexander now realised that the Congress
was likely to last longer than had at first been antici-
pated, he wished first to visit Russia. This decision
he announced only when on his way back to the Con-
tinent ; and the Ministers had perforce to postpone the
meeting till the end of September.3
I The four Powers were also now faced with the fact
1 that they had to meet Congress without having
obtained a decision on the principal points in dispute.
But they were still firm in their intention to decide
these points by themselves. They resolved, therefore,
that while the Powers who had signed the Treaty of
Paris had the right to formulate a plan for the
organization of Congress, this must only be " d'apres
le plan qui aura 6t6 arrets entre les quatre cours."4
1 He had instructed Merveldt to pursue a similar course of
policy as early as Jan. 1814. Vienna Archives.
2Klinkowstrom, p. 393.
3 Protocol of June 20, 1814, F.O. Continent 5.
4 "Points de deliberation " endorsed Conference of June 16,
1<\0. Continent 5. These protocols, hitherto unpublished, are th
only direct evidence of these meetings, and historians have beeri
puzzled. It is probable, however, that, as the meetings were
mainly informal, no others exist except those concerning Belgium
and the maintenance of the Allied armies, which have long been
known.
i
PREPARATIONS 49
For this purpose .the Ministers of the four Courts were
to meet at Vienna some' little time before the rest of
Congress assembled. Alexander was somewhat sus-
picious of this last step, and only agreed to it on
condition that nothing was to be definitely decided
before he appeared on the scene.1 The four Powers -
also agreed that no action should be taken in the /
countries which they provisionally occupied except in so
far as their fate had already been definitely decided by
treaty.2 This was a point of great importance. Rus-
sian troops held all Poland and Saxony, as well as
Holstein and other places in the north, while Prussia
was in possession of the territories on the left bank of
the Rhine and Mainz. The temptation to produce a /
fait accompli was, therefore, considerable. Lastly, in
order that there might be no danger from Prance or
other disturbing elements, the four Powers agreed that
each should maintain at least 75,000 troops on a war/
footing until the new order should be finally consum-
mated.3 This was almost superfluous, for none of the
Continental Powers had the slightest intention of dis-
arming so long as their territories were undefined.
The only specinaqiiastion -which made any progress
in theJLwxdoiLXJonfereiices was that of the incorpora-£X
tion of the Low Countries in Holland. The principles
on which the new State was to be governed were sub-
mitted to the Conference by the Sovereign Prince
and approved by the Allies ; and the provisional ad-
ministration of the Belgian provinces was transferred
from the Austrians to its new ruler.4 The frontiers of
Holland beyond the Meuse could not, however, yet be
1 " Declaration au protocole du 10/22 Juin," F.O. Continent 5.
Nesselrode to Alexander, June 12/24, 1814, Petrograd Archives.
2 Protocol of the Conference of June 20, 1814, F.O. Conti-
nent 5.
3 " Convention supplementary " of June. 29, 1814, D'Ange-
fcberg, 183.
4 Protocol of June 14, D'Angeberg, 182. The question of the
Dutch colonies was finally settled by a Convention of Aug. 18
between the Netherlands and Great Britain, by which the latter
retained the Cape of Good Hope and some minor possessions, but
[285—69] E
50 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
decided, since they depended on the other arrange-
ments; and the recognition of the new State was
deferred until the Congress.
In the interval between the London Conferences and
I the Congress the activities of the Ministers of the
J a Great Powers were necessarily absorbed to a consider-
^ able extent by domestic affairs, but they were also
engaged in endeavouring to produce situations favour-
able to their own plans for the Congress. Thus. Met-
ternich attempted to strengthen in every way the
coalition he was endeavouring to build up against
Alexander. At a meeting in London, Minister and
Hardenberg had attempted to settle the vexed ques-
tions of Luxemburg and Mainz, while Metternich had
discussed with the Prussian Minister the constitution
of the German Confederation.1 On h}s return to
Vienna he renewed his negotiations with Hardenberg;
and, despite the fact that he found a strong party,
headed by Stadion and Schwarzenberg, working
against him, persisted in his offer of Saxony if Prussia
would join him wholeheartedly in opposition to Alex-
ander. Now was the time, he urged on Hardenberg,
to undermine the influence which Alexander had ac-
quired over the Prussian King. He also sent an
emissary to Russia to ascertain how far opposition to
the Tsar's plans could be discerned there.2 In all
these negotiations he had a considerable measure of
success, but an attempt to bring them to a conclusion
by a preliminary meeting of the four Ministers at
Baden was a failure.3
1 Memorandum of Hardenberg and Miinster, June 15, 1814,
F.O. Continent 5.
2Fournier, Zur Vorgeschichte des Wiener Kongresses, Hi*-
iorische Studien und Skizzen, II, p. 304.
3 Fournier, Die Geheimpolizei auf dem Wiener Kongress,
p. 116.
returned the Dutch East Indies. A sum of two millions sterling
was also paid to the Dutch to create fortifications on the French
frontier; D'Angeberg, 209. See the paper on Holland in this
series (No. 37); also that on Indemnit' • /NV 159).
-
PREPARATIONS 51
Nor was Castlereagh idle during this time. Much
trouble was caused by the refusal of the Norwegians to
accept Swedish rule ; and a British fleet had to blockade
their coasts. Eventually this matter was settled; and
Prussia also signed a treaty with Denmark, by which
the latter was promised Swedish Pomerania. The
larger question was also not neglected. Castlereagh
called Hardenberg's attention to Alexander's organiza-
tion of the Polish Army, and warned him to watch the
activities of Russian troops in the north. In his reply
the Prussian Minister stated that he hoped that Alex-
ander was going to give way, as Metternich professed
to believe; and he explained his ow7n plans for the re-
construction of Europe. That Prussia would receive
the whole of Saxony was, of course, assumed; but he
also showed great jealousy of Austria's connections
with Bavaria, and suggested that the two Great
German Powers should partition the left bank of the
Rhine between them.1 This correspondence revealed
how much there was still dividing Austria and
Prussia. Nevertheless, Castlereagh saw in their union
the sole hope of checking Russian aggrandisement.
Meanwhile, Talleyrand was drawing up his instruc-
tions for the Congress. This brilliant and deservedly
famous document based the settlement of Europe on
the principle of legitimacy, which would restore
Saxony and Naples to their old rulers, and hoped to
effect France's entrance into the European directorate
by insisting on the rights of the smaller Powers. But
Talleyrand was also seeking other means by which he
might make his presence felt at the approaching re-
union, while none of the Great Powers was uncon-
scious of the fact that France was a possible ally,
should all other resources fail to settle the difficulties
between them. Alexander was endeavouring to con-
clude a marriage between his sister Anne and the Due
de Berri, but he had failed to> conciliate Louis XVIII.
Metternich had visited Paris on his way to Vienna, but
1 Castlereagh to Hardenberg, Aug. 8, 1814; Hardenberg to
Castlereagh, Aug. 27, 1814; F.O. Continent Archives 20.
[285—69] E 2
52 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
he had adopted an attitude of precaution that had
alarmed Talleyrand and his master.1 It was to Eng-
land that Talleyrand looked.
When, therefore, Castlereagh took the precaution of
communicating the convention of June 29 to Talley-
rand, and explaining the reasons for the postpone-
ment of the opening of the Congress, he was met
with an eager request that France and England
should act together at Vienna as the only two
disinterested Powers.* Talleyrand, who was greatly
alarmed at the news that preliminary meetings
would be held at Vienna previous to his arrival,
opened his mind on the questions of Poland and
Italy. He cleverly did not lay too much stress on the
project of the dethronement of Murat, which his col-
leagues were now loudly advocating, and endeavoured
■to bring forward points in which he believed Castle-
ireagh's views would coincide with his own. The nego-
tiations culminated in an urgent request for Castle-
reagh to visit Paris on his way to Vienna.2
The advantages of Talleyrand's support were fully
realised at London. Castlereagh had been rather un-
easy from the first at the position in which the
Coalition had placed France. But he was no more pre-
pared than any other Minister of the four Powers to go
hack on his engagements and admit France as an equal
party to their discussion. While, therefore, he received
Talleyrand's overture cordially, he immediately made
it clear that he would only consent to meet him on the
understanding that the Alliance of the four Powers
remained intact. But he agreed to visit Paris on his
way to Vienna, and in two long interviews with Louis
XVIII and his Minister he went over with them the
whole of the questions at issue. Their support on the
1 Sir Charles Stuart to Castlereagh, July 4, 1814, F.O.
France 97.
2 Castlereagh to Sir Charles Stuart, July 4, 1814; Stuart to
Castlereagh, July 28; F.O. France 96 and 97. Later letters in
W.S.D., IX, 180-186. Wellington to Castlereagh, Aug. 18, 1814.
Correspondence, X, 94.
PREPARATIONS 53
Polish question was freely offered; and Castlereagh
had rather to repress than encourage their desire to co-
operate with Great Britain. He succeeded in placing
the preliminary meetings at Vienna in such a light
that Talleyrand could offer no objections, and he
allowed Castlereagh to be the agent to express the
views of the French Government until his own arrival.
This important interview placed Castlereagh at the
outset in a position towards France somewhat different
from that which his Allies had adopted, though he had
not committed himself to any definite line of action.1
The special influence which he had thus acquired he
was to use with advantage at the Congress in the
course of the next few months.
^Castlereagh to Liverpool, Sept. 3, 1814, F.O. Continent 7;
Sbomik of the Russian Imperial Historical Society, vol. CXII;
cf. Alison Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, p. 96.
54 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
PART II. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
CONGRESS OF VIENNA
Section 14. The Problems and the Personalities of
(the Congress. — When the Powers, by Article XXXII
of the Treaty of Paris, agreed that the settlement of
European affairs should be regulated at a Congress,
they struck the imagination of all Europe. The
j peoples did not know of the first secret article by which
the Allied Powers intended to keep affairs in their own
hands. They had vague historical recollections which
carried them back to the treaties of Westphalia, and
they looked on the Congress as a constituent body of
Europe which should settle on lofty principles of jus-
tice and equity the great problems resulting from
twenty years of war. The dispossessed princes and
potentates, who had been submerged in the great flood
of the Revolution and Empire, saw, indeed, in the
Congress an assembly which would restore their stolen
" rights," while the Governments of the smaller States
looked to Europe to round off their possessions by
giving them long-coveted cities and counties. But the
ipeoples as a whole expected something more. Many of
L the Germans, whose nationality had been awakened by
the victorious struggle against Napoleon, were eager
to obtain new institutions by which they would be
^able to express their new ideals. Similar aspirations,
though not so strong and widespread, were also to be
^found in Italy. y In England it was hoped that the
humanitarian movement for the abolition of the slave
trade would be strengthened by the approval of all
Europe. In all countries there was a feeling, if vague
and ill-defined, that some means should be found to
/•prevent the recurrence of those evils from which the
existing generation had so grievously suffered.
PROBLEMS OF CONGRESS 56
It has been seen how little the statesmen who were
directing the affairs of Europe were occupied with
these matters. For all of them, except for Talleyrand,
who was vainly attempting to place himself at their
side, the Congress was little more than a convenient4^
assembly of diplomatists which would make it easier
for them to consign to paper the agreements they would
ultimately conclude. They had put forward the word
' Congress " imprudently, without reflecting upon all
the results that the wx>rd implied. It had been an
expedient to postpone, and perhaps to solve, their diffi-
culties. But the invitation had been given and accepted
by all the States of Europe ; and the Great Powers were
committed to admit them in some way to their councils.
The result was .that there came to Vienna an enormous
number of plenipotentiaries imbued with vague aspira-^
tions and ill-considered designs, only to find no
principle which should govern their procedure and no
machinery by which they could be made into a coherent
body. No appreciable difference would have been made
in the final settlement at Vienna if the large majority
of the plenipotentiaries had never appeared there at
all. They merely acted as a picturesque and expensive
background to the real Congress of Vienna. The
stages by which this result was brought about will be de-
scribed in the succeeding sections, but the problems of
the Congress and the representatives who took part
in it may be briefly indicated here in order to render
what follows more intelligible.
The Congress had been called into being by the
Treaties of Paris, and its programme was, in a sense,
provided at the same time. Certain matters had been -
indicated for settlement in the public and secret!
articles of the treaties, such as the extension of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, the creation of a German j
Federation, and a Constitution for Switzerland, and;
the more general topics of the navigation of inter-
national rivers and the abolition of the slave trade;
but the most important subject of the Congress, thej
territorial changes to be made in Poland and Germany;
56 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
which affected 32,000,000 inhabitants, had not even
been mentioned. The wording of Article XXXII of
the Paris Treaties allowed any subject to be brought
forward which could be considered necessary to com-
plete the few and vague specific references that had
been given.
^ The primary task of the Congress was the redistri-
bution of the conquered territories. In effecting this
redistribution it was necessary to take into account not
only the stipulations of the Treaties of Paris but also
the treaties made in 1813 by the three Eastern Powers,
both among themselves and with the minor States. As
has been seen, these Powers had so far exhausted in
vain every expedient to come to a decision. The prin-
^ cipal stumbling-block had been the question of Poland.
On this depended the fate of Saxony ; and on the dis-
posal of Saxony depended all the other arrangements
in Germany, so that the frontier of almost every
; German State was likely to be affected. In Italy the
V frontier of the Austrian dominions and the incorpora-
tion of Genoa in Sardinia were already determined.
-But the fate of the territory that lay between the Papal
dominions and Austria, including the three Legations,
was still uncertain, while the Bourbon Powers had de-
termined never to recognise Murat, and the Great
Powers were already repenting of the treaty which,
with their consent, Austria had signed with him. The
^fate of the Ionian Isles, then in British occupation,
depended ultimately on the problem of Sicily. In the
north, while the Norwegians had submitted ,at last to
come under Swedish rule, there were still compli-
» cated questions to be settled in which Sweden. Hanover,
and Prussia were interested. The boundaries of the
* new Kingdom of Holland had also to be defined. When
it is remembered that constitutions had also to be
i given to Germany and Switzerland — problems in which
the history of centuries was accumulated — it can be seen
that the time available for the treatment of more
general questions, such as those of the international
rivers and of the abolition of the slave trade, was
PERSONALITIES 57
not likely to be great, while only great pressure of
public opinion could be expected to make the statesmen
consider seriously such problems as the construction of
an international tribunal, the possibilities of general
disarmament, or the creation of representative institu-
tions.
By the Treaties of Paris all the States of Europe
which had participated in the war had the right to
send plenipotentiaries to Vienna; and every State
availed itself of the privilege. The four Great Powers
were represented by the same Ministers who had so
long transacted business together, but to each were
added new assistants, who in some cases played a con-
siderable part in affairs. Thus Castlereagh took with
him his half-brother, Lord Stewart, together with Lord
Cathcart, both of whom had represented him on the
Continent since 1813. To these he added Lord Clan-
carty, recently his Minister at The Hague, and the
holder of minor offices in the Ministry, an indefatigable
and tenacious diplomatist, who was to be one of the real
workers of the Congress. These three were all pleni-
potentiaries, but the first two gave him little assistance,
and Lord Stewart was to be the laughing-stock of
Vienna. Wellington relieved Castlereagh in the
middle of February. He was no diplomatist, but his
courage and military reputation were used to advan-
tage when Napoleon's escape was announced.
Clancarty was in charge after Wellington's departure
at the end of March. Castlereagh's technical staff in-
cluded Edward Cooke, the Assistant Under-Secretary,
an experienced official, who got into close touch with
Metternich's secretaries. His mordant letters to the
Prime Minister gave great satisfaction. Castlereagh
also took wiHh him Planta, his private secretary, and
other officials, while Stratford Canning, the Minister
at Berne, was summoned to assist at the Conferences
on the Swiss Question. For military opinions Castle-
reagh relied almost entirely on Wellington, when he
was not content to use those supplied by the Prussian
and Austrian General Staffs. The British personnel
58 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
was far too small in number for the vast amount of
business to be got through; the mere copying of des-
patches was at times overwhelming. But it was well
organized and disciplined, at any rate during Castle-
reagh's own stay at Vienna.
Hardenberg and Humboldt represented Prussia,
whose King was forced to take a considerable share in
events. They had a very efficient staff, which included
real experts, among them Hoffmann, one of the best
statisticians in Europe, who was to prove very useful.
They produced more memoranda than any other Power,
but their diplomacy did not prove equal to their
technical ability. This last fact was partly the fault
of the General Staff, who constantly interfered.
Alexander surrounded himself with Ministers who
were almost purely non-Russian. Nesselrcde was still
Foreign Secretary, but he was entirely out of favour
during the critical period of the Congress ; RazumofTski
and Stackelberg, the other two plenipotentiaries, were
colourless persons. Czar tor yski continued to advise
the Tsar on Poland, and wrote most of his memo-
randa concerning that country; Capo d'Istria had
great influence on Alexander's general policy; Stein,
though somewhat disillusioned, still advised on
German affairs; Laharpe controlled the attitude of
Russia in the discussions on his native country ; while
the Corsican Pozzo di Borgo was summoned from Paris
to give advice, which was not, however, well received.
The Tsar himself exercised complete control, and
chose the instruments of his policy as the situation of
the moment dictated.
As for Austria, Metternich was in his own capital,
and had a large and, on the whole, very efficient
diplomatic machine at his disposal. Wessenberg, the
second Austrian plenipotentiary, was a good diploma-
tist, and supplied the industry which his chief lacked.
Hudelist, a permanent official, and Gentz, one of the
most facile writers in Europe, who was just beginning
to gain his chief's confidence, inspired much of Metter-
nich's policy, and helped to draft his memoranda.
PEESQWALITIES &9
Throughout there was a party, of which Stadion and
Schwarzenberg became the leaders, which objected to
his policy, and did their best to discredit him.
France was represented by Talleyrand, who brought
with him as plenipotentiaries three rather mediocre
diplomatists, of whom the most important, Dalberg,
though hard-working, was self-opinionated and very
indiscreet. His principal assistant was La Besnar-
diere, a permanent official of wide experience and a
brilliant writer, who exercised great influence until the
return of Napoleon.
Of the three other signatories of the Paris Treaties,
Spain was represented by Labrador, who most ineptly
tried to imitate Talleyrand; Portugal principally by
Palmella, whose Court in Brazil was so distant that he
was not able to play much part ; and Sweden by Loven-
heilm, w^ho passively looked on at the struggles in
which his master, Bernadotte, now professed to take
no interest.
Of the minor Powers, only a few of the plenipoten-
tiaries exercised much influence. Miinster, who repre-
sented the Prince Regent as ruler of Hanover, was also
at times used by Castlereagh for other purposes.
Holland was represented by Van Spaen and von
Gagen, who resented keenly, without being able to
alter, the secondary part which they were forced to
play. Their policy was settled in the last event by
England ; and Clancarty corresponded with the Dutch
Sovereign throughout the Congress. Field-Marshal
Wrede arrogantly defended Bava_ria's interests. Both
Murat and Ferdinand of Sicily had representatives at
the Congress. All the minor States of Italy and Ger-
many, as well as a large number of German princes and
counts of the Empire who had been deprived of their
sovereign rights during the upheaval in Germany, sent
representatives. There were also present a large
number of royalties, including the Kings of Bavaria,
Wurttemberg, and Denmark, and many smaller
monarchs. The Pope was represented by Cardinal
Consalvi, who played a singularly narrow role, in spite
60 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
of his undoubted ability; the Sultan by Mavrogeni, his
charge d'affaires at Vienna, a Greek by nationality.
Added to these were representatives of many
special interests, some as imposing as the German
Catholics or as influential as the Germanjews, others
of little importance, amongst them the Order of St
John, which still had hopes of compensation for Malta.
Even the deposed King of Sweden had Sir Sidney
Smith, the defender of Acre, to uphold his cause.
When it is remembered that a large number of the
sovereigns and diplomatists brought with them their
wives and other female relations, the extraordinary
spectacle which Vienna presented can be imagined.
It attracted, naturally, a large number of visitors, who
seem to have been admitted without even the excuse of
business ; and the presence of the courtiers and rich of
all countries added to the difficulties of accommodation
and supply which were throughout harassing to all
concerned.
Section 15. First Discussions as to the Organization
of the Congress.— By SeptemberJL3^18-14, the Ministers
of the four Powers had reached Vienna; and discus-
sions were immediately begun touching the organisa-
tion of the Congress. They were agreed in substance as
to the necessity of keeping the control of the decisions
in their own hands, but the delicate question as to how
this determination was to be communicated to the other
plenipotentiaries had nowT to be faced. There were no
precedents of much value as to how the Congress should
be constituted. The Congress had not met to make a
treaty of peace; and to define the status and powers of
the vast number of plenipotentiaries who wished to take
part was not easy, even if there had been anything like
a consensus of opinion on the subjects to be discussed. •
\ The informal meetings, in which Castlereagh and
Metternich consulted first Nesselrode and then Har-
denberg and Humboldt, began on September 15; and
these led to four Conferences, at which these Ministers
met in order to give their discussions a shape in which
""^ (dm
ORGANIZATION 61
they could be communicated to the rest of Europe. It
was universally agreed " that the conduct of the busi-
ness must practically rest with the leading Powers ";
but in defining the "leading Powers " an entirely new
distinction was now introduced for the first time.
' We are agreed/' wrote Castlereagh, " that the effec- ^
tive Cabinet should not be carried beyond the six I
" Powers of the first order."1 Thus the final directing \
CabineLj£^te--be based, not on the Treaty of Paris or \
on any other- public document, but on a distinction
between " great " and " small " Powers. The four^
Allies-together with France and Spain, were to be
considered the Great Powers. The first expression of-:
the ideaof the Great Powers, with rights as such, dis-
tinct from any derived from treaties, may perhaps be
dated from this meeting. C
But this was to be merefy the fornjal directing
Cabinet. The Allies deemed it necessary to preserve
the " initiation " in their own lands and by " initia-
tion " they really meant " (Jecision." They based their
claim to effect this on the first secret article of the Paris
Treaty, which, according to their interpretation, gave
them the right to come to a preliminary decision, not^
only on the subjects mentioned in the articles attached
to the Paris Treaty, but also on the disposition of the
whole of the conquered territories. This principle was ~
definitely stated in a protocol of September 22, which
had been drawn up by the Prussians. Its object was ~
to prevent France from mingling in the discussions
and using the differences of the Allies to further their
own designs. The blunt way in which this was stated
was considered by Castlereagh, fresh from his concilia-
tory interview with Talleyrand, " to be rather repul-
sive against France and a little more conclusive in its
expressions" tl|an he quite liked. He accordingly-
added a separate declaration to the protocol,2 which
%'
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Sept. 19, 24, 1814, F.O. Conti-
nent 7.
2 Protocols of Jan. 22, British and Foreign State Papers, II,
p. 554-5.
/
62 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
asserted that the discussion with France or Spain was
to be conducted as towards friendly and not hostile
Powers. He further reserved to himself the right to
dissent from any decision of the " four " with which he
could not agree.
There was then to be a sham directing Committee of
-the six Powers, with a real inner Committee of the
four Powers; but what of the Congress as a whole?
How was it to be assembled, and how was its business
to be conducted? How was the decision of the Great
Powers to keep matters in their own hands to be com-
municated to the other States without provoking a
united protest? On this point none of the Ministers
had at the outset any very definite plan; and the
record1 which Castlereagh despatched to London shows
how diffidently they approached the subject and how
their ideas changed in the course of the discussion. The
first proposal was to constitute the Congress by sum-
moning the plenipotentiaries, and then getting them
to appoint a Committee to prepare a scheme for their
consideration. But, as Castlereagh pointed out, this
would have immediately involved the Powers
" without previous concert in all the preliminary questions of
difficulty — viz.t what Powers shall be admitted to sit and
deliberate and what only to petition and negotiate, what are
to be the functions and attributions of the Congress, and by
what mode they are to act and conclude."
T.t was at once abandoned, therefore, and a scheme sub-
stituted by which the six Powers should simply assume
control, without any authorisation, and announce that
the preliminary decisions must first be made by them-
selves, other Powers being consulted when the necessity
arose. This point of view was strongly urged by the
1 See Appendices I, II, III, IV, V, VI. There is an account by
Gentz, but it merely indicates the difficulties. The protocols or
some of the letters are published in D'Angeberg and B. and
F.S.P., vol. II. Some of the points are still obscure, and it is
not easy to assign to some of the memoranda in the F.O. Records
their exact place in the discussions.
ORGANIZATION 63
Prussians in a memorandum written by Humboldt,
which, after dividing the subjects to be discussed by
various Committees in a manner which in effect would
have given control to the four, suggested that these
Committees should first draw up in treaty form their
decisions, that these decisions should then be discussed
by the formal directing Committee of the six, and,
lastly, communicated by it to the Powers whom it
concerned. This procedure he proposed to set in
motion at once, without any preliminary meeting.1
To Castlexeagh, however, though he agreed with the
substance of these proposals, this appeared too open a
disclosure of the intentions of the four. He preferred, y-
if possible, to obtain the sanction of the rest of Europe
to the ascendency of the Great Powers. Accordingly,
he suggested a scheme by which, at a preliminary meet-
ing of all the plenipotentiaries, they might be induced
to allow the six Great Powers to manage affairs for
them. In two papers he worked out the whole plan in
great detail.2 It is characteristic of his policy that,^/
he proposed to get the scheme through by making it as
palatable asjossible to the smaller Powers and using
the influence of_ the Great Powers to manage the
voting. In this way he thought that the six Powders
would be accepted as a formal directing Committee
almost universally, and that any opposition would be
easily overcome. It was impossible to be certain, how
ever, how the Conference of Plenipotentiaries would
act ; and the question of the exact status of the Neapoli-
tan and Saxon plenipotentiaries would, in a sense, be
raised merely by summoning the plenipotentiaries
together. k These difficulties were insisted upon in a
second memorandum drawn up by Humboldt, which, .
with true Prussian disregard of nice susceptibilities,^/
proposed to issue a declaration that the six Powers
would direct the business of the Congress, and would
summon other Powers to such discussions as they
1 See Appendix IV.
2 See the papers in Appendix III, p. 152,
64 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
thought fit.1 Castlereagh thought that this idea was
objectionable, as
"it too broadly and ostensibly assumed the right to do what
may be generally acquiesced in if not offensively announced,
but which the secondary Powers may protest against, if re-
corded to their humiliation in the face of Europe."
He had not, however, sufficient confidence in his own
proposal of an opening meeting to press it further in
the face of this opposition.
The question was thus left open until the plenipoten-
tiaries of France and Spain arrived, with the intention
that the Congress should simply be postponed until
there had been " confidential intercourse " between the
• plenipotentiaries. Neither Castlereagh nor the others
■quite realised the opportunity which their indecision
'would give to Talleyrand. Castlereagh had loyally
endeavoured to arrange a working agreement on the
lines he had laid down at Paris, but he found that the
other three Courts were strongly against " admitting
" France either to arbitrate between them or to
" assume any leading influence in the arrangements
/ ./" consequent upon the peace." The final result was
that the four Powers signed a protocol which reserved
'" the settlement of the territorial questions to them--
■sekesL.__Iheir decisions were to be first communicated
, to France and Spain, and then to the Congress as a
whole. The arrangements for the formal Congress 1
were to be discussed between the six Powers. A !
^Special Committee of the five principal German
Powers was to be set up to draft the scheme for a
German Federation.8
1 " Proposal of Baron Humboldt to publish a Declaration."
See Appendix V, p. 162. He also ingeniously suggested that the
Declaration might be issued by each of the six Powers individually
in its own name on behalf of the others. By this means one
Power could communicate it to plenipotentiaries whom the others
did not wish to recognise without committing the rest. See
Appendix VI.
2 " Projet des 4 Cours sur les Formes du Congres." Sept. 22,
1814, B. and F.S.P., I, 556.
ORGANIZATION 65
Talleyrand arrived on the evening of the 23rd; and ^
on the 30th, together with Labrador, the Spanish pleni-
potentiary, he was invited to a Conference in order that
these decisions might be communicated to him in as
palatable a fashion as possible. The scene described
by himself in much detail has become memorable in
history, and has perhaps had too much importance
attached to it. Talleyrand, supported by Labrador,
used all his diplomatic arts of persuasion, insinuation,
and intimidation to claim from the first a position of .^*
full equality with the four Powers, and he endeavoured
to appeal from their authority to the Congress as a
whole.1 In this he was not successful, but he was able
to disarrange the plans the four Powers had made. A
protocol was shown him, which, though less strongly
worded than those which recorded the decisions of the
22nd, of which he was not to know till much later, yet .
was sufficiently inept in that it emphasised the word \y^
"Allies."2 Talleyrand refused even to consider this^"
document. It was therefore withdrawn, and a Pro jet ^
of Declaration for the opening of the Congress was
submitted to him, which simply left the general direc-
tion of affairs in the hands of the six Powers. This
was reserved for consideration ; and the meeting broke
up after Talleyrand had expatiated on the responsi-
bilities of Constitutional Powers such as England and
France, and intimated that he saw no reason why the
Congress should not at once assemble. That evening ^
he addressed a formal reply to the Ministers of the
four Courts,3 in which he claimed that the Congress
must meet at once, and, while he admitted that a
directing Council was necessary, suggested that the
only legal body that could act as a preliminary Com-
mittee was one consisting of the eight Powers which l
1 Pallain, Correspondance de Talleyrand pendant le Congrbs
de Vienne, p. 10; Gentz, Depeches Inedites, I, 108.
2 The exact form is not known except from his own account.
Talleyrand did not know of the protocols of the 22nd until March,
1815. See Pallain, p. 337.
3 B. and F.S.P., II, 559.
[285—69] F
66 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
had signed the Treaties of Paris, which would have
added Portugal and Sweden to the six. For it was by
the Paris Treaties that the Congress itself had come
into being; and the position of the convening Powers
must be immediately made regular by the approval of
the whole Congress.
^ The four Ministers met on the morning of October
1 to consider their reply.1 The formal character which
Talleyrand had given to his answer was viewed with
great disfavour, as they had intended their overtures
to be regarded as unofficial and confidential. They
decided to abandon the idea of the six Powers alto^
gether, since it rested on no documentary ground, and
! to accept Talleyrand's proposition of the eight Powers,
signatories of the Paris Treaties, as the formal direct-
ing Committee.2 They adhered, however, to their
determination that the Congress itself should not meet
until the directing Powers had determined its proce-
dure and method of business. It wTas also decided
that this reply should be submitted to Talleyrand ver-
bally, and that no formal answer should be sent if it
could be avoided. Talleyrand was accordingly told
their opinion at a social meeting in the evening.3 He
discerned the embarrassment of the " four," and
endeavoured in every way to increase it. He allowed
the fact of the controversy to become known; and a
meeting of the smaller German Powers was held to
support him. Fortified by assurances of support, he
./formally rejected the projet de declaration originally
drawn up by Castlereagh, which was submitted to him
1 " Conference du 2 Octobre entre les Ministres d'Autriche, de
Prusse, de Kussie et d'Angleterre " bears the note: " II a ete
decide que cette piece sera simplement conservee comme memo-
randum de la susdite Conference," F.O. Continent 7.
2 Palmella, the Portuguese plenipotentiary, had already sent,
in collusion with Talleyrand, a protest against his exclusion from
the first meeting. Palmella to Castlereagh, Sept. 30, 181-4, F.O.
Continent 7. Lovenheilm, the Swedish representative, con-
tented himself with formally announcing his arrival. Fournier,
Die Geheimpolizei, etc., p. 221.
3 Talleyrand, Memoires, II, 328.
ORGANIZATION 67
as an alternative method of procedure,1 and in a letter2
to Castlereagh of October 5 he again insisted on the
necessity of the Congress being at once constituted.
An informal Conference between Talleyrand and the
Ministers of the four Powers followed on October 5, in
which the former was asked to withdraw his note. He
refused; but, after some discussion with Metternich,
consented that the Congress should be postponed, pro-
vided, however, that it was for a definite period only,
and that a regie of his own composition, in accordance
with which the plenipotentiaries were to meet, should
be at once announced.3 This regie, which was expressly
designed to admit Saxony and exclude Neapolitan
plenipotentiaries, broke up the meeting, Castlereagh,
as they departed, in vain endeavouring to secure Talley-
rand's acquiescence to his views. But^if Talleyrand
had scored a formal victory in substituting the
" eight " for the iC six " he had already given way on
the point. Jtbat the Congress must be postponed; and
his regie, which opened up the Neapolitan question at
the very outset, was premature and ill-advised. Yet
without some such rule even a meeting of the plenipo-
tentiaries was impossible, since it was imperative to
decide who had a right to be summoned.4 Harden-
berg was clearly on unshakable ground when he said
that no plan could be considered which would give the
1 B. and F.8.P., II, 560.
2 Ibid., II, 561.
3 Talleyrand, Memoires, II, 339. The regie, which was not, of
course, invented at the moment, but drawn from his instructions,
was as follows : " Que tout Prince ayant sur des Etats qui ont ete
engages dans la derniere guerre un droit de souverainete qui a ete
universeiiement reconnu, qu'il n'a point cede, et qui n'est reconnu
a aucun autre, peut, de meme que tout Etat que la derniere guerre
a trouve libre, qui y a ete engage et qui est actuellement libre,
avoir des plenipotentiaires au Congres ; qu 'aucun autre Prince ou
Etat ne le peut pas." F.O. Continent 7. This, as a marginal
note on the F.O. copy points out, " would have excluded Naples,
but admitted Saxony; considered, therefore, by Prussia as particu-
larly hostile to her interest." See Alison Phillip1- op. eft,,
p. 102.
4 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Oct. 9, 1814. F.O Continent 7.
[285—69] F 2
68 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
minor princelings the right to intervene in the general
arrangements of Europe.
The four Powers, therefore, stuck to their idea ; and
Gentz was set to the task of preparing another de-
claration. A further Conference did not take place
till October 8th, Talleyrand being flattered by Metter-
nich1 in a special interviewT before the meeting with
some general observations on the Polish-Saxon ques-
tions. At this Conference the four Powers unanimously
decided to adopt Gentz 's declaration, which merely
announced the postponement of the Congress till
November 1, in order to give time for reflection.
Talleyrand this time gave his consent. He covered his
defeat by insisting on the addition of a sentence that
the Congress would conform " aux principes du droit
public." According to Talleyrand's own account, a
tumult was produced at this simple proposal, which
the Prussians took as deliberately aimed at themselves.
But the addition of the words to the declaration in no
way altered its character. While Talleyrand, there-
fore, had prevented any formal recognition of the
rights of the four Powers or the Committee of Six, he
/had secured little else. The opening of the Congress
7was postponed ; and, if he could not appeal to Congress
he was helpless against the four, so long as they were
united in their decision to keep control. But the real
^ business of the Congress was already being carried on
in informal meetings of the Ministers of the four
Powers and private correspondence between them and
Alexander; from these momentous discussions Talley-
rand was entirely excluded.
Section 16. The Second Attempt to Constitute Con-
gress. Further Postponement. -^-This situation coft-
t/tinued throughout the whole of October. The four
J Courts engaged in violent controversy over the Saxon-
' Polish question ; but the only formal Conferences which
took pUce were those assembled to consider the ques-
1 Talleyrand, Memoires, tl, 342.
v
POSTPONEMENT 69
tion of the German Constitution. A committee of the '
five principal German Powers (Austria, Prussia,
Bavaria, Hanover, and Wiirttemberg) met on October^
14 for this purpose, entirely in defiance of Talleyrand's
ideas, and without any authority from the Congress, j
the eight, or any other body. It based its existence
simply on the Treaty of Paris, and itself decided who
should be members of it.1 At the end of the month the
question of the opening of the Congress had neces-
sarily to be further considered. The energies of the
four Powers had been absorbed in the Polish-Saxon
controversy, and they appear to have devoted little
time to considering the question of organization.
Talleyrand, excluded from all participation in these
critical debates, was able to prepare his own plans at
leisure. He had already, however, receded somewhat
from his first uncompromising attitude; and both
Castlereasrh and Metternich, by keeping him to some
extent informed as to their disputes, had made him
still more conciliatory. The threat of an appeal to
the Congress had been even contemplated by Castle-
reagh as a means of intimidating the Emperor of r
Russia, though he does not seem to have had any clear
idea of what he meant by the term,2 while Metternich
did actually use the threat in a conversation with
Alexander, who simply replied that he did not care for
1 " Premier Protoeole du Comite institue pour les affaires
d'Allemagne, Seance du 14 Octobre, 1814," D'Angeberg, p. 289.
2 He proposed to Austria and Prussia in the Memorandum on
Poland, dated Oct. 24, 1814, that copies of the correspondence
concerning Poland should, if necessary, " be laid before Con-
gress," and " that the several Powers of Europe should be invited
. ... to declare to the Emperor of Eussia to what extent and
upon what conditions Europe in Congress can or cannot admit
His Imperial Majesty's pretensions to an aggrandisement in
Poland." "It is desirable," he added, "that the Emperor
should be made distinctly to understand that .... it would rest
with the Powers in Congress assembled to decide upon the
measures which should be called for by so alarming an infrac-
tion of treaties." F.O. Continent 7. D'Angeberg, p. 291. French
translation with wrong date.
I
J
70 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
the Congress.1 But the two Ministers do not seem to
have done more than see what the effect of the threat
would be.
It was the full Committee of the eight which met
j^on October 30 to consider once more the constitution
of Congress; and Talleyrand was further flattered
by a request from Castlereagh to submit a plan
to this body.2 At this meeting and a subsequent
one on the next day Talleyrand therefore brought
forward a new scheme. He proposed as a directing
A/ Committee for the Congress a Commission generate,
comprised of representatives of all the sovereign heads
(including the Pope). By this General Committee
four sub-Committees were to be nominated to discuss
the questions of Poland, Saxony, Switzerland, and
Italy. The sub- Committees were to report to the
General Committee, which in its turn was to report to
the Congress. Plenipotentiaries (such as those of
Murat or the King of Saxony), whose position might
be challenged, were to be present at discussions, but
not to vote. Meanwhile, the full powers of all pleni-
potentiaries were to be examined, with a view to the
whole Congress being summoned to consider the work
of the Commission generate.3 But, despite their dis-
sensions, the four were no more ready than before to
submit. The difference between them and Talleyrand
was, indeed, too great to be bridged by any scheme,
however ingenious, Talleyrand postulated th^t the
,j| "'[Congress as a whole should be the supreme^ Council of
Jll Europe, and really should decide the questions in dis-
pute. The four Powers regarded it merely as a con-
venient assembly to facilitate their own decisions.1
1 Minister to the Prince Regent, Oct. 25, 1814, Hanover
Archives : " II (Metternich) n'a reussi qu'a s'attirer nne sortie des
plus vives de la part de l'Empereur, qui l'a accuse de vouloir le
menacer de l'appui d'un Congres pour lequel il n'avoit aucun
egard."
2 Pallain, p. 91.
3 B. and F.S.P., II, 563 ff.
4 The situation was well described by Lovenheilm on
November 5 : "La seule d-marche a laquelle les pl£ni-
POSTPONEMENT 71
The only step that was taken, therefore, was the^
appointment by lot of a Committee of three Powers
to verify the full powers of the plenipotentiaries, while
Metternich was formally elected president1 of the
Committee of Eight. Talleyrand's agreement, with
scarcely a struggle, can only be explained by the fact/
that he was beginning himself to realise the hopeless-/
ness of his position, and hoped to gain more by an
alliance with Castlereagh and Metternich than by
maintaining his previous attitude. He^ passes over
these decisions with few words in his letters to the
King, for he could not claim to have played a beau
role. Thus, though the plenipotentiaries hastened to
send in their full powers, which were duly examined,
there was no word of the opening of Congress; and at
a meeting of the eigKtToiT November 18 it was post-//
poned to an indefinite date.2 That date was, of course,
never reached, and the ..Congress of the whole body of
plenipotentiaries never came into existence at all.
Meanwhile, the organization for the transaction of
business grew out of the necessities of the situation;
and machinery was set up which derived its authority
from no consistent principle. The Committee of Eight
assumed without further authorisation the position of!
a formal directing Committee; the Federal Constitu-
tion was continually discussed by the German Com-
mittee, which also at times discussed the territorial
arrangements. The reunion of Sardinia and Genoa, x
1 B. and F.S.P., II, 563.
2 Ibid., 570.
potentiaires russes, prussiens, anglais et autrichiens se
soumettent vis-a-vis du Congres est la connaissance qu'ils
veulent donner a toute l'Europe de leurs^arrangements respectifs.
.... Les plenipotentiaires francais entendent le mot ' Congres
dans son acceptation ordinaire, .... les Ministres des
autre grandes puissances ne veulent point s'en tenir a cette notion
connue mais le considerer simplement comme une reunion de
toutes les puissances sur un meme point pour faciliter leurs
arrangements." Fournier, Die Geheimpolizei, &c., p. 278.
:
72 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
already decided on in principle at Paris, was ratified
by the Committee of Eight, the request of Talleyrand
and Labrador to proceed with the other Italian affairs
being refused ; and special Committees were formed on
xthe nomination of the four Powers to consider the
affairs of Switzerland. But the real kernel of the
vhole settlement, the Polish-Saxon question, which in-
volved also the whole territorial distribution of
Germany, was discussed in no formal Committee at
all, .but merely by interviews and the exchange of
letters and memoranda between the representatives of
the four. Tha_determination of the four to keep these
matters in their own hands persisted until they found
<; themselves on the verge of war, and neither Talleyrand
nor anyone else could alter their decision. The only
thing that he had done was to prevent these meetings
of the four Powers from being officially recognised;
but all knew that, if once an agreement could be
reached, their decisions must be ratified by the rest of
Europe The reason why they allowed the matter to
^pdrag on was because they had drifted into open opposi-
v tion, which grew daily more and more irreconcilable J
The attention of the principal statesmen was, in
fact, directed so much to the substance of the negotia-
, tions that the form had become a secondary matter, and
| the ascendancy of the four was so great that the pleni-
potentiaries of the other Powers had no business to
'transact. Castlereagh did not even report on these
changes in organization until November 21, when he
was able to announce that all opposition was dying
away, and that the impossibility of assembling Con-
gress and the gradual growth of asuitableorganization
had been submitted to, both by Talleyrand and by the
other plenipotentiaries.1 Both Metternich and Castle-
/reagh, despairing of overcoming the^Prusso-Russian
alliance, were indeed now beginning to treat Talley-
rand with more confidence, with the result that the
latter showed himself more and more accommodating
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov. 21, 1814, F.O. Continent 9.
lyJ f+
COMMITTEE OF FIVE 73
in the matter of organization. Conferences of the
eight Powers were held on December 9, 10, and 14, at <*
which, on the initiative of Talleyrand, Committees
were set up on the question of the rank of diplomatic
representatives (all the eight Powers having members)
and on the navigation of international rivers, Austria,
France, Great Britain, and Prussia being represented ;
while only the opposition of Spain and Portugal pre-) S
vented a formal Committee from being also appointed1^
to consider the abolition of the slave trade.1
Section 17. The Constitution of the Committee of
Five; the Real Congress. — This rapprochement
between France and Great Britain and Austria was
soon to receive more formal expression. Towards the
end of December Castlereagh proposed to the other
members of the four the formation of a Statistical
Commission to ascertain the real numbers of the
populations of the territories in dispute, and provide
some basis of settlement.2 It had not at first been his
intention to include a French plenipotentiary on this
Committee, which would have to play an important
part in determining the territorial distribution; but,
when Talleyrand made it an essential condition for
the continuance of his support that France should be
represented on it, both Castlereagh and Metternich
acquiesced.3
There shortly followed a complete change in the
constitution of the Congress. Again it was the logic^
of events and not the deliberate planning of the states-
men that determined the forms by which they worked.
On December 24 Alexander insisted on bringing to-
formal conferences the discussion on the Polish ques-
tion, which had now lasted three months, and had
reached a complete deadlock. The Committee of Four,
therefore, which had hitherto only met in the most in-
1 B. and F.S.P., II, 573, 578.
2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Dec. 24, 1814, F.O. Continent 9.
See below, Section 21.
3 Pallain, p. 200; W.S.D., IX, 503. c
74 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
formal way, was now constituted as a formal confer-
y. ence.1 At its first meeting Castlereagh and Metter-
.knich insisted that France should be represented.2 The
explosion that ensued and the signature of the Secret
Treaty of January 3, 1815, are narrated in a subsequent
section (see pp. 106-115). 3 But the result of the defeat
of Prussian trucuience was to turn the Committee of
Four into a Committee of Five.4 For over a week the
issue hung in the balance ; but eventually Prussia gave
K /way, and at the last meeting on January 9 Castlereagh
V made a formal demand for the inclusion of France,
which was agreed to by all the four Powers.
L Thus, at last, Talleyrand had won his way into the
\% real directing Committee. This result had, however,
been less due to any effort or intrigue on his part than
IS to the fact that the four Powers had been unable to
agree, and had, in fact, come to the verge of war. But
Talleyrand, now that he was admitted to the inner
! Committee, abandoned all ideas of constituting a
' general Congress; and no more was heard of the
rights of the small Powers. The result was that
^the formal Committee of Five, originally designed
merely to settle the Saxon question, became the
'real directing Committee of the CongressN It at
first settled, piece by piece, the territorial distribu-
tion of Germany; and, when this was accomplished, it
reviewed and adjusted the reports of the other Com-
mittees. 'In fact, it worked out the territorial details
of the Treaty of Vienna, and the actual agreements
were recorded in its protocols. The Committee of
/Eight only met nine times before the last Conferences
to sign the Final Act, while in the same period the
Committee of Five held forty-one meetings. Thejtruth
is, that at last the natural and normal organ of work
ft* -'had been found. The Committee of Five represented
\y the force that governed Europe. Once the five Great
1 D'Angeberg, p. 1861.
2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Jan. 1, 1814. F.O. Continent 10.
3 See Section 25.
* Protocol of Jan. 9, B. and F.S.P., II, 597, 601.
COMMITTEE OF FIVE %
Powers were really determined on settlement, this was
the obvious means to bring it about. The proposal,
therefore, which had been suggested in the early meet-
ings of a Committee of the Great Powers directing the
Congress, was finally brought about, though only by)
the admission of France to an equal place with the/
four and the recognition that Spain was not a Great
Power.
The Committee of Five, then, is the " real Congress 1/
of Vienna."1 Its first business was to arrange the com-
promises on the main territorial settlement which were
concluded between January 7 and February 13. f
Castlereagh, who was determined not to leave Vienna I
while a subject was left open which was likely to leaAT
to war amongst the Great Powers, took the- lead in
these transactions. Using the information provided
for him by the Statistical Commission, by interview
after interview with Sovereigns and Ministers, he
gradually secured a distribution of the German and
Polish territories, which all the three Powers in-
terested were able to accept. These arrangements
were then formally adopted in the Committee of Five,
and recorded on its protocols; and so rapidly was the
work done that on February 8 a Drafting Committee
was appointed by the Five to work out the plan of a
general treaty. Though some thorny questions, such as
the territorial arrangements between Austria and
Bavaria, were to occupy the Committee for* a consider-
able time, the main difficulties were now over. Except
in one particular, the Committee? of Five, after Castle-
reagh's departure, was dealing with questions of which
the principle had been settled, and which were, there-
fore, susceptible of treatment by minor diplomatic
functionaries ; and officials so skilled as Gentz and La
Besnardiere soon turned the complicated discussions
as to territory, servitudes, boundaries, royal and feudal
domains, debts and commercial interests, into articles
1 So described by Humboldt in his " Systematic Description
of the Proceedings of the Congress of Vienna," June 15, 1815,
quoted in Treitschke, op. cit., II, 72.
V
76 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
which were attached to the protocols, and thus made
ready for a treaty. The exception was the situation
created by the return of Napoleon. For the Committee
of Five also acted as a political and military Com-
mittee to direct the coalition against France, and on
its protocol^ were recorded the decisions necessary t/fa
meet the new danger. *
Section 18. The Functions of the Committee of
Eight and of the German Committee. — Though the
/ Committee of Five became the centre of the Congress,
the Committee of Eight still existed, and met on
several occasions. It was retained as an organ for
those questions of wider interest which did not involve
territorial alterations. Thus the Committees that had
been appointed, to deal with the questions of inter-
national rivers, precedence of ambassadors, &c, re-
ported to it; while it also received the report of the
Conference on the Slave Trade, and drew up a formal
^-declaration on the subject. The Swiss Committee also
reported to the Committee of Eight, which approved
the final declaration on the subject, though the Com-
mittee of Five also considered this question. The Com-
/mittee of Eight was also chosen as the organ of the
declaration of March 13 against Napoleon, when it
spoke in the name of all Europe, much to the discontent
of some of the minor Powers.1 Its protocol of May 13
on this subject was also subsequently signed by many
of the minor Powers. In short, the Committee of Eight
i was apparently intended to be used,' when it was neces-
'/sary, to consider subjects affecting the general interests
of all Europe; and it was to this Committee that the
Final Act, when the Committee of Five had prepared
it, was given for signature.
1 Minister, op. cit., p. 228: " It is reasonably asked by what
right the eight Powers signing the Treaty of Paris speak in the
name of all the Sovereigns of Europe, whom they were not at the
trouble of consulting; by what right Sweden and Portugal decide
for Sardinia, Denmark, the Low Countries, or Bavaria. The
Kings of Bavaria and Denmark, both present, have with
reason regarded this omission as an insult."
COMMITTEE OF EIGHT 77
Lastly, it must be remembered that, side by side
with the Committee of Five, and in no way constituted
by it or depending on it, sat the Committee to consider
the German Constitution.1 The original Committee <
which held thirteen meetings, perished in the midst of
the dissensions of November. It was not until May 23 *
that a new Conference was instituted; containing
representatives of all the minor States of Germany
except Wiirttemberg, which would have nothing to do
with it. In the time at its disposal it could not work
out a full scheme. It merely created a central body and
laid down some general principles; and the Constitu- /
tion of Germany was not completed until the final
meeting at Vienna five years afterwards. But it is
noteworthy that both the Germanic Committees were >
separate from the rest of the organization of the Con-
gress. Their only connection with the central Com-
mittees was the incorporation of some of the articles
they had agreed upon in the Final Act, which set the
seal of the Great Powers on their work.
It is seen, therefore, that the Congress of Vienna as
a Congress of all Europe was never constituted. It
remained a Congress of the Great Powers, who for.'L^
their convenience had summoned the smaller Powers of
Europe to meet them. The idea of a constituent
assembly, imagined by some, which Talleyrand had
tried to use for his own purposes, was found to be
impossible. The large number of small States made
such an assembly impracticable in any case. • But the
wishes of the masters of Europe were from the first
clear and unbending on this point. They considered
themselves as " Europe/' and at the Congress they
asserted successfully the ascendency of the Great
Powers. The smaller States were only to be admitted
at such times and on such terms as suited those who
had great resources and armies at their command.
Section 19. The Preparation of the Form, of the
Treaty. — The exact form in which the treaty should be
1 See below. Section 28.
78 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
finally drawn up was a subject of controversy almost to
the close of the Congress. The problem was not an
easy one, and on the whole it was solved in a manner
jwhich did credit to the diplomatists concerned. In
this question, as in so many others, it was the insistence
of the British plenipotentiaries which finally settled
the points in dispute. When the discussions in
January and February had resulted in agreement on
the territorial arrangements in Germany and Poland,
the Committee of Five nominated a Commission de
redaction, which contained mostly the same members
as the Statistical Commission, which had just been
investigating the territories in dispute. This reported
/ on February 10 a plan for the first thirty-two articles
/ of a treaty, which covered the points already discussed ;
and this scheme was approved by the plenipotentiaries
1 at this and the next Conference.1 The actual drafting
of the articles had, however, yet to be undertaken.
Many of these had been agreed to and consigned to the
protocols by the end of February, and the final redac-
tion could now be begun.
On March 6, therefore, the Committee of Five ap-
pointed two chief draftsmen (Gentz and La Besnar-
diere) to draw up a treaty from the protocols; and a
Committee, containing a representative of each of the
five Great Powers, was associated with them in the
work. It was decided, however, to refer the matter
- to the Committee of Eight; and in this Committee a
third chief draftsman was added in the person of
Anstett, a Eussian, and a representative of each of the
eight Powers was appointed to supervise the work.
Anstett, however, was ill, and La Besnardiere was
unable to work, so moved was he by the return of
Napoleon. To Gentz alone, therefore, was left the
tafek of drawing up the form of the treaty, and he sub-
mitted a scheme at the end of March.2
1 JVAngeberg, 707, 737, 774, 776.
2 Clancarty to Castlereagh, April 1, 1815, F.O. Continent 7:
B. and F.S.P., II; Gentz, Depeches Inedites, p. 162. Stem
also drew up a plan for the treaty. Pertz, G. H., Das Leben dcs
Ministers Freikerrn von Stein, VI, 2, 13
FORM OF TREATY *9
The decision to have one general treaty had not,
however, been arrived at without some controversy.
The idea had been persistently opposed by the Rus-
sians, who wished merely to have each separate
transaction recorded in its own treaty. But Castle--^
reagh insisted on the inclusion of all the agreements in
the general treaty; and this view was upheld with
success by Wellington, who, however, never realised
all the difficulties of securing the redaction of so for-
midable an instrument, and expected everything to be
concluded in a very short space of time.1 Difficulties, /
however, continued to arise; and, now that Europe was
again being organized for battle against Napoleon, it
was impossible to delay the settlement of the final
agreements on the territorial arrangements by formal
treaty between the Powers specially interested.3
Separate treaties were, therefore, concluded concerning ^
Poland between Kussia, Prussia, and^Austria, Great Jj
BrlTaililiecl^ party, since jl
t^stiereagh wanted to appear as little responsible as /
possible for the Polish partitions. A similar treaty^
was concluded as to Saxony, and this example was
followed in other matters as they became ripe for a full
settlement; while on other questions, such as the slave--
trade, a form of declaration was drawn up. The
Russian plenipotentiaries used this situation to
attempt once more to avoid the signing of a general
treaty, but Clancarty insisted on concluding it before s
the diplomatists separated. He suspected, not with-
out reason, that Russia wished to avoid committing
herself at this moment on several questions which
would necessarily be included in the Final Act. He
carried the day, assisted by the Prussians, who wanted
as much guarantee for their new possessions as pos-
sible, and by Talleyrand, who wanted Louis XVIII's
1 On March 12 he thought the final treaty would be signed by
the end of the month, and when he left he only gave it to the
middle of April.
2 This course was urged by Castlereagh as soon as he received
news of Napoleon's escape. W.S.D., IX, 590.
80 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
name on a public treaty. By a protocol of May 26
Gentz was again entrusted with the redaction of the
general treaty, while Clancarty and Humboldt were ap-
pointed to watch in the interests of the other Powers.1
^treatyof^llQ articles was thus drawn up. Not
all thT^separate agreements were included in the
articles, but the other treaties and declarations were
added as appendices, and given the same force as if
they had been embodied in the treaty itself. The
actual subjects chosen for insertion in the general
treaty were somewhat arbitrarily selected, but were in-
tended to include all the most important territorial
changes. At the last moment Metternich insisted on
the basis of the German Confederation being included
in the treaty, which necessitated the addition of eleven
articles, the total being thus 121.
Next came the question as to who was to sign the
instrument thus prepared. The mere labour of pre-
paring copies would alone have prevented all the
sovereign States affected being made parties.2 Many
of the Powers had now no plenipotentiary left at
Vienna, while some would have been certain to raise
objections. It was therefore decided to confine the
/ signatures to the eight Powers, which, since Spain
would have nothing to do with a treaty which it con-
sidered had entirely neglected its interests, meant
seven Powers only.3 On June 9 the plenipotentiaries
1 Minister, op. cit., 268; Clancarty to Wellington, May 26,
1815, W.S.D., X, 380; Protocol of May 26, 1815, B. and F.S.P.,
II, 738; Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, May 23 and 27, 1815.
Pa'llain, pp. 426, 428; Talleyrand, Memoires, III, 193; Gentz,
Depeches Inedites, p. 165.
2 It took twenty-six secretaries, working from morning to night,
to prepare a copy of the treaty. Klinkowstrom, p. 538.
3 Clancarty to Castlereagh, June 10, 1815, F.O. Continent 19;
Minister, op. cit., p. 274: " It is agreed that the Powers sub-
scribing the. Treaty of Paris should alone sign, and that the rest
of the Courts should accede separately. This _ distinction is
arbitrary in itself, and even unsound. . . . But it was^ difficult
to find another way of diminishing the number and the intricacy
of the ratifications, which would amount to more than 1,600 if
all the Courts had signed and exchanged formal Acts."
FORM OF TREATY 81
of these seven Powers met and initialled all the articles
except those concerning the German Constitution, which
were not yet ready. The Russian plenipotentiaries,
however, declared that they could not sign the treaty
until Alexander had seen it in its completed form.
There were no sinister motives in this refusal, which
simply marked the subordination in which Alexander
kept his Ministers. The other plenipotentiaries, and
especially Clancarty, were, however, so dismayed at
this news that Nesselrode set out in haste to get per-
mission to sign.1 Clancarty 's anxiety on June 19,
when a final sitting was held to affix the formal signa-
tures, may therefore well be excused. Amid the
sarcasms and scarcely hidden jeers of the other pleni-
potentiaries he insisted on re-reading the whole treaty,
and kept them waiting till midnight before he would
sign.
" On ne peut pas etre trop scrupuleux," he said, " dans
cette affaire ; cet instrument sera un titre de famille pour ceux
qui y ont mis leur nom."2
As it was, permission for the Russians to sign did not
arrive till eight days later, and the treaty was not /
finally completed till June 26. All the Great Powers,
as well as Portugal and Sweden, had then signed, the
last-named, however, protesting against certain articles,
notably that which restored Ferdinand to Naples. A
protest by Consalvi on behalf of the Papal Court,
which dealt mainly with the neglect of the Pope's tem-
poral interests, did nothing to lower the importance of
the Final Act in public opinion.
A-genera] instrument had thus been created which
served as a basis for the international life of Europe?
for nearly fifty years. It was of first-class importance
1 Clancarty to Castlereagh, Ibid. : " We strongly represented
not only the inconvenience and delay which would be thus in-
curred but the incalculably pernicious consequences which must
infallibly follow from the appearance thus afforded of difference
and disunion, or at least of strong jealousies being prevalent
among the Allies." /Nv>
2 Klinkowstrom, p. 537,
r285 — 69"| G
K$
■
82 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
that the insistence of the British and French plenipo-
tentiaries on this form of treaty had met with success.
By uniting all the separate instruments in the Acte
final a much more solemn document was constructed
than would have been a collection of treaties and
declarations, some of which would have lacked the
| signature of many of the Powers. By the procedure
adopted, each Power, in order to obtain .from the
Vienna Treaty the protection and guarantee of its own
special interests, had also to agree to the rest, however
much it might object to any particular portion of it.
As almost every State was affected by the treaty, the
^result was to pla-ce the Vienna settlement in a special
position, which no other instrument has ever attained
/ The rest of Europe was invited to sign the treaty by
accession. Several of the minor Powers refused for some
time, either because they violently disagreed with some
of the stipulations, or because there were still some
arrangements outstanding which they desired to see
completed before they committed themselves. But, in
the end, practically the whole of Europe acceded to the
' treaty; and its stipulations were thus in a special way
agreed to, and in a sense guaranteed by all the
, sovereign States of Europe. The Pjope and the Sultan
• were, of course, exceptions, both for rather pettv
reasons, and both, ultimately, much to their own dis-
advantage.
As has been seen, when the Congress met there had
been in Europe a desire to give the new arrangements
something more than the form of a treaty — a desire to
add such special guarantees of the whole as would
intimidate any Power which might try to overthrow it.
Such an attempt to give permanence to a territorial
settlement which was defensible solely by the principle
of the balance of power would, in any case, have been
doomed to failure. But the idea formally brought for-
ward by Castlereagh, and warmly welcomed by the
Emperor of Russia, is worthy of more extended con-
sideration as the first attempt by European statesmen
to make their agreements permanent.
\
VIENNA TREATY 83
Section 20. The Project of a Special Guarantee of
the Vienna Treaty. — This project for a special
guarantee of the Vienna Treaty was brought forward
by Castlereagh just before his departure. After the
crisis of the Polish-ISaxon question was ended, both the
contending parties wished to renew their alliances with \
Castlereagh before he left Vienna. The Tsar, who
knew of the secret treaty of January 3, 1815
rather cleverly pressed for a renewal of the
Quadruple Alliance, while Metternich and Talleyrand
wished to conclude further secret engagements.
Castlereagh, in order to check both these proposals,
and at the same time give a special safeguard to that
territorial equilibrium which he hoped had been suc-
cessfully established, brought forward a scheme for a
special declaration to safeguard the arrangements
which had cost so much effort to conclude.
" I submitted to the Emperor," he reported, " that the best
alliance that could be formed in the present state of Europe
was that the Powers who had made the peace should, by a \
public declaration at the close of the Congress, announce to \
Europe, whatever difference may have existed in the details,
their determination to uphold and support the arrangements I
agreed upon; and, further, their determination to unite their [
influence, and if necessary their arms, against the Power that
should attempt to disturb it."1
Alexander had himself long ago put forward ideas not
altogether dissimilar,2 and he professed himself enthu-
siastic over the proposal. j
Gentz was accordingly asked to draw up the de-
claration, and produced a verbose and not very happily
worded document.3 It would, however, have bound
the Powers to oppose, with arms if necessary, any
attempt to overthrow "1'ordre etabli " by the treaty;
and Castlereagh at this time undoubtedly expected the
declaration to be issued to the world.4
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Feb. 13, 1815, F.O. Continent 7.
2 Alison Phillips, op. cit.„ p. 32.
3 D'Angeberg, p. 864; Klinkowstrom, p. 529.
4 Castlereagh, Circular Despatch, Feb. 13, 1815: " It affords
me great satisfaction to acquaint you that there is every prospect
[285—69] G 2
84 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
Castlereagh united this scheme with a project for
obtaining in the Vienna treaty a guarantee of the in-
tegrity of the Ottoman Empire. The Porte, genuinely
alarmed at the increase of Russian power, had been
pressing this idea on both the British and Austrian
Governments for some time.1 Metternich had been un-
willing to risk a proposal of this nature in the state
of his relations with Russia, but Castlereagh seized
this opportunity to bring the matter before Alexander.
If the Tsar's new possessions in Poland were to receive
the special guarantee of Europe, a guarantee of those
of the Porte might be claimed as a quid pro quo.
Alexander could not very well refuse, without betray-
ing designs which were in direct contradiction to the
lofty principles he was joining in defending. But he
made it a condition that the points in dispute between
Russia and the Porte, which had arisen since the has-
tily-executed Treaty of Bucarest (1812), should first
be settled through the intervention of Great Britain,
France, and Austria; and he also wished that some-
thing should be done to prevent the massacre of the
Serbs, to which the Turks had now turned their
energies.2 These conditions were sufficient to make his
consent useless; and, though the British Ambassador
did his best to get the Porte to agree, the proposal was
1 Sir Robert Liston to Castlereagh, Mar. 10, July 25, 1815,
F.O. Turkey 82; Gentz, Depeches Ineditcs, 1, 121, 142.
2 Castlereagh to Liston, Feb. 14, 1815, F.O. Continent 12;
Fournier, Die Geheimpolizei, &c, p. 411, where the report of the
Turkish representative, Mavrojeni, is given; Wellington to Castle-
reagh, Feb. 25, 1815, W.S.D., IX, 578.
of the Congress terminating with a general accord and guarantee
between the Great Powers of Europe, with a determination to
support the arrangement agreed upon, and to turn the general
influence, and if necessary the general arms, against the Power
that shall first attempt to disturb the Continental peace." F.O.
Continent 8. See also the " Declaration des Plenipotentiaires de
-la Grande-Bretagne par rapport a la garantie," annexed to the
protocol of February 11; D'Angeberg, J). 1860,
VIENNA TREATY 85
rejected even before the news of Napoleon's return
reached Constantinople.1
This rebuff was not likely to make England press
the general scheme; and the return of Napoleon, which
brought about a renewal of the Quadruple Alliance,
inevitably increased the difficulties of guaranteeing
the new order in Europe. It is, however, surprising
to find Russia, at a later stage, pressing the adoption
of a special guarantee, while Austria and England
opposed it.2 The motives which led to this result are
not fully known, but they appear to have been based
on the uncertainty of the situation in Europe and the
failure of the negotiations concerning Turkey. The
Final Act, therefore, had no greater sanction than any
other treaty. The impression produced on Alexander
by the transaction was, however, immense. It awoke
ideas that had been in his mind at previous epochs,
and these, twisted into a strange shape by the emotional
crisis he was to experience during the course of the
year, produced the strange document of the Holy
Alliance.3 The Holy Alliance, however, was drawn up
on lines very different from those of Castlereagh's
scheme, which was simply a territorial guarantee. It
should also be noted that, while Castlereagh's scheme
was specially suited to protect the interests of the
1 Liston to Wellington, Mar. 25, Apr. 4, 1815, F.O. Continent
Archives 26, F.O. Miscellaneous 95/23.
2 See a paper on " Some Aspects of Castlereagh's Foreign
Policy " by the present writer in the Transactions of the Koyal
Historical Society, 3rd series, vol. VI, Nov. 16, 1911. A subse-
quent examination of the Petrograd Archives confirms the fact
that Clancarty refused to agree to the scheme at a later date;
Nesselrode to Lieven, June 5-17, 1815. The refusal was attributed
by the Kussians to secret projects between Austria and England
on the model of the treaty of January 3, 1815.
3 There can be no doubt that the idea of the Holy Alliance
was given to Alexander by this proposal. Castlereagh was of
that opinion (see Castlereagh to Liverpool, Sept. 28, 1815.
W.S.D., XI, 176), and the Tzar confessed as much to his religious
confidant, Prince Golitzin, at a later date. Grand Duke Nicholas
Michaelovitch, L'Empereur Alexandre ler I. 524.
86 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
Porte, the Holy Alliance was so worded that only
Christian sovereigns could sign it.
It may be well also to remember that, in the discus-
sions that were to ensue during the period following
the Congress of Vienna on the exact character of the
treaties signed in his period, Castlereagh adopted the
view that the Vienna Treaty was no more sacred and
special than any other treaty which settled the limits
of the European States. By that time he had learnt
how difficult it was to guarantee territorial rights with-
out at the same time touching upon internal questions.
The extravagant schemes of Alexander had made him
welcome the fact that the Treaty of Vienna was no
European Alliance, but simply an ordinary treaty, the
breach of which gave any Power affected the right to
recourse to arms, but which implied no general promise
on the part of Europe to come to its support.1
Section 21. The Method of Transacting Business.
The Functions of the Committees. The Statistical
Committee. — The charge of idleness made against the
Congress is, on the whole, unfounded. The real work
could only be transacted by a comparatively small
number of people, and these were most of the time over-
whelmed with business. It was only the sovereigns,
minor plenipotentiaries, and the mass of irresponsible
visitors, who really had time to enjoy the daily routine
of pleasure provided by the Austrian Court. The
principal Ministers and their subordinates put in an
appearance only when it was necessary for them to
approach some royal personage or to meet some rival
or ally. Metternich was the least industrious'vof the
principal Ministers, as Gentz often complained, but
tho others never relaxed their efforts.
At the formal meetings of the Eight, held in Metter-
nich's room, there were usually eighteen to twenty
persons present ; and the scene has been perpetuated in
1 See Appendix VIII, p. 166. Memorandum presented to the
Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, Oct. 1818.
METHOD OF BUSINESS 87
a picture by Isabey. Metternich was President of this
Committee, and Gentz acted as its secretary; and in
this sense they were President and Secretary of the
Congress.1 At the Committee of Five Wessenberg
acted as protocolist. Gentz, however, and his sub-
ordinates kept what was substantially a " Bureau de
Protocole," which served as the business centre of the
Congress; and Gentz expressly styled himself " First
Secretary of the Congress/'2 The main business was,
however, transacted informally. During the first four
months the Ministers of the four Powers met nearly
every morning at Metternich's for an informal confer-
ence. For some time also the three Sovereigns met in
the afternoon to review the matters which had been
discussed by their Ministers in the morning. It was
necessary for innumerable private interviews to take
place between the Ministers and the representatives of
smaller Powers ; and it was in these private conferences
that the decisions on the big questions were arrived at.
Castlereagh, especially, who was acting as mediator,
scarcely allowed a single document to be exchanged
between the Powers on the Polish-Saxon question
without either preparing the way for it by an inter-
dew or smoothing away difficulties by personal ex-
planations. The technical work by which the ideas
and compromises of the Ministers were put into shape
was managed by a small group of men. Of these
the chief were Humboldt, who was mainly responsible
for the numerous Prussian papers; Clancarty, who
was one of the most industrious i and conscientious
workers at the Congress ; Dalberg, who added the prac-
tical touches to Tallevrand's outbursts; La Besnar-
1 Metternich, however, disclaimed the title of " President of
the Congress." D'Angeberg, 197.
2 Klinkowstrom, p. 538. One of Talleyrand's original ideas
was the formation of a Bureau de Protocole for the Congress,
which he suggested should be in charge of La Besnardiere, Cook,
the British Under-Secretary, and Binder, an Austrian diplomatist.
The nationality of the three officials is significant. Miinster,
Sept. 2. 1814. Hanover Archives
88 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
diere, who composed many of his ablest papers; Wes-
senberg, who made up for Metternich's lack of in-
dustry; and Gentz, who drew up nearly all the most
important declarations, drafted the treaty, and found
time to send long despatches to the Hospodar of
.Wallachia. Both Prussia and Austria had also a
number of capable civil servants who rendered
invaluable service.
Special Committees. — As has been seen, various
Committees x were set up to deal with special questions.
These were constituted on no set principle, being
appointed from time to time as circumstances required.
The members of them were not always plenipoten-
tiaries, minor officials being allowed to take part. The
Committee of Five, the real Congress, however, kept
so much of the work in its own hands that the total
number of these Committees is surprisingly small,
when the large number of subjects covered is con-
sidered. The Committees were all nominated by the
Committee of Eight or the Committee of Five (except
the German Committee, which arose of itself, and
the Swiss Committee), and to these two directing
Committees the sub- Committees reported — to the Com-
mittee of Eight if the subject were of a general nature,
and to the Committee of Five if territorial questions
were concerned. The Committees consisted for the
most part of representatives of the five Great Powers,
though in one or two the minor Powers were also repre-
sented. Not all of the five Powers were, however,
represented on all the Committees, only those specially
interested having members.
The most important Committee was that on Switzer-
land, consisting of representatives of the four Powers,
a French one being added later. It was appointed
apparently by the Ministers of the four Powers, and
met first formally on November 14, 18 14.2 It conferred
1 For details of the constitution of the Committees see also the
paper on International Congresses, No. 154, Part II, Section 10.
2 D'Angeberg, 430. The exact occasion on which it was
appointed is obscure.
SPECIAL COMMITTEES 89
with the Swiss representatives, and eventually re-
ported to the Committee of Eight, but its territorial
arrangements were also considered by the Committee
of Five, altered, and referred back by them.1 A Com-
mittee on Tuscany, appointed by the Committee of
Eight, contained representatives of Spain and France,
as well as of Austria, Russia, and England. There
were also small Committees appointed to consider the
transfer of Genoa to Sardinia and the complicated
question of the Duchy of Bouillon.
Three Committees were also appointed by the Com-
mittee of Eight to deal with the three general questions
brought before the Congress. That on the slave trade,
however, was not allowed to call itself a Committee,
but only a Conference. Spain and Portugal had mem-,
bers on it, as well as England and France, while
Sweden, Russia, and Austria were also represented.
The important Committee on international rivers at
first consisted only of the Great Powers interested, but
subsequently representatives of the smaller riparian
Powders were added to it. Each of the eight Powers was
represented on the Committee appointed to examine
the relative status of European Powers and their diplo-
matic agents. These three Committees reported to
the Committee of Eight, and their reports were
adopted by it.
The functions and constitution of the drafting Com-
mittee has already been considered.2 The Statistical
Committee, of which details are given below, was the
only other formed. The total, not counting the Com-
mittee of Eight, and that of the Five, was only ten,
including the German Committee. The small size
of the directing Committee and the wrish of the prin-
cipal plenipotentiaries to keep affairs in their own
hands accounts for the small number necessary to deal
with so many complicated questions. It may be
doubted if the efficiency of the Congress would have
been increased by any further devolution of business.
1 D'Angeberg, 735, 930, 932.
2 See above, Section 19.
90 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
The territorial questions were all closely related, and
needed consideration as a whole, and, if separate*?,
would have constantly needed reference back to the
Committee of Five.
One of the conspicuous successes of the Congress was
the Statistical Committee. As has been stated, this
Committee was one of Castlereagh' s ideas, and it is dif-
ficult to see how the Congress could have come to any
definite conclusion without it. There had already been
considerable recrimination as to the population of the
territories under discussion. The problem of the re-
construction of Prussia was largely an arithmetical
one. The Committee was ordered to make a complete
enumeration of all the territories conquered from
Napoleon and his Allies. Martens, the international
lawyer, acted as its secretary, but the chief work was
done by Hoffmann, a Prussian statistician of deserved
reputation ; and the result was to establish, in the main,
the Prussian figures. The sources on which the Com-
mission drew were, of course, largely non-official, since
a systematic census had never been taken of many terri-
tories. Nevertheless, the only serious difficulties were
found in the enumeration of the Duchy of Warsaw.
where a mean between two disputed figures was
accepted'. The Commission was not appointed till
December 24 ; and on January 19 it was able to furnish
the Committee of Five with a report, which gave
statistics of population of all the territories with which
they were concerned. It had been originally the in-
tention, both of Castlereagh and Metternich, that
something more than a mere evaluation of numbers
should be made, and that the riches of the respective
provinces and the quality of their inhabitants should
be taken into consideration.1 But this view was suc-
cessfully opposed by Prussia; and the Committee was
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Dec. 24, 1814, F.O. Continent 9
(see Appendix VII); Pallain, p. 201; D'Angeberg, p. 561. See C.
Dupuis, Le Principe d'Equilibre et le Concert europecn, pp. 60 ft. ;
F. von Arneth, Johann Freiherr von Wessenberg, I, 233. Miin-
ster also tried to use this Commission for political purposes.
ESPIONAGE 91
eventually strictly enjoined not to take into considera-
tion anything but the actual numbers. Talleyrand,
indeed, made some protest against a valuation which
reckoned an inhabitant of Poland and one of the rich
territories of Saxony and the Rhine as of equal worth.
But it was impossible to put these ideas into practice,
as they would have introduced standards of value
which could not be really weighed by the statisticians.
The result was, of course, much to the advantage of
Prussia.
Section 22. Espionage. The Social Life of. the
Congress. — At Vienna there was in existence the most
completely organized secret police in Europe;1 not even
Napoleon, with the help of Fouche, possessed a machine
of such efficiency. When it was known that the Con-
gress was to meet at Vienna, immense preparations
were made to strengthen the personnel of this secret ser-
vice. Not only was there engaged a large number of
new agents in every class of society, but also a number
of volunteers, many of the highest rank, were enlisted
in the service of the Emperor by Hager, the industrious
head of the secret police. From the opening of the
Congress to its close the vigilance of these agents never
relaxed. The wastepaper-baskets of the diplomatists,
whose contents were obtained by servants placed there
for the purpose, provided a rich store of material.
Every letter that came through the post was, of course,
opened. This was the usual custom, and known to all
diplomatists. If they sent anything by post which
they did not wish to be read, cipher was always used.2
But the Austrian police obtained, through the venality
1 The activities at the Congress of the secret police have recently
been revealed by two historians who have had access to the docu-
ments of the Ministry of the Interior in Vienna. See Fournier
(A.), Die Geheimpolizei auf dem Wiener Kongress; Weil (M. H.),?
Lcs Dessous du Congres de Vienne, 2 vols.
2 But some ciphers were known. The Prussians obtained a
copy of the British cipher during the Napoleonic wars, and this
fact was not discovered till 1817. The Prussians also had the
Austrian and Swedish cipher. F.O. Prussia, 108, 114.
92 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
of couriers and servants, many letters and notes which
were thought to have been despatched quite safely. A
daily report of these documents was sent to the
Emperor by the chief of the secret police, together
with a record of a large number of conversations which
had been shared in or overheard by his agents. Even
the Austrian Court and Ministers were not exempt
from this espionage, which attempted to include in its
meshes every person of the slightest importance at
Vienna.
By such means the police did find out a very great
deal. Their reports were, perhaps, most useful in
furnishing details of the relations of one person to
another and in gauging the public opinion of the
Congress. The principal Ministers used their own
couriers, and thus their despatches were generally safe,
while the actual facts as to the most important transac-
tions were only known to a very few people. Still, a
great many very secret things were ascertained in this
way.1 The French Embassy, in particular, was indis-
creet; and the inner motives of Talleyrand's campaign
were fully known to the Austrians. The relations of
Alexander and Metternich with the Princess Bagratian
and the Duchess de Sagan were reported in the greatest
detail. A record of the visits that each important
Minister paid or received each day was carefully made.
Tow far the Austrian Foreign Office was able to use
this information to advantage is not known. It
appears possible that the Foreign Minister himself was
not shown all of it, the reports being made direct to
the Emperor. But it must have played a part in the
decisions of November and December, when the issue
of events was so uncertain; and it was very useful to
Metternich in the deep game of intrigue he played in
the Italian questions.
1 For example, the French Consul at Leghorn was engaged in
a plot to kidnap Napoleon. His report, written in sympathetic
ink between the lines of an ostensibly commercial report, was torn
up by Dalberg and thrown into the wastepaper-basket. It was
secured and pieced together by the secret agents.
SOCIAL LIFE £3
The secrets of the British mission were better
guarded than those of any other mission at Vienna.
The despatches were, of course, sent by couriers of tried
fidelity. The only intercepts were some sent to Con-
stantinople by Austrian couriers, the contents of
which were already known to Metternich. Special
instructions had also been given at the outset that the
contents of the wastepaper-baskets were to be carefully
burnt; and the Embassy staff was specially warned
against the dangers of Vienna social life. Thus,
though at one time some of the Embassy servants seem
to have been in the pay of the secret police, nothing of
the slightest importance was found out. In short,
Castlereagh anticipated the other diplomatists in pre-
cautions the necessity for which they only found out
by experience.
The social side of the Vienna Congress has impressed
itself on history, but its importance has been ex-
aggerated. As has been pointed out, the unending
series of balls, dinners, reviews, and fetes did not
greatly hinder the work of those whose industry was
important. More serious were the rivalries of various
ladies, in which Metternich and Alexander were in-
volved, and which certainly increased the friction
between them ; and a certain amount of indiscreet con-
versation was due to the presence of so many women.
Almost all the crowned heads and diplomatists
brought their wives and other female relations to
Vienna. Gentz's remark to Wessenberg:
" Eien de plus choquant que des generaux et des Ministres
qui trainent avec eux des femmes (epouses surtout) dans leurs
campagnes ou dans leurs missions,"
may be considered just, but on the whole the results
were less pernicious than might have been expected.
Section 23. Attempts to Influence the Decisions of
the Congress through Public Opinion and the Home
Governments. — The endeavours of the diplomatists at
Vienna to influence the course of events at the Congress
94 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
by applying pressure elsewhere, either through public
opinion or, in the case of Great Britain and France,
through the home Governments, though on the whole
entirely unsuccessful, are worthy of some notice.
Public opinion in Germany was greatly stirred by the
Saxon question and the problem of the German Consti-
tution. There was a great journalistic battle on these
subjects, in which all the Courts were concerned; and
Talleyrand was suspected on more than one occasion
of stirring up strife for his own purposes. It cannot,
however, be said that they affected the decisions of
the statesmen in any material degree. The Polish-
Saxon question was settled purely on grounds of ex-
pediency ; and the populations of Germany were trans-
I ferred from one monarch to another, with scarcely
the slightest reference to their wishes. The public
opinion of the Habsburg Kingdom was directed (in
the interests of Metternich) by Pilat in the Oester-
reichische Beobachter, while Gentz disseminated his
chief's views throughout Europe in articles which
have been described as masterpieces of force and point.
Public opinion in England w^as closely watched, and
especially the debates in the House of Commons.
" Tant que nous aurons un Parlement en Angleterre,
il y aura une tribune pour toute l'Europe," said Sir
Sidney Smith at the Congress; and his words were
repeated by a more profound publicist, the Abbe du
Pradt,1 The idea of using British public opinion to
influence Castlereagh occurred to more than one
Power. Talleyrand's notes were written to a certain
extent with this end in view, though he appears to
have taken no steps to act directly on the British
Government.2 Other diplomatists, however, wrote to
the British press, amongst them the Bavarian
Minister, who sent a letter to the Morning Chronicle,
the principal opponent of the Government, under the
1 Du Pradt, Congres de Vienne, I, 51.
2 The Comte de la Chastre, his representative at London, was.
however, ordered to discuss the Neapolitan question with the
Ministry, and to try to find out their real opinions. To La
Chastre Dec. 14, 1814, Archives des Affaires Etrangeres. Paris.
EXTERNAL INFLUENCE 95
pseudonym "Saxon."1 Metternich might have been
satisfied that he could not better the position which
Castlereagh had assumed ; but he tried to put pressure
on the Prince Regent in the question of subsidies, only
to meet with a complete rebuff. His Ambassador, Mer-
veldt, was also ordered to insert articles in the press.
Merveldt, however, who was not in Metternich's confi-
dence, spent much time in trying to remove a deeply-
rooted feeling in political circles that Austria was both
financially and militarily exhausted, but he received
a severe reproof for discussing the affairs of the Con-
gress with Liverpool and the Prince Regent.2
It was the Russians, however, despite their failure in
the early part of the year, who made the most deter-
mined attempt to undermine Castlereagh. Lieven was
instructed, in a series of despatches of December 1814,
that Castlereagh was deliberately attempting to keep
the Continent in a state of unrest in order to estab-
lish British influence in the rest of the world. He was
ordered to obtain access to the members of the Cabinet
who did not agree with Castlereagh's policy, especially
Bathurst, Sidmouth, and Vansittart. The principal
leaders of the Opposition were also to be sounded, while
every effort was to be made to influence public opinion
in a direction favourable to Russia's interests. For
this purpose the principal journalists were to be
approached, and views suitable to their different party
opinions were to be suggested to them. Special stress
was to be laid on the commercial advantages of a good
understanding with Russia ; and it was to be suggested
that the liberties of the English people were themselves
threatened by the support which the Foreign Minister
was giving to the most reactionary Continental Powers.
1 Pfeffel to Wrede, Jan. 19, 1815; Fournier, Die Geheimpolizei,
cfc, p. 365.
2 Merveldt to Metternich, Sept. 22, Oct. 4, Dec. 2, 1814,
Vienna Archives. The Courier was the paper chosen by Merveldt,
and some money appears to have changed hands, though the
Embassador reported that " English journalists affect not to bo
bought."
96 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
The various stages of the plan were carefully indi-
cated. First there was to be the attempt to win over
the Cabinet; only if this failed was recourse to be had
to the Opposition and the press.1
Subsequent experience showed the Russians that
they could do little by these means. Lieven reported
that the best way of winning a more favourable posi-
tion was to flatter the Prince Regent and to try to
overcome the marked hostility he displayed towards the
Russian Court. Orders were accordingly given for
orders and uniforms to be sent for the delectation of
His Royal Highness.2 Special instructions were also
sent, however, to watch over the discussions on the
Polish question in the British Parliament, in order
that the Russian point of view might be brought before
the British public. The total effect of all this was not
great. It is true that Castlereagh's policy was not
popular with his colleagues, but they were unable to
influence him. As for public opinion in England, it
was never sufficiently instructed and organized to pro-
duce any effect except in the question of the slave trade.
Castlereagh adopted with more success a similar
policy towards Talleyrand. When he was not satisfied
with the latter's attitude on the main points in dispute,
he endeavoured to work on the King and Blacas
through Wellington, hinting that, unless they agreed,
he might be compelled to recognise Murat, ,and was able
to get instructions sent which placed the Polish ques-
tion for the moment before the Saxon one.3 The
readiness of his home Government to come into line
with Great Britain undoubtedly affected Talleyrand's
policy, but it was also at bottom his own real desire ;
and the total effect of the pressure cannot be said to
have been of great importance. Metternich also en-
1 Projet d 'Instruction pour le Comte de Lieven, Dec. 1814,
Petrograd Archives. See Martens (F.), Becueil des Traites, dc,
XI, 211.
2 Nesselrode to Lieven, June 5-17, 1815, Petrograd Archives.
3 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Oct, 24. 1814, F.O. Continent 7;
Correspondence, X, 182, 185; W.S.D., IX, 417, 493, 494.
EXTERNAL INFLUENCE 97
deavoured to circumvent Talleyrand by opening direct
negotiations with Paris on the Italian question, and in
this scheme he had considerable success. But events
made this transaction of less importance than at one
time seemed probable.1 The truth was that nearly
all that was most powerful in Europe was concen-
trated at the Congress, and distances were too great and
the means of communication too slow for much effect
to be produced by action elsewhere.
1 See below, Section 27.
[285—69] H
/
PART III. THE WORK OF THE CONGRESS
Section 24. The Polish-Saxon Problem. The
failure of Castlereagh' s first "plan. — The decisions of/
the Congress of Vienna, as has been stated above,
depended almost entirely on the settlement of- the
Polish-Saxon question. As has been seen, Metternich
and Castlereagh hoped to achieve their ends in Poland
by sacrificing Saxony. If Poland could be saved from
falling, almost entirely brought under Russian rule,
or, instead of this, partitioned anew among the three
Powers, Metternich appeared willing to agree to the
lesser evil of the absorption of the whole of Saxony by
Prussia. The territories in the west of Germany,
which were at the disposal of the Congress, could then
be used to a large extent to build up Holland and
Hanover, and there would be a surplus left to facilitate
arrangements between Austria, Bavaria, arid Baden.
Nothing had, however, as yet been agreed to in writing
The plan depended on an informal understanding
between Hardenberg and Metternich, which Castle-
,- reagh had enthusiastically supported. T.wo great
obstacles still stood in the way. Metternich had to fear
the hostility of an Austrian party, led by Stadion and
Schwarzenberg ; while Hardenberg could not count on
the support of his King against the Tsar. There were
also other questions in dispute between the two
German Powers which threatened to break up their
alliance.
Of all these difficulties Castlereagh was fully aware,
but he was under the impression that, by himself direct -
1 See above, Section 14.
CASTLEREAGITS PLAN 99
ing the negotiations, he could overcome them and force
Russia to give way before the united opposition of her
three allies. The instructions which Castlereagh
certainly drew up for himself for the Congress of
Vienna have never been discovered. The principles
on which he acted are, however, not in doubt. His
main object, as he told his Cabinet in November, was
the establishment of a " jus^equilibrium " in Europe;1
and his conception of a " just equilibrium" meant
strengthening the centre of Europe against the East
and the West. For this purpose he wished, not only
for "a strong Prussia, but also for an alliance between
Prussia~1ina Austria. The extension of Russian
dominion over the whole of Poland he regarded as a
real menace to the security of Central Europe. He
would naturally have been glad to obtain an indepen-
dent Poland. But, though he constantly rendered lip-
service to this idea, it was never really contemplated
as a possible solution either by him or by any other
statesman at the Congress.,
The attack against Alexander was begun, not by
Hardenberg and Metternich, whose countries were
mainly concerned, but by the English Minister acting
as mediator. The Tsar condescended to argue his own
case, which he first stated in an interview with
Castlereagh at the end of September. Castlereagh,
after establishing the fact that neither Russia nor her
Allies were prepared to create an independent Poland,
set out once more all the arguments against the
Russian plan. Alexander's wish to give the Poles a
Constitution wTould, he maintained, ensure the dis-
affection of such Poles as were still left under Prussian
and Austrian rule ; and he insisted that Alexander was
defying the opinion of all Europe, including his own
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov. 11, 1814, F.O. Continent 8.
See an article by the present writer on England and the Polish-
Saxon Problem at the Congress of Vienna in Transactions of the
Royal Historical Society, 3rd series, vol. VII, where a selection
from Castlereagh's despatches is printed.
[285—69] H 2
100 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
Russian subjects. In reply, Alexander said his policy
was directed, not by Russian interests or his own
ambition, but with a view to the happiness of the Poles
I and from a sense of " moral duty " ; and he^hinted that
f public opinion in Great Britain approved Ins scheme. I
The impression he produced on Castlereagh, however, I
was that he was prepared to give up the idea of a
Polish Kingdom if he could be allowed to retain Polish
territory ; and in an interview with Nesselrode next day,
Castlereagh made it clear that he was not prepared to
allow the odium of vetoing a Polish Constitution to fall
on Great Britain. His objection, he said, to
Alexander's plans lay more in the extension of territory
which Russia would obtain than in the system by which
she proposed to administer it.1
In order to set the Austrian and Prussian Ministers
on a line of attack which he could himself support, he
drew up a memorandum for their guidance, which
based the opposition to Alexander's designs on the fact
that they were contrary to the treaties signed in 1813.
A second interview with Alexander followed. His plea
that he had a duty to the Poles was turned by Castle-
reagh against him. "I asked His Imperial Majesty
how he distinguished between his duty to the Poles on
one side of his line and on the other." He insisted
that the matter must be argued on grounds of ex-
pediency, which were the real motives animating the
Powers concerned. It would be an injustice to
Alexander to suppose that the interests of the Poles
did not play a considerable part in his decisions; and
he ultimately showed his good faith by granting them
the Constitution which he had promised. But it was
useless for him to plead his motive when he was not
prepared to press it to its logical conclusion and re-
establish a free Poland. It was Russian interests that
governed the major decision against independence;
and, on this point, Castlereagh fastened. Beaten in
logic, Alexander could only rely on the argument of
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Oct. 2, F.O. Continent 7.
CASTLEREAGH'S PLAN 101
force. On this point, too, Castlereagh had an
answer : —
" The Emperor insinuated that the ques/ion could only end
in one way, as he was in possession. I observed that it was
very true His Imperial Majesty was in possession, and he must
know that no one was less disposed than myself hostilely to
dispute that possession ; but I was sure His Imperial Majesty
would not be satisfied to rest his pretensions on a title of
conquest in opposition to the general sentiments of Europe."
He transmitted the same day to the Tsar the
memorandum he had drawn up for the guidance of
Metternich and Hardenberg, together with a letter
worded with the utmost frankness, so that there might
be no doubt as to his opinions.1 Meanwhile Alexander,
in interviews with Talleyrand and Metternich, had /
adopted an even more menacing tone.2 He made no
secret of the fact that he intended to keep almost all l
the Duchy of Warsaw, and he would make no con-
cessions of any kind.
The reason why Castlereagh had had to enter the
lists single-handed, instead of the three Courts making
a united protest, lay in the fact that the Austro-
Prussian Alliance was not yet completed. On his
arrival at Vienna, Castlereagh found that both
Metternich and Hardenberg were loth to commit
themselves. Metternich, indeed, talked loudly of war;
but, in spite of the negotiations of the summer, he
would not make in writing that definite offer of Saxony
to Prussia which alone could induce her to join him
in opposing Alexander; while Hardenberg dared take
no step that would risk a rupture with Russia, lest he
should be left without an ally. In these circumstances
it was impossible to get either Power to oppose
Alexander's threats by a show of force. But Castle-
reagh endeavoured to get them to combine to refuse to
recognise Poland as Russian territory. He personally
1 Castlereagh to Alexander, Oct. 12, 1814, W.S.D., 330 The
memorandum is printed in D'Angeberg, 265; W.S.D., I "1 332.
2 Pallain, Correspondance inedite du Prince Talleyrand et du
Eoi Louis XVIII, p. 18.
102 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
tried to influence the King of Prussia, but found him
unwilling to oppose Alexander, though he admitted
that he disapproved of his plans.
Castlereagh had more success with Metternich and
Hardenberg, between whom he contrived an interview.
Hardenberg explained very frankly that he could not
join in exposing Russia while assurances as regards
Saxony were still lacking. He promised, however, that,
if Austria and Great Britain would guarantee Saxony
to Prussia he would unite with them " to oppose such
resistance as prudence might justify to Russian
encroachments." Metternich was without a fixed plan,
and appeared already to have abandoned hope, but the
insistence of Castlereagh at last induced him to agree.1
Hardenberg immediately tried to obtain these promises
in writing by a letter of October 9, which formally
asked for the assent of England and Austria to the
incorporation of Saxony in Prussia, as wTell as the
acquisition of Mainz. Castlereagh gave immediate
consent. Metternich still hesitated. r Hardenberg
pressed for reply, and at last, on October 22, Metternich
agreed to the proposal.2 He made it conditional, how-
ever, on the success of the Polish negotiations, and he
declared that Bavaria must have Mainz. This was not
sufficient to satisfy Hardenberg; and it was only by
again bringing the two Ministers to a conference at
his hotel that Castlereagh at last got them to agree,
Hardenberg waiving the point of Mainz for the
moment. Castlereagh himself drew up a plan for joint
action. Alexander was to be threatened with a refusal
of all thcPPowers torecognise his Polish acquisitions.
The suggestion of "aiTindependent Poland on a large
scale was to be made, but this was not seriously
intended. A partition of the Duchy of Warsaw
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Oct. 9, 1814, F.O. Continent 7.
\ 2 HardenBerg to Metternich, Oct. 9, 1814, D'Angeberg. 1934;
Castlereagh to Hardenberg, Oct. 11, 1814?ST6id., 274, W.S.D.,
IX, 339; Hardenberg to Metternich, Oct. 21, 1814, F.O. Conti-
nent 7; Metternich to Hardenberg, Oct. 22, 1814, D'Angeberg,
1939.
CASTLEREAGH'S PLAN 103
. between the threeJEastern Powei^wa^J^iej^aj^o^ec-
^^-JJy^.^Trle two i^mperors and the Kingof Prussia were
about to visit Buda-Pesth, and here Alexander was to
be told of the united demand of his allies. Castlereagh
had great hopes of success, but he made a fatal mistake
in allowing the plan to be disclosed when he was not
himself on the scene. Alexander showed that his
reliance on his personal supremacy over the Prussian
King was well founded. He attacked Metternich and
Hardenberg with bitter fury in the presence of their
mgsgFs; and, though the Emperor of Austria was firm,
T rederick William immediately gave way. The whole
edifice that Castlereagh had built up thus collapsed at
the outset.2 When Metternich, on their return to
Vienna,., asked the Pfnssian Minister- to co-operate
against Alexander. an ejvasive answer was
returned, deprecating steps that might lead to
hostilities, and suggesting various lines of compromise
which Castlereagh was to submit to Alexander in the
name of the two Powers, Even this answer was con-
sidered too anti-Russian by Frederick William.3
Castlereagh and Metternich refused to consider joint
discussions under these conditions. The role of
mediator which the former wished to play was only
possible if he had the two German Powers united be-
hind him, while the Austrian Cabinet was now growing
restive on the question of Saxony, with the result that
Metternich's tone stiffened considerably. Castlereagh
accordingly withdrew from the negotiations, and
Metternich also intimated to Prussia that their joint
action against Russia was at an end.4
In narrating his failure to his Cabinet, Castlereagh
could only reiterate his opinion that, had it not been
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Oct. 24, 1814, F.O. Continent 7.
2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov. 11, 1814, F.O. Continent 8.
3 Metternich to Hardenberg, Nov. 2, 1814, D'Angeberg, 379;
Hardenberg to Castlereagh, Nov. 7, 1814, F.O. Continent 8; Del
briick, Friedrich Wilhelm III und Hardenberg auf dem Wiener
Kongress, Historische Zeitschrift, LXIII, 263.
4 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov. 21, 1814; Metternich to Har-
denberg, Nov. 12, 1814, F.O. Continent 8.
104 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
for the Kmg of Prussia, the plan would have succeeded.
The two Central Powers would then have been able
to settle their difficulties on friendly terms, and it
would have been easy to confront Alexander with a
united Germany. He admitted that he had been led
to take a more active share in the negotiations than he
had thought was possible, but he felt that a mediator
was necessary to unite Europe against Russia. All this
had! now failed, and he gave it as his opinion that,
unless the Emperor of Eussia can be brought to a more
moderate and sound course of public conduct, the peace which
we have so dearly purchased will be of short duration."1
The Emperor meanwhile had been forced by the
Poles to reply to Castlereagh's written communication.
The memorandum was drawn up by Czartoryski, as
Alexander had now ceased to employ any of the
Russians on these transactions ; and Nesselrode had so
completely fallen into disfavour that it was expected
every day that he would be superseded. In these cir-
cumstances it is not surprising that no suggestion of
compromise was made. Castlereagh found himself
under the necessity of replying, though he refused tc
treat Alexander as personally responsible for the memo-
randum. He reiterated the argument that Alexandei
was breaking the treaties of 1813; and, though the
Poles insisted on an answer to this attack, Alexander
forwarded it with a cold note asking that in future only
official channels should be used. Neither Castlereagh nor
Alexander had much reason to be satisfied with this
method of conducting business. The Tsar had doubt-
less thought that, by negotiations in person^he could
bear down Castlereagh's opposition, but trie result was
only to expose their differences. It may be noted, how-
V/ ever, that, wtrjle^Alexander permitted himself to
*VT~ indulsre in un^overiiabTe~~o!isDlavs of temper towards
indulge in ungo^rnaBTe~Hisplays of temper
lleTternlcliT'llaraenBerg, and Talleyrand,
he never
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov. 11, 1814, F.O. Continent 8;
Nov. 18, 1814, W.S.D., IX, 451.
CASTLEREAGH'S PLAN 105
treated the British Minister_otherwise than with the
greatesT courjasj. ^
Where Castlereagh had failed it was not likely that
Hardenberg would succeed, though for the sake of
appearances it was necessary for him to make some
attempt. He proposed to Alexander considerable
cessions of his Polish territory, which would have giveD
to Prussia the fortress of Thorn and the line of the
river Wartha, and to Austria Cracow and the line of
the river Nida. It was added that no further object
tion would be made to the Emperor's plans for a Polish
Kingdom. The answer, delayed by Alexander's illness,
was delivered by Czartoryski and Stein. The only con-
cession made on the Polish frontier was to offer to make
Thorn and Cracow free towns. At the same time even
this concession was linked up with a demand that
Saxony should be given to Prussia, and that Mainz
should be a fortress of the Confederation.2 The
Busso-Prussian Alliance was thus demonstrated.
Metternich could not accept such a proposal. His offer
of Saxony to Prussia had been conditional on active
co-operation against Alexander. It was now, there- ^
fore, withdrawn, and a complete deadlock ensued, r'
The Saxon question now opened, especially in the
inflamed state of public opinion in Germany, was a
problem which appeared to have no solution; and, as
Prussia had now to seek compensation in Germany for
her losses in Poland, all the minor* States were
threatened,
• Thus the first phase of the negotiation closed with a
heavy defeat for Castlereagh. The scheme was his,
and he had failed owing to Alexander's control of the
Prussian King. Hardenberg had, indeed, acted
against his own wishes, and bitterly repented of his
1 Alexander to Castlereagh, Oct. 30. 1814, W.S.D., IX, 386;
Castlereagh to Alexander, Nov. 4, 1814, Ibid., 410; Alexander to
Castlereagh, Nov. 21, 1814, Ibid., 441. The last reply was
delayed by the Emperor's illness.
2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Dec. 5, 1814, F.O. Continent 8;
D'Angeberg, 485, 493; Minister, p. 194,
106 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
folly in not settling the Polish frontiers in 1813. But
Prussia was now relying on Russia to get Saxony,
which was transferred from Russian to Prussian
occupation in a manner which asserted in the eyes of
Europe Prussia's intention to keep the whole of it.1
The two German Powers were hopelessly at variance;
and the situation which Castlereagh had feared from
jthe first had arisen. The failure to check Russia had
made Prussia and Austria irreconcilable rivals in
Germany. For the moment Castlereagh could do
nothing but let events take their course. As soon as he
abandoned the conduct of the negotiations they
became more embittered every day. Even the decencies
of diplomacy were no longer observed, and military
preparations were hastily begun by all the Great
Powers.
Section 25. The Deadlock over Saxony. The Secret
Treaty of January 3, 1815, between Austria, Great
Britain, and France. — Castlereagh was not long to
remain a spectator of this impossible situation. He
was soon called back to construct an entirely new com-
bination. Beaten on the question of Poland, he was
yet able to preserve the peace of Europe and build
up a barrier, as lie thought, to Russian power. In
this he acted entirely on his own responsibility in a
/ situation which cannot have been covered by his
instructions* and, to a certain extent, in defiance of
the wishes of his Cabinet. He received no official
instructions of any importance from London until
December. Liverpool carried on a voluminous private
correspondence with him, throwing out suggestions,
and giving some account of Parliamentary and
public opinion at home; but it took between ten
1 Eussia had pressed this transfer, to which Castlereagh and
Metternich had given only provisional assent, at a much earlier
date, in order to embroil Prussia with Austria. Hardenberg re-
fused; but, acting on orders from Eussia, Eepnin, the Russian
commander, issued a proclamation, which produced at Vienna
exactly the effect desired by Alexander. Miinster, p. 105.
DEADLOCK OVER SAXONY 107
and twelve days for a courier to get to Vienna, and
situations changed so rapidly that it was not possible
for the Cabinet to exert much control. Its opinion on
these European problems was, however, clear. On the
Polish question it was exceedingly lukewarm, and it
wished to have as little to do with this as possible.
Liverpool was much afraid lest Great Britain should
appear to oppose Polish independence, and, in the
middle of October, he thought it advisable to press this
point on Castlereagh's notice.1 The account of
Castlereagh's activities increased the alarm in London;
and, at the end of October, Vansittart attacked Castle-
reagh's display of initiative in a memorandum which
Liverpool said had made a deep impression on the
Cabinet.2 These warnings were repeated during the
middle of November, and the dangers of war, and the
necessity of at least an interval of peace, were pointed
out again and again.3
Public opinion in favour of the independence of
Saxony was now growing in London, and this was also
expressed in Liverpool's letters;4 but his main pre-
occupation was to keep Great Britain out of war.'
CS&tfereagh's despatches, recounting the failure of his
policy of mediator, and hinting at hostilities, pro-
duced a definite instruction from the Cabinet. On
November 27 an official despatch was sent to him,
which contained the sentence: —
"It is unnecessary for me to point out to you the impos-
sibility of His Eoyal Highness consenting to involve this
country in hostilities at this time for any of the objects which
have been hitherto under discussion at Vienna."5
Three weeks after he received this instruction,
Castlereagh signed a treaty which made definite pro-
1 Liverpool to Castlereagh, Oct. 14, 1814, W.S.D., IX, 342.
2 Liverpool to Castlereagh, Oct. 28, 1814, W.S.D., IX, 383.
3 Liverpool to ■ Castlereagh, Nov. 2, Nov. 18, Nov. 25,
1814, W.S.D., IX, 402, 438, 285.
4 Liverpool to Castlereagh, Nov. 18, 1814, W.8.D., IX, 408.
5 Bathurst to Castlereagh, Nov. 27, 1814, F.O. Continent 6.
s
108 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
vision for war. He did indeed alter his policy on the
question of Saxony, but that was the natural outcome
/of the failure of the first plan. The offer of Saxony
was conditional on the co-operation of Prussia in the
question of Poland; and, when that was refused, the
offer was withdrawn. The change arose, not from any
instructions from home, but as a natural result of
Castlereagh's attitude; he could not now desert
Austria, whom he had compelled to follow the policy
of co-operafion with Prussia. It was indeed believed
by many at the Congress that Castlereagh's change of
policy was due to definite instructions from his
Cabinet, whose timid attitude was fully known.1 But,
though this weakened Castlereagh's position, it did not
affect his policy nor move him from the course he felt
it necessary to follow.2
Castlereagh now regarded the Polish battle as lost.
But, as relations between the three Eastern Powers
grew more and more strained, it became evident that
no settlement could be produced between them, except
by the active interference of Great Britain. At the
beginning of December, therefore, he began to attempt
to reconcile the differences between Austria and
Prussia. He joined, it is true, the Austrian side, but
«/he never abandoned his policy of constructing a strong
Prussia; and, as will be seen, he found it necessary to
check her opponents after he had thwarted her in her
main ambition. His first step, however, was to join
Metternich in withdrawing his offer as to Saxony. In
an interview with Hardenberg, he made it clear that he
considered Austria could not be expected to give way on
her Bohemian frontier now that she had lost her line
of defence in Poland. She could not submit to see both
Dresden and Cracow in the hands of Great Powers.
The Prussian Chancellor, who now saw himself faced
with the prospect of being beaten both in Poland and
1 Minister, p. 201. The question is discussed in Delbriick,
op. cit., p. 249, and in Transactions of the Royal Historical
Society, 3rd series, vol. VII, p. 61.
2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Dec. 7, 1814, F.O. Continent 9.
DEADLOCK OVER SAXONY 109
Saxony, flared up and talked of war, but Castlereagh
used his favourite argument that war was no remedy.
How could Prussia expect to govern Saxony, he said,
unless she had the consent of Europe? This language
produced some eifect, and Hardenberg promised to
listen to an Austrian proposal. Castlereagh did his
best to persuade Metternich to make this as conciliatory
as possible. This Metternich promised to do, and both
he and the Emperor of A.ustria had interviews with the
Emperor of Russia to get him to make some con-
cessions to facilitate the general arrangement.
In these circumstances there was some chance of a
compromise; but, though Hardenberg and Metternich
had been calmed down, they were both surrounded by
soldiers and officials who were exasperated by what ,/
they considered the weakness of their chiefs.1 " I
witness every day," wrote Castlereagh, " the astonish-
ing tenacity with which all the Powers cling to the
smallest point of separate interest, ' ' 2 and he was not
sanguine. In a private letter to Liverpool, written at
the same time, he recapitulated the chances of war, and
discussed how far an armed mediation could prevent
it. These fears proved only too well founded. The
Austrian proposals, besides rejecting the offers of
Thorn and Craoaw as free towns, refused to allow
Prussia to incorporate Saxony, and reserved the point
of Mainz.3 Hardenberg was so exasperated that he
communicated to Alexander the whole of Metternich 's
confidential letters. Metternich in his turn had to
defend himself, and the result was a tremendous
explosion and numerous hot alnd excited interviews
between the Emperors and their Ministers. But as
Castlereagh phrased it, " the climate of Russia is often
1 Even Hudelist was now inveighing against Metternich's
weakness ; and Gentz had already drawn up a project for a Triple ■
Alliance of Austria, Great Britain, and France, Munster to the
Prince Kegent, Nov. 27, 1814; Hanover Archives.
2 Castlereagh to Liverpool Dec. 7, 1814, F.O. Continent 8*
Dec. 5, 1814, W.S.D., IX, 463.
3 Metternich to Hardenberg, Dec. 10, 1814, D'Angeberg, 505.
110 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
the more serene after a good squall " ; and Alexander,
after vainly trying to get Metternich dismissed, made
a personal cession to the Emperor of Austria by
offering to give back the Tarnopol Circle of Galicia,
which he had obtained at the Peace of 1809. *
^ But the two German Powers were still hopelessly
divided. Hardenberg and Metternich, embittered by
their mutual treachery, disputed every fact and figure,
and compromise seemed hopeless. It was Talleyrand's
opportunity. Had his hands been free he might now
have made a great bargain, but he was already com-
mitted. The attitude he had adopted from the first at
Vienna had made it necessary for him to join Castle-
reagh and Metternich. The steps which led to* this
situation go back to the interview of September, which
laid the foundations of the Franco-British Alliance.
As has been seen, Castlereagh from the first adopted
y an attitude different from that of any of the other
| Ministers towards the rights of ^rapce in the Con-
Igress. Talleyrand's insistence on the point of Saxony,
and his refusal to subordinate it to the question of
Poland, had caused some friction JDet ween them.2 But
Castlereagh succeeded in limiting Talleyrand's public
activities, and prevented him from bringing forward
the Saxon question by inopportune notes. When he
suspected that the French Minister was endeavouring
to make some arrangement with the Tsar concerning
Saxony, he took steps to act on the French Government
through Wellington.3 In this he had some success;
and Talleyrand kept very quiet through all the critical
stage of the negotiations, though h^ encouraged the
popular movement in favour of Saxony in every
quarter. When the Polish negotiations had broken
down, there was no longer any need to hold back.
Castlereagh, therefore, gradually grew more and more
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Dec. 17, 1814, W.S.D., IX, 483.
2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Oct. 20. Oct. 24, 1814, F.O. Co:
tinent 7.
3 See above, Section 23.
DEADLOCK OVER SAXONY 111
intimate in his relations with Talleyrand, without,
however, giving him his whole confidence.1 When the
moment of crisis arrived, and the deadlock had to be
solved by a show of force, he had France at his back,
and he knew that his policy was one favoured! by both
the French and British Cabinets.
At the same time Metternich began to look to Talley-
rand. Their relations had not been close until the
month of December. But, after the storm between
Hardenberg and Metternich, the latter sought Talley-
rand's assistance. He appears to have been eager to
anticipate Castlereagh, and on December 16 he made
formal overtures to Talleyrand for joint action.
Talleyrand's answer was a lofty defence of the
integrity of Saxony, but in his private interviews he
showed himself very accommodating. It was sufficient
for him that the Alliance had broken to pieces, and he
only required assurances on the question of Naples.2
These could not be given him at once, but both Castle-
reagh and Metternich began to examine their archives
to ascertain whether they could escape from the
engagements made to Murat, while the French Govern-
ment was asked to give proofs, if possible, of his
treachery.3
Before, however, France was. openly brought into the
discussion, one more effort was made to come to a settle-
1 Castlereagh to Wellington, Nov. 21, 1814, W.S.D., IX, 447:
" I have not deemed it prudent to disclose to him my operations
in detail, finding that he was not always discreet, and that I
should lose influence in other quarters if Lwas understood to be
in close confidence with the French Minister. I have endeavoured,
however, to treat him with all proper regard, and to keep^ him
generally informed of our endeavours to promote common objects.
He is becoming infinitely more accommodating in our general
conferences than at the outset."
2 Pallain, pp. 181, , 183. Castlereagh to Liverpool, Dec. 18,
1814, F.O. Continent 9, W.S.D., IX, 483; Metternich to Talley-
rand, Dec. 16, 1&14, D'Angeberg, 1961; Talleyrand to Metternich,
Dec. 19, 1814, D'Angeberg, 540.
3 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Dec. 18, 1814, W.S.D., IX, 485.
For the development of the Neapolitan question see below,
Section. 27.
112 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
merit through the intervention of Great Britain alone.
This was directly requested by both Austria and
Prussia, while Czartoryski, in the name of the Emperor
of Russia, also pressed Castlereagh to accept the office
of mediator. The result was that conferences were
held between Castlereagh, Stein, Hardenberg, Hum-
boldt, and Czartoryski in which a new proposal was
broached. This plan, which had already been sub-
/ mitted to Metternich, was to compensate the King of
. Saxony with territory on the left bank of the Rhine,
including Luxemburg, Treves, and Bonn.
On December 21, in a long discussion, the Prussians
in vain endeavoured to make Castlereagh yield on this
point. Apart altogether from his engagements to
Austria, Castlereagh did not want the left bank of the
./Rhine to be in the hands of a small Power, which he
thought must come under the influence of France. He
told the Prussians candidly that they must be content
to acquire only a part of Saxony, and accept compensa-
tion elsewhere. At the same time he made it clear that
he wished to make Prussia a powerful State, and, in
order to win Russia over, he definitely promised that he
would not press the Polish question further if Austria
and Prussia consented to abandon their claims.1 He
had indeed hopes of some compromise, and finding that
the dispute as to the statistics of populations caused
much friction, he proposed the special Statistical
Committee.2 The appointment of this Committee
revealed the attitude of Austria and England towards
Talleyrand. The French Minister made it a point of
honour that a French member should be appointed on
it; and, though rather unwilling to expose his hand,
Castlereagh acquiesced, and insisted that the concession
should be made. He was anxious, however, not to
allow a premature revelation of the close relations of
himself and Metternich with Talleyrand, which might
give an excuse for an immediate Rupture of relations on
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Dec. 24, 1814, F.O. Continent 9.
2 See above, Section 21.
DEADLOCK OVER SAXONY 113
the part of Russia and Prussia. If the rupture was
to come, he wished the other two Powers to furnish the
excuse. \3 /
Meanwhile, the Tsar was showing every sign of
desiring a compromise. He interviewed the Emperor
of Austria, and expressed his wish to finish every-
thing amicably and without delay. The minor
German Powers were now all rallying round Austria;
and Metternich was coquetting with the idea of estab-
lishing a German Confederation under the Habsburgs
without Prussia. Alexander brought matters to a head .
by desiring formal conferences on the Polish question.
Castlereagh consented to attend2 on condition that he
was not supposed to be waiving his objection to the
principle of partition, though agreeing to its
expediency. The Conference which met on December
29, however, proceeded to discuss Saxony as well as
Poland, and the time had come for Austria and
England to reveal their connection with France. They ,
demanded Talleyrand's admission to the formal con--^
ference. Prussia vehemently objected. The arguments
used were formal ; but all knew that the introduction of -
Talleyrand meant the end of Prussian hopes of obtain-
ing all Saxony. The Prussians knew, too, that
Alexander was weakening ; and they attempted to force */
a settlement in their favour before it was too ,
late. Hardenberg intimated that Prussia could not J
afford to remain longer in a state of provisional
occupation of Saxony, and that, if recognition of her
rights was refused, she would consider it as tantamount
to a declaration of war. This truculent language pro-
duced an immense effect on Castlereagh.
' I took occasion to protest,'' he reported, " in the strongest
terms against this principle as a most alarming and unheard-of
menace : that it should be competent for one Power to invade
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Dec. 25, 1814, W.S.D., IX, 511;
Pallain, p. 199.
2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Dec. 25, 1814; F.O. Continent 9;
Minister, p. 219.
[285—69] I
114 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
another, and by force compel a recognition which was founded
upon no treaty, and where no attempt had been made to
disturb the possession of the invading Power in the territory to
which he laid claim. Such an insinuation might operate upon
a Power trembling for its existence, but must have the con-
trary effect upon all that were alive to their own dignity ; and I
added that, if such a temper really prevailed, we were not
deliberating in a state of independence, and it were better to
break up the Congress."1
tlardenberg's words were explained away, but the
effect remained, and was increased by the knowledge
I that the Prussians were organising their army for the
field and fortifying Dresden. Castlereagh's scruples
about signing a treaty w^ere overcome. He summoned
Talleyrand and Metternich, and submitted a draft of a
secret treaty which he had drawn up with his own hand.
It was defensive in character, but made definite pro-
vision for war in case of attack by Prussia, on the
model of the Chaumont Treaty against France. Any
danger of its being used to extend French influence wras
guarded against by a clause stipulating that the Treaty
of Paris was to regulate the future frontiers of Europe ;
and Holland's acquisition of the Low Countries was
specially protected. Talleyrand and Metternich
accepted this draft as it stood, though Castlereagh
made it clear that he did not mean the treaty to pre-
vent considerable concessions being made to Prussia
in Saxony; and it was signed by all three on January 3.
When it is remembered that Castlereagh's last official
instruction had definitely forbidden him to involve his
country in war, the boldness of this action will be
realised. The news of the signing of the peace with
America, which arrived on January 1, doubtless helped
him to a decision, and he knew that his Cabinet would
welcome an alliance with France.2 But the treaty
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool (Nos. 43, 44, 45), Jan. 1, 1815. F.O.
Continent 10. Pallain, p. 210. The draft of the treaty enclosed
agrees almost entirely with the French text subsequently signed.
Talleyrand made the translation. $.
2 A memorandum had been drawn up by Bathurst urging an
alliance with France ' (W.S.D., IX, 480). There is no evidence
that Castlereagh knew of this.
TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT 115
meant war if Prussia did not give way ; and in signing
it on his own responsibility, Castlereagh showed how
great was his courage and decision of character in
moments of great emergency. In his private letter to
Liverpool, he defended his action on the ground that, if
war took place, Great Britain was bound to be involved,
and it was necessary, therefore, to safeguard her
interests.1 Bavaria, Hanover, and Holland were all
ready to sign; and there can be no doubt that, if war
had broken out, all Europe would have joined in
opposing Prussia, the behaviour of her soldiers having
made her detested in every quarter. But the treaty
was meant to prevent war, not to make it, and it
succeeded in its object. In a few days all danger of a
rupture was over.
Section 26. The Final Settlement of the German
and Polish Territorial Questions. — The effect of the
treaty of January 3 was immediately apparent in the
firm tone held by Metternich and Castlereagh in the
second and third meetings of the four Powers. They
declared peremptorily that they would not negotiate y
about Saxony until France had been admitted to the
conferences. Hardenberg was at once intimidated,
and went privately to Castlereagh to inform him that
he would yield. He obtained in return an assurance
that the settlement would be a real compromise, and
would in no way depend on the consent of the King s
of Saxony himself; and Castlereagh secured Talley-
rand's consent to this promise. More alarming was a
revival of the proposal to get the Saxon Monarch to
consent to be transferred to a new kingdom, com-
posed of the Rhine provinces. Castlereagh again de-
clared this to be an impossible idea, and again got
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Jan. 2, 1815, W.8.D., IX, 523.
He seems to have had no doubt as to its reception; and his
ascendancy over the Prime Minister was shown by the fact that
Liverpool did not even call a full Cabinet to consider it, but
ordered the ratification to be despatched post haste. Liverpool to
Bathurst, Jan. 15, 1815, W.S.D., IX, 535; Liverpool to Castle-
reagh, Jan. 15, 1815, W.S.D.. IX, 536.
[285-89] J 2
116 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
Talleyrand's support, sorely tempted though the latter
perhaps was to establish a weak and subservient
Power on the left bank of the Rhine.1 Next day
Castlereagh had an interview with Alexander, in
order to put an end, once for all, to this scheme,
which some of the Prussians were pressing
hard. He found the Emperor in a very peaceful
mood. Rumours of the secret treaty had already
reached him, and he challenged Castlereagh point-
blank on the subject. The reply he received could have
left him little doubt as to what had happened; and
henceforward the Russian plenipotentiaries worked
their hardest for a settlement.2 In these circum-
stances the settlement of the Polish question advanced
quickly; and the question of admitting France to the
rest of the negotiations was also now only a matter of
procedure. On January 9, Castlereagh secured it by a
memorandum in which France was declared to be
bound, through the second secret article of the Treaty
of Paris, by the stipulations of the treaties of 1813:
while it was definitely laid dowTn that the King of
Saxony's consent should not be considered necessary
to any arrangements made. This memorandum was
accepted by the others ; Talleyrand gave a written con-
sent; and the Committee of Five was thus constituted,
and held its first meeting on January 12. 3
All immediate danger of war might now be con-
sidered as past, but the situation was still full of
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Jan. 3, 1815, F.O. Continent 10;
Jan. 5, 1815, W.S.D., IX, 527.
2 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Jan. 8, 1815, F.O. Continent 10.
When, therefore, Napoleon sent to Alexander this treaty, which
he found in the Paris archives on his return from Elba, it can
have produced no surprise. Munster reported that Castlereagh 's
answer had dissipated the suspicion, and that rumours of the
Alliance had died down (Munster to the Prince Eegent, Jan. 22.
1815, Hanover Archives); but, in spite of Castlereagh 's later fears,
there can be no doubt that Alexander knew that a treaty had been
made .
3JB. and F.S.P., II, 601; Talleyrand to Castlereagh, Jan. 8.
1815, F.O. Continent 10.
1/
TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT 117
difficulty. It was not easy to find a sufficient number
of inhabitants to compensate Prussia for the loss of a
great portion of her Polish territories, if only a small
part of Saxony was to be used for this purpose. The
Austrian war party, feeling protected by the secret
treaty, wished to press their victory home, and began
to make inordinate demands. But Castlereagh had
anticipated this situation. Having prevented Prussia
from dictating terms to Europe, he had no intention of
allowing the Austrians to make demands which would ^
have been unattainable without his assistance. In the
final stage of the negotiations, therefore, Castlereagh
was engaged more in combating the extravagant pre-
tensions of all sides than in merely supporting his own
special allies. The construction of a powerful Prussia
was, in his eyes, one of the essentials of the equilibrium
of Europe; and it was largely by his assistance that she
obtained so great an extension of territory. In the
task of producing a territorial settlement he had now
to work with feverish haste. Liverpool was pressing
him by every courier to come back and defend the Tory
Ministry in the House of Commons. But he had no
intention of leaving Vienna until the main problems
were settled. For six weeks he worked with immense
energy, keeping the conduct of the negotiations almost
entirely in his own hands, acting as a real mediator,
and by persuasion and firmness obtaining concessions
from all sides, until at last an agreement had 'been pro-
duced on all the main questions. \
The Austrian soldiers wished to deprive Prussia of
Torgau on the Elbe as well as Erfurt, and Metternich
was forced to second their demands. To these preten-
sions, urged by Stadion, and Sehwarzenberg, Castle-
reagh opposed an uncompromising negative. Austria's
strength against a united Prussia and Russia must lie,
he said, in the support of her allies; against Prussia
alone she was strong enough to stand, and he could not
admit that Saxony was to be considered as a State in
the Austrian orbit. He told Metternich franklv that
he would not support him in these strategical details,
118 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
and, when he found that the Austrian Minister could
not control his subordinates, he went to the Emperor
himself. He found the latter fully determined to
support the militarists, while Talleyrand joined
Metternich in the endeavour to keep as much as possible
of Saxony out of Prussian hands. Castlereagh, how-
ever, refused to " sacrifice the peace of Europe for two
or three hundred thousand subjects more or less " ; and,
after a long wrangle, he at last made Metternich give
way, and secured a proposal which he thought he could
support.1
It was now necessary to get Prussian consent to
this offer. Hardenberg asserted that he dared not
return to Berlin without Leipzig. Castlereagh re-
torted that the feelings of Berlin were not so material
as the public opinion of the rest of Europe, and that a
partition which separated Leipzig from Dresden was
just what sound policy ought to avoid. Hardenberg
remained unconvinced; and it was obvious that the
pressure of the Prussian militarists was being exercised
on him in the same way as Metternich was being
coerced by the Austrian soldiers. Castlereagh, there-
fore, approached the King of Prussia himself. In an
interview, which he described as " the most painful
in all respects that it has been my fate to undergo since
I have been upon the Continent," he endeavoured to
win his consent to the loss of Leipzig. This stormy
interview produced no result; and a new deadlock
threatened once more the peace of Europe. In this
extremity Castlereagh turned to Russia. Alexander
was exceedingly anxious for a compromise; but. when
he was pressed for further concessions to assist the
general arrangement, he again pleaded his duty to the
Poles. The reply was that Polish discontent could be
easily overcome by uniting more of Russian Poland to
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Jan. 11, 22, 29, 1815, F.O. Con-
tinent 10 and. 11; Metternich to Schwarzenberg, Jan. 27, 1815;
Klinkowstrom, p. 823; Minister, p. 222; D'Angeberg, p. 677:
Fournier, Die Geheimpolizei, &c, p. 349.
TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT 119
the new kingdom. These arguments at last extracted
Alexander's consent to the cession of the fortress of
Thorn and a rayon round it to Prussia. With this
bribe, Castlereagh succeeded in obtaining the Prussians' ^/
consent to the loss of Leipzig, and the main difficulty
was overcome. Prussia was, however, still intent on \
retaining more of Saxony than Austria would allow.
In these circumstances Castlereagh, on his own
responsibility, made Hanover and Holland reduce their
claims to territory, so that Prussia might receive
further compensation to the west of Germany; and by
this bold exercise of authority he at last succeeded in
producing an arrangement which all the Great Powers
could accept.1 By February 6, therefore, he was able
to announce " the territorial arrangements on this side
of the Alps as, in fact, settled in all their essential
features." It cannot be doubted that this result was
very largely due to the energy, firmness, and diplomatic
skill of the British Minister.
After Castlereagh' s departure there was no subject
of controversy likely to disturb the peace of Europe;
and, though the return of Napoleon Drought new sub-
jects for deliberation, yet it also furnished another
reason for hastening the close. Yet the Congress lasted
four months longer. The final arrangements as to *-"
Germany were hindered by a long struggle between
Austria and Bavaria as to the town of Salzburg; and
this matter was no( finally solved until long after the
signature of the Vienna Treaty. Both the settlement
of Italy and the* construction of the German Con-
federation progressed slowTly. In this last phase,
Metternich took the lead in all matters not specially
concerned with the prosecution of the war. But his
energy was not equal to the demands on it; and, when
he was dilatory, others had perforce to mark time. To
a certain extent he deliberately delayed matters in
order to give time for new combinations to appear more
suited to his designs.
Castlereagh to Liverpool, Feb. 6, 1815, F.O. Continent 11;
Gagern, II, 124.
120 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
AJLthisJiaTgaiiiing . produced a settlement in Central
Europe which almost entirely ^uHool^hate"o!~Toiisi3era-
tTons of nationality to the idea of the balance of power
v and strategical necessities; yet, if this was so, a great
\ advance on previous~coridrtTon^ had been made, even in
Irespect to national interests in the case of Poland.
Though Posnania and the outlet to the sea at Dantzig
remained in Prussian hands and Galicia was retained
. by Austria, Cracow remaining a free city, the mass of
/ Polish territory remained intact under Russian
I sovereignty; and, though the idea of associating with
the Duchy of Warsaw any portion of the old Polish
territories now incorporated in the Russian Empire was
jabandoned, the rest was made into a kingdom which
Swas soon to be endowed witli^a-Constitution. Further,
all the Powers had found themselves forced to recognise
in theory the principle of Polish independence, though
they had never the slightest intention of sacrificing
their national interests to it. Castlereagh also, before
he left, addressed a circular to all the Ministers,
solemnly affirming his preference for a free Poland,
and admonishing the three Eastern Powers that, only
if the Poles were treated as Poles, was their future
happiness and loyalty likely to be of long duration.'
-Both Prussia and Austria, as well as Russia, were
/ forced to subscribe to these sentiments ; and the final
1 treaties in theory secured to all the Poles a separate
administration. It must be admitted, however, that
Castlereagh' s declaration was made mainly with the
view of being produced in the British Parliament:
and, except Alexander and one or two of his advisers,
none of the statesmen at the Congress were prepared to
risk anything substantial for the sake of conciliating
Polish national sentiment.
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Jan. 11, 1815, F.O. Continent 10:
" I am convinced that the only hope of tranquillity now in Poland,
and especially of preserving to Austria and Prussia their portions
of that kingdom, is for the two latter States to adopt a Polish
system of administration as a defence against the inroads of the
Russian policv." The note and replies are in B. and F.S.P.,
IT. 642.
TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT 121
In Germany, Prussia obtained about two-fifths of
Saxony, containing about 850,000 subjects, and includ-
ing the Elbe fortresses, while she also obtained the main
share of the left bank of the Rhine and the Duchy of
Westphalia. The new Kingdom of the Netherlands had
to be content with a small extension of territory beyond
the Meuse. Castlereagh had, in fact, sacrificed the pro-
ject of making a large Holland to the necessity of
finding compensation for Prussia; and the attitude of
Miinster contributed to this result. The ancient Bel-
gian province of Luxemburg was actually severed from
the new realm. Prussia wished for the possessions of
King William, i.e., the Nassau principalities of Dillen-
burg, Siegen, and Dietz; and the greater part of
Luxemburg (a part was retained by Prussia) was given
to tne King, in exchange for his German principalities,
he receiving the title of Grand-Duke, and the Grand-
Duchy becoming a sovereign State of the German Con-
federation. The town of Luxemburg itself was regarded
as a federal fortress, and received a Prussian garrison.
The idea of creating a great Hanover was also
abandoned, though she was raised to the dignity of a
kingdom. Her acquisition of East Frisia was, how-
ever, considered important and bitterly lamented by
some of the Prussians, while she obtained other valuable
accessions of territory.1 But the British Ministers
were anxious that the old charge of sacrificing British
interests for the continental possessions of the royal
house should not be revived; and Castlereagh had no
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Feb. 13, 1915, F.O. Continent 12:
The Hanoverian arrangement will not only give that Power tha
command of the Ems, but place it in direct contact with Holland
throughout the greater part of its eastern frontier— an arrange-
ment which\ in a European point of view, must be considered of
the utmost importance for the purpose of strengthening Holland
and of securing the Low Countries. The general arrangement of
the Prince of Orange's interests has given great satisf action to his
Ministers here ; and I trust by his contiguity with Hanover, with
Prussia advanced beyond the Rhine, and with Bavaria on the
other flank, a better defence has been provided for Germany than
has existed at any former period of her history."
122 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
scruples in cutting down her increase of territory when
it was. needed to compensate Prussia. Between the two,
Prussia got a solid block of territory in the west,
though she failed to secure a line of territory uniting
it to Brandenburg as had been planned. Swedish
\Pomerania, the last relics of an old domination, also
fell to her; Denmark, to whom it had been promised,
being forced to accept in its stead Lauenburg, which
Hanover had made great efforts to regain, and a mone-
tary indemnity, which was partly a compensation for
Heligoland.1
Prussia^, gains were thus of far more importance
than the Polish territory she had lost; and one of the
chief results of the Congress of Vienna was to estab-
lish her preponderance in the north of Germany. This
reconstruction must be largely attributed Jo Castle-
reagh, for without his insistence Austria and France
would never have consented to give her so much, what-
ever had been the fate of the Polish provinces.
Austria, meanwhile, though she regained Tirol and
Salzburg from Bavaria, had retired from Germany
to a large extent, and abandoned all share in the
defence of the west. Stadion lamented that she had
ceased to.be a German" Power. She still, however, main-
tained her ascendency in the German Confederation,
while her territorial power was increased in Italy.
Bavaria, though she was not allowed to hold Mainz,
which was made a fortress of the Confederation, was
given the Lower Palatinate, which brought her into
contact with Alsace. The series of exchanges between
her and Baden and Austria were not, however, fully
concluded until three years later. This individual bar-
gaining was, indeed, never fully completed, and pro-
1 The history of this tedious and obscure diplomacy has been
Illuminated by the work of Commandant M. H. Weil, Joachim
Murat, Roi de Naples, la Derniere Annie de Regne, 5 vols.,
Paris, 1910, which is based on an exhaustive study of the Euro-
pean archives. His conclusions are, however, open to objection
on some points, and he has neglected to a certain Sxtent the
British papers.
ITALIAN PROBLEM 123
duced some strange compromises on the map of
Germany. Such points as were left by the Congress
to be settled by the Powers concerned were, in fact,
more unsatisfactorily handled than any others.
Section 27. The Italian Problem. Murat. Spain
and Portugal. — The Italian States were the subject of
an intricate and sustained diplomatic duel between
Talleyrand and Metternich, in which the former
suffered heavy defeat. While this was largely due to
circumstances over which he had no control, the situa-
tion was one in which Metternich 's subtle dishonesty y/
found an ideal opportunity; and he used it to great
advantage. Austria had already secured for herself
both Venetia and Lombardy by the Treaty of Paris.'
But Metternich intended, if L^flfcle. to. make her ^
influence dominant in the wl wiinsula, and to
perpetuate the victory of HabsW Brer Bourbon.
The problem revolved round iVrarat, King Joachim .
Napoleon oOiaplesT -whose throne had been guaranteed
by Austria., in unequivocal language in a treaty of
January 11, 1814. Great advantages had been obtained
by this treaty; for Murat's desertion of Napoleon re-
sulted in the collapse of the resistance made by Eugene
Beauharnais in the north. Both Great Britain and
Russia had assented to Austria's action; and the
former had immediately abandoned the attack on the
mainland which she was organizing from her base in
Sicily; but they did not enter into diplomatic relations
with Murat orsign treaties with him. As to the rest of
Italy, it had been agreed at Paris that Genoa should be %/
incorporated in Piedmont, while the Duchies of Parma,
Piacenza and Guastalla were given to Napoleon's wife
and son by the Tfea ty-of . Fon ta -mebleau, when Napoleon,
himself was granted Elba for his lifetime: The fate
of Tuscany, Lucca, and a few other smaller princi-
palities was, however, undecided. The Pope had been
1 There is no truth in the contention, believed by many his-
torians, that a secret treaty was signed at Prague in July 1813
between Great Britain and Austria regarding Italy.
124 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
restored to Rome and the Papal State round it, but his
Minister, Cardinal Consalvi, had in vain pressed at
London and Paris for the restoration of the three
Legations in the north of his territory, while Murat
refused to give up the Marches of Ancona in the south.
' Talleyrand from the first demanded the overthrow
of Murat and the restoration of Ferdinand of Sicily in
his place. To allow Napoleon's brother-in-law to
remain on a throne was intolerable to Louis XVIII, but
the policy was also Talleyrand's own. He wished by
dynastic changes to increase French influence in Italy
at the expense of Austria. In this demand he was
vehemently supported bv Labrador, who pressed also
J for the restoration of the Parma Duchies as well as
Luoca to the Spani^^Bourbons. This was also Talley-
rand's object, b«Fne\mew its difficulties. He sub-
ordinated everything Mheref ore, to the overthrow of
Murat, hoping to^Hmi some of his other aims in the
resulting adjustment.
Murat had no friend amongst the Great Powers.
Metternich realised as well as any how dangerous it
was to allow a remnant of the Napoleonic regime to
exist in Italy. England, the saviour of Sicily, whither
she had conveyed both British armies and a British
J Constitution, saw in a Napoleonic Naples a danger to
her control of the Mediterranean. The Tsar, while
chivalrously anxious to protect the rights of the
Empress and her son, had no inclination to protect
Murat. Prussia had^ from the_first^giyen her opinion
that Murat must go Murat had to sustamTtherefore,
the active hostility of France, Spain. Sicily, and the
Pope, without a single friend. His only safeguard was
the treaty, and the rivalry between France and Austria.
Two other forces might also work for him, But only at
the cost of a war. The growing dislike of Ajistrian
domination in Italy and the revival of hopes of
liberty and independence, which had been implanted bv
Napoleon and encouraged at one time bv the Whig
representatives of Great Britain, might rallv all Italy
to his side. There was also the Emperor at. Elba But,
MURAT 125
while these possibilities made it more dangerous to
attack him, they provided also additional reasons why
his throne should fall.
Metternich's plan at the Congress was to postpone
the settlement of Italy until the last, and wait upon
events. The incorporation of Genoa in Piedmont was,/-
therefore, the only point finally settled in the first
period of the Congress."" Though Talleyrand objected,
lie could do nothing until the Polish-Saxon question
enabled him to make the destruction of Murat a con-
dition of his alliance. Both Castlereagh and Metter -
nich had, as a matter of fact, long made up their mind
that Murat must be abandoned to his enemies. The
only question was the method and the time. Metternich
had to break a treaty for which all Murat 's mistakes
gave no real excuse, while Castle]Peagh had to think of
the Whigs who took an intense interest in Italy, and
had already protested again^§§ Genoa's loss of
independence. Both were agreeathat French troops
must not march through Italy; and to this condition
Talleyrand was forced to agree. But Metternich
wished to use the Neapolitan question to secure" his
other aims in Italy, and, Talleyrand proving obdurate,
he had recourse to Paris. He had already in December
been in direct correspondence with BlaealT, who was
jealous of Talleyrand. At the beginning of January,
he sent through his Ambassador direct proposals to
Blacas, of which step Castlereagh, who appears to
have had his entire confidence, was fully informed. In
these proposals the certainty of the ultimate fall of
Murat was demonstrated, as well as the impossibility of
Austria acting at the moment, or of allowing French
troops to go through Italy. The advantages of direct
correspondence with the Court of Versailles were also
dwelt upon. This overture was well received at Paris,
and Blacas was ready to act with Metternich to the
exclusion of Talleyrand.
The finishing touches to this diplomacy were to be
made by Castlereagh, who, in spite of the remon-
strances of Bentinck, had pledged himself to Metter-
126 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
nidi's policy. He had obtained the consent of
Liverpool to the destruction of Murat in time for him
to win Talleyrand's consent to all arrangements in
Germany.1 Castlereagh and Metternich determined
that the final arrangements should, if possible, be made
at Paris; and with this object in view Castlereagh, on
his return, paid a special visit to Louis XVIII. He
succeeded in inducing the King to^go~a long way
towards granting the other Austrian arrangements in
' Italy in return for the promise that Murat should be
overthrown; and new instructions were sent to Talley-
rand, who was, however, ignorant of the game that was
being played.2
This was the situation when the return
of Napoleon broke up all these combinations. While it
^ deprived Talleyrand%f influence, it drove Murat into
action. Though Metternich by skilful manoeuvres had
endeavoured to luH^fcn into security, he could not help
being aware of the danger of his position. He had
probably had no share in Napoleon's return, which he
regarded as a fresh danger to himself ; ^buthe thought
that it gave him an opportunity to rally Italy round
him while Europe was otherwise occupied. His troops
marched to the north, and by the end of March he was
^virtually at war with Austria. England also declared
war; and, as the Neapolitan Army failed entirely.
Murat fled, and Ferdinand's restoration was accom-
plished. Metternich secured his main aims; for
Ferdinand, who had been made into a constitutional
monarch by England, was now pledged by a secret
treaty to avoid ,any such experiment in Naples.
Castlereagh defended his own conduct in the House of
Commons by producing evidence, from documents
supplied by the Bourbons, of Murat's so-called
treachery; but even Wellington admitted that no
1 Bentinck to Castlereagh, Jan. 7, 18U, F.O. Continent 11:
Castlereagh to Liverpool, Jan. 29, F.O. Continent 11*.
2 "Weil, M. H., Joachim Murat, Roi de Naples, III, p. .12 ff.
A copy of the document whic*h Louis XVIII drew up is in F.O.
Continent Archives 8.
MURAT 127
case was made; out against him. The perfidy
of the statesman was, however, hiddem from Europe
to a certain extent by Murat's own hasty con-
duct. This dubious incident is one of the greatest
blots on Castlereagh' s conduct, and it is made even
blacker by the fact that he was at once made aware of
the secret treaty with Ferdinands He could not indeed
be held responsible for the extravagant promises which
Bent i nek and other Whigs had made to Italians. His
consent to the overthrow of Murat may be defended by
the great necessity of securing a settlement at Vienna.
Jut this does not excuse his active participation in
Metternich's aims, which were not only to extend
Austrian influence over the whole of Italy," but to
stamp out the ideas of nationality and liberalism which
threatened Austrian domination.
With Talleyrand impotent, the rest of Italy was
partitioned .to Metternich's liking. Piedmont,
increased by Genoa and some accessions from France,
was the only State which Metternich did not fully
control ; and even there he was aiming at changing the
succession in Austrian interests. The Parma Duchies
went to Marie Louise, the settlement of the reversion
being left open ;2 Tuscany and Modena to an Austrian
Archduke, while only Lucca was left to the Infanta
Maria Luisa, the representative of the Parma Bour-
bons. The Pope regained the Legations of Ravenna,
Bologna, and Ferrara, where, however, Austria
kept the right of garrison. Austrian influence
was thus perpetuated in the centre of the Peninsula.
Spain refused to sign the Final Act because of the
1 A 'Court to Castlereagh, July 15, 1815, F.O. Continent 11.
The treaty was dated June 12, 1815. So early as September 24,
1814, Castlereagh had pressed for a modification of the Sicilian
Constitution which should strengthen the power of the Crown.
2 A secret protocol was signed at Vienna on May 31, 1814, at
the instance of Alexander, without the knowledge of England and
France, which would have preserved the rights of succession to
the young Napoleon. It had, however, later to be disavowed,
and the succession went to the Spanish claimant, the Duchess of
Lucca, and her issue.
128 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
neglect of the claims of her house; and only later
rearrangements won her assent in 1817. The Ionian
Isles, which had been originally designed by Castle-
reagh as compensation for Ferdinand of Sicily, were
also affected by the changes in Italy. After Murat's
fall, Austria would not consent to allow Naples and the
Ionian Isles to be under the same sovereignty. The
idea of handing them over to Austria herself was
opposed by Eussia, though England would readily have
consented, and pressed this solution on the Congress.
The matter was not settled until the second Peace of
Paris, when a plan was accepted which had long
been advocated by Capo d'Istria, to whom Alexander
^ gave all his authority in this question ; and the islands
remained under British protection.1
Spain, whose interests had been handled in the
worst possible manner, was also required by the Final
Act to restore to Portugal Olivenza, which she had
^ occupied in 1801: but this restitution, which was to be
* the cause of much trouble in succeeding years, was
never carried out. For the rest, neither Spain nor
Portugal received any recognition of their efforts in the
struggle against Napoleon. The question of their
colonial possessions was excluded from all considera-
tion, no less by their own wishes than by the determina-
tion of Great Britain not to allow the Congress to
discuss extra-European affairs, except in so far as
they were connected with the slave trade.
Section 28. The Making of the German Confedera-
tion.2 The Swiss Constitution. General Questions. —
Though the Congress did not give Europe a Constitu-
tion, it at least laid down the principles of a Constitu-
1 See Schiemann, Gcschichtc Russlands, I, 558.
2 There is an enormous bibliography on this complicated sub-
ject. The documentary evidence is largely printed in Schmidt,
W. A., Gcschichtc der Deutschen Verfassungsfragc wahrend der
Befreiungshriege und des Wiener Kongresses. The account by
Sir Adolphus Ward, in the Cambridge Modern History, vol. IX. is
the most impartial that exists, and is based on an unrivalled
knowledge of the subject.
GERMAN CONFEDERATION 129
tion for Germany, but the result of months of intense
effort on the part of many sincere and able personalities
was only to produce a Confederation which was a mere
mockery of the hopes of German patriots. The truth
was that there was not yet a sufficiently organised
fcody of public opinion strong enough to overcome
Prussian militarism, -Hatebtir^ism-, -and the selfishness
of the smalle^jnonaLrch^of _Germany.
The factors of this intricate and obscure diplomacy
reach back into the mediaeval history of Germany.
Napoleon had substituted the Confederation of the*^
thine fofThe~~worn-out shell of the Holy Roman
frtpire, which, in the hands of the Habsburgs,
had been the only bond linking together the multitude
of petty States, princes, and free cities which consti-
tuted Germany. The dissolution of the Confederation
of the Rhine by Napoleon's defeat, and the ieconquest
of the territory which had been incorporated in France,
raised the question as to what was now to be created
in Germany. There was in Germany a strong feeling
that Gferman weakness before France had been due to y
disunion ; and that some form of unity must be created
tcTprevent a recurrence of past evils. There was also a
strong democratic movement, somewhat academic in
character, which hoped that this united Germany might^
be given representative institutions. The princes, how-"
eyer, had no intention either of sharing their
sovereignty with their peoples, or of subordinating it to
the common welfare of Germany ; andjtheir sovereignty
had indeed been guaranteed in the treaties signed in
the_ autumn of 1813. when they joined the Grand
, Alliance. Had Metternich, therefore, in 1813 or early
X In 1814 consented to revive the shadowy suzerainty of
the Holy Roman Empire in the Habsburg house, as he
had been pressed to do from many quarters, there is no
cloubt that he would have had a large following. But
he did not think it advisable to risk the opposition that
would ensue from Prussia and the German patriots,
and, though this idea was more than once revived in
various shapes, it was never seriously pressed.
[285-^69] K
130 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
It was _S tern, one of the creators of regenerated
Prussia, who was foremost among the statesmen in
pressing the schemesJox_^.iLniLeil..Gej:in_ajiy. He had
the ear of Alexander, as well as a considerable
following among German Liberals, and would have
sacrificed Prussia's, or any separate interest, to the
construction of a powerful central Constitution. By
both Prussia and Austria, however, the interests of
Germany were subordinated to their own advantage.
Thus, when the question of a German Constitution
came to be discussed between them early in 1814, it was
directed mainly by the desire to secure their own posi-
tion against one another and the other German States.
The result was the adoption of the principle that
Germany should be united by a Federal bond, which, as
has been seen, was agreed to at Chaumont, and inserted
in the Paris Treaties. Discussions as to the nature of
this bond were carried on by Stein, Hardenberg,
Miinster, and Metternich throughout the whole of the
summer of 1814; and by September a sketch of a Con-
stitution had been drawn up, which would have revived
the system of division into " circles " which had at one
time prevailed in the Holy Roman Empire. This
scheme, which secured the lukewarm approval of
Austria, was based on a plan drawn up by Stein.
Though the position of the secondary States was recog-
nised, the result would have been to place Austria and
Prussia in dual control.
Had not the Polish-Saxon question hopelessly
divided Austriaand Prussia in the first months of the
Congress, there might have resulted from this proposal
a Federal n^rmany. mritedby many more legislative
and economic ties than~ever"beiore ; for a joint effort on
the part of the two Great Powers might have overcome
the opposition of the secondary States to surrendering
any real portion of their sovereignty. But in the
German Committee, which, as has been seen, was set up
to draft the scheme, though the two Powers adhered
to their proposals, their rivalry in other matters, no less
th^--4hfr-~efip€^tie^ and Wxirttemberg,
GERMAN CONFEDERATION 131
prevented any real progress towards the acceptance of
the. Constitution. Minister, in spite of his jealousy of
Prussia/ and though he personally had many objections
to the scheme proposed, supported a strong Germany,
which was also greatly desired by the British Ministers.
The result of this disunion was to open the way for
many^other combinations. The petty States, having no
means~~bf securing representation on the Committee,
united amongst themselves, and sent in a formal protest
at their exclusion, while at the same time they declared
for a single head to the Federation. In the circum-
stances this could only have been Austria; and, when
the Committee suspended all operations towards the
end of November, after repeated refusals of Wurttem-
berg and Baden to submit to the proposed scheme,
]y£etternich seriously considered the revival of the
Germanic Empire under the presidency of Austria to
the exclusion of Prussia. Had a compromise not. been
found inTEe_PoIish-Saxon question, there can be little
doubt that" this scheme would have been usedT and, as
nearly all the smaller States were disgusted with the
overbearing character 01 Prussian diplomacy, it might
have stood a chance of acceptance. As it was, the
period of rupture only produced from every conceivable
quarter a host of ill-digested proposals, which revealed
the outstanding fact that there was in Germany no real
consensus of opinion on which a Constitution could be
provided. Nor can it be said that the attempts to
reconcile the conflicting interests of the two Great
German States, the secondary Powers, the minor
princes, and the peoples, showed any signs of political
genius. The smalLbody of really patriotic and liberal-
mjjjded^pexsiias^^who desired a strong Germany,
endowed with institutions capable of giving expression
to ideas of self-government, had no influence among
the diplomatists on whom the decisions really depended.
The scandal was, Tiowever, "too great to Be endured;
1 Miinster to the Prince Eegent, Sept. 17, 1815, Hanover
Archives.
[285—69] K 2
132 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
and when, by the end of February, the main territorial
difficulties were solved, Austria and Prussia agreecTtb
\take up the task once more. The German Committee
was to be reconstituted on a much wider basis, and the
proposals to be laid before it were to be of a less
ambitious nature. But the Prussian projects, of which
there always appeared to be an inexhaustible supply,
were not approved by Metternich ; and three months
elapsed before the subject was in a sufficiently advanced
state to be discussed officially. Itjwas Wessenberg who
produced a scheme sufficiently innocuous to be laid, on
May 23, before a committee which-_consisted, besides
Austria and Prussia, of Hanover, Saxony, Bavaria,
Hesse-Darmstadt, and Baden, as well as delegates of
the princes_and free cities. Both the Netherlands (for
Luxemburg) and Denmark (for Holstein) were also
represented. In eleven sessions this Committee worked
out, not a detailed Constitution, but merely the outline
of a Confederation which it was intended to supple-
ment at a later date. This was finally agreed to in the
shape of Twenty Articles, which were signed on June
9, eleven of them being incorporated also in the Final
Act itself.
^y A Federal Diet was to be the central organ of the
thirty-eight iStates3 of which Austria and Prussia were
to be reckoned members for their German possessions
only, while the Kings o.f„j^_eJNLetharlands and Denmark
were included for Luxemburg and Holstein respectively.
Austria had the presidency of this Diet, a position
which, though Tt seemed merely a recognition. of her
ancient prestige," was of real importance, especially as,
though the votes were unevenly distributed/ the
overwhelming preponderance of the two Great Powers
was not expressed in the Constitution. Beyond recog-
nising a common necessity to act together in war.
and hinting at a Federal army, there was no xommon
institiiliQiL.cxejated. ,except_ the Diet itself. Even the
rqilitary union, which the measures at the moment in
progress~"against Napoleon showed to be so urgently
necessary, was_not constructed. To the Diet was left
GERMAN CONFEDERATION 133
the elaboration of the fundamental laws of^ the Con-
federation, including such principles as theTiberty of
the press ; but Metternich, at_a later date, was to use i
thai ^central body simply as an organ, of reaction.
There was indeed in the Act no safeguard for the
liberties of the people, except a clause that an Assembly
of Estates would be set up in each country of the
Confederation, and the insertion of a few fundamental
rights, such as freedom of religion and permission to
move from one State to another. The " liberties " of
the " mediatised ' ' Princes were treated with little
more consideration, but they obtained many personal
privileges to compensate them for their loss of
sovereignty.
In these discussions the other Powers, of Europe,
though they took -the Constitution of Germany under
their protection in the Final Act, had scarcely any
influence. In the earlier stages, it is true, Talleyrand
Had sought with some success to increase the dissensions
in Germany. But both Great Britain and Russia were
sincerely anxious for the construction of a^ united
Germany, Alexander being predisposed by the influence
of Stein to this view, which_was, perhaps, against
Russian national interests. His connections with
Wurttemberg and other small States, at any rate,
played no real part in increasing the difficulties of the
situation. Castlereagh throughout used! all his
influence to promote union, which he regarded as a
fundamental necessity for the equilibrium of Europe.
TJhe failure -to produce anything better than the
em^sc^la^etTConstitution, which left a large part of
Gfcermany at the mercy of a host of petty sovereigns,
was the result of many causes, but the responsibility
must lie with the Germans themselves, and not with
the other States. The rupture between Austria and
Prussia over the Saxon question prevented a settlement
such as Stein had planned, which, owing to their
diverse interests, was, perhaps, in any case, impossible.
The smaller States, already secured in their sovereignty
by the treaties of 1813, made the most of this oppor
134 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
tunity. The reductionof these States to thirty-eight
was indeed a great advance, but this was mainly due
to the French Revolution and to Napoleon, ancTnot to
the Congress. The institutions under which Germany
had now to live were really quite inadequate to_solve
the problems raised by the Napoleonic upheaval^and
contained the seeds of a generation of war and revolu-
tion.
The affairs of Switzerland, though complicated and
full of intrigue, were settled without serious friction
among the Great Powers, whose fundamental interests
were norin conflict. A new Constitution was drawn
up which modified the Act of Mediation of 1803, one
of the most successful emanations of Napoleon's genius ;
and by the addition of Geneva, Valais, and Neuchatel
a Confederation of twenty-two cantons was formed.
Stratford Uanning and others held the balance between
the more democratic schemes of Capo d'Istria, whose
attitude was determined by La Harpe's influence on
Alexander, and the reactionary views of Austria and
France, who after some delay was allowed a repre-
sentative on the Committee. The Constitution was
ultimately accepted by the Swiss Diet, and was
followed, as had been promised, on November 20, 1815,
by^ the guarantee of the neutrality of Switzerland and
the inviolability of its territory, which was also
extended to parts of Savoy! This^ established a new
principle in the public law of Europe, and may beacon -
sidered as one of the most important results of the
period, for the Great Powers had definitely recognised
that their own interests, as well as those, of__all Europe,
were bestfserved by the exclusion of a small State Jrom
participation in future conflicts.
Of the three general questions brought before the
Congress, that of the abolition of the slave trade was
forced on the^oTrieFPower,s by the vehemence of English
public 6pinion, which acted as a never-ceasing spur
to the English plenipotentiaries. As Castlereagh more
than once complained, this insistence rather hindered
than helped the cause, for the Continental Powers
GENERAL QUESTIONS 135
were convinced that it was due more to self -interest v
than to humanitarian motives. Castlereagh used every
expedient to compel France, Spain, and Portugal to
agree to an immediate abolition. Talleyrand gave him
some support on the general principle, with a view to
conciliating British public opinion, but refused
immediate abolition, which was only granted by
Louis XVIII after Napoleon had set the example on
his return from Elba. Castlereagh succeeded, however,
in obtaining^a declaration condemning the practice ofF/'
the slave trade, which w7as annexed to the Final Act,
while, by a monetary equivalent, he induced Portugal
to abolish the trade north of the Equator. Concessions
in money and colonies were the chief expedients he
used. But one suggestion of an economic character
deserves special notice. It wTas proposed to exclude
from the European markets the produce of_ those
colonies which refused to abolish the trade: and,
though this provision was never put into force, "it
served as a basis for a similar proposal made by
Alexander in 1817 to put pressure on the revolted
Spanish colonies. The use of the economic weapon in
peace time for political purposes was, therefore,
seriously contemplated by the Great Powers at this
period. ~
The regulations for settling the precedence amongst
the Powers and their diplomatic representatives
showed a great advance on all previous discussions of
this subject, and henceforward these formalities
occasioned little inconvenience.
PART IV. THE COMPLETION OF THE
CONGRESS
Section 29. The Return of Napoleon and the Second
Peace of Pwis. — The position of Napoleon was 6ne of
the first points discussed at Vienna by the Ministers of
the four Powers,1 and they were all agreed. on the
danger of leaving him at Elba. All they could do, how-
ever, was to watch his activities as closely as possible
by an elaborate system of espionage, and rely on British
ships to prevent his escape. These precautions failed,
and Napoleon was eagerly welcomed by a France that
had already learnt to distrust and despise the Bourbons.
The crisis at Vienna was already past, and the Powers
were unanimous in desiring Napoleon's immediate
overthrow. The eight Powers issued a declaration on
March 13, which denounced him as a public enemy.
The news of his success produced a renewal of the
Treaty of Chaumont on March 25 ; and the huge forces
of the Coalition were set in motion once more. But it
was only with great difficulty that the military machine
could again be organised. Austria was occupied in
Italy, many British troops were still in America,
Russia's forces had retired to Poland, and only in the
Low Countries was there the nucleus of an army within
striking distance of France. There were renewed the
usual squabbles about the troops of the German con-
tingents, the methods of subsistence, and the plan of
campaign. Wellington brusquely refused Alexander's
outrageous demand for his own nomination as
Generalissimo, and a grand General Headquarters was
again formed to direct the strategy of the armies which
1 See Appendix IV, p. 160.
RETURN OF NAPOLEON 137
were to invade France from every side. Napoleon was
thus given three months to organise an offensive, but
the British-German and Prussian forces in the Nether-
lands sufficed to destroy it, and the imposing allied
array was never brought into action.
During the Hundred Days it seemed as if the
Bourbons had lost the throne of France. Alexander felt
confirmed in his dislike and distrust of their methods ;
Metternich opened secret negotiations with Fouche,
whose Jacobin intrigues Napoleon, posing as a
constitutional monarch, had perforce to tolerate;
Clancarty chivalrously defended Bourbon interests at
Vienna; but the British Government added a declara-
tion to the treaty of March 25 to the effect that the war
was not being waged to impose a special dynasty on
France ; and Wellington, the strongest supporter of the
Bourbons, in April regarded their cause as lost. A
third declaration against Napoleon, drawn up in their
interests, had to be abandoned owing to the differences
of opinion among the Powers. A republic, the Due
d' Orleans as King, a regency, were suggested as
expedients. Only as to the exclusion of Napoleon was
there complete and irrevocable agreement.
The British Government, however, at heart wished
well to Louis XV1TI, and were secretly pressing his
return on the other Powers; and, as Talleyrand had
foreseen from the first, the new Coalition, of which
Britain was the paymaster, immensely increased
British influence on the Continent. The Waterloo
campaign made Wellington and the Prussians masters
of Paris at the critical moment ; and, as the latter cared
for nothing but revenge, the former had the game in
his hands. Fouche played the same part as Talleyrand
had played in 1814; and this strange combination
triumphed over the republican factions, Louis XVIII
was brought back soon after the allied armies had
entered Paris, to make once more terms with the con-
querors of France; and, when the Sovereigns and the
diplomatists arrived, they could do nothing but accept
the situation.
138 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
The negotiations for the new treaty extended over
four months. The allied troops, to the number of
900,000, poured into France, and lived there at the cost
of~the inhabitants. As they were at the same time
earning subsidies from Great Britain, they showed no
signs of wishing to leave. The brutal conduct of the
Prussian and other German troops towards the French
population was both militarily and morally
indefensible, and merited the severe condemnation
which the British Ministers hastened to express. Even
these latter, however, pressed on the King a policy of
severity towards Napoleon and his generals. In such
an atmosphere a treaty was not easy to construct.
Talleyrand, though entrusted with the negotiations,
had not now the confidence of the King. Nor were the
allies by any means united on the terms to be offered.
From Prussia and the German States arose a loud cry
for the dismemberment of France. The Prussian
soldiers, intoxicated with their victory, demanded the
final voice in their Cabinet ; and Hardenberg confessed
to Cathcart that " he felt himself in the midst of
Praetorian bands/ ' They were seconded by the Nether
lands and the smaller German States, while Austria,
afraid to oppose this national outcry, was vacillating.
Huge indemnities, Alsace and Lorraine, French
Flanders, Savoy, were considered as just spoil to be
taken from a France which had brought upon herself
this second defeat.
This insatiate rage was opposed by the Tsar and the
British Ministers — the one from motives of generosity
as well as policy, the latter, so they avowed, solely for
reasons of State. Alexander hated the Bourbons, and
bore a grudge against Talleyrand, but he was sincere in
his assertions that he wished well to France. Castle-
reagh and Wellington, in insisting on a policy of
moderation, were in opposition to the wishes of the
Prince Regent, the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, and
British public opinion. For two months there ensued
a fierce struggle between the Allied Powers as to the
terms to be offered to France; and Talleyrand had to
SECOND PEACE OF PARIS 139
look on, impotent to influence the decisions in the
slightest degree. The Prussians came forward with
large schemes for territorial changes on the north-
eastern frontier. They wished to absorb large portions
of Hanover, compensating the latter with Luxemburg,
while the kingdom of the Netherlands was to receive
large increases in French Flanders. Gagern, the
Dutch Minister, was won over to this point of view,
and did his best to persuade his King. At the same
time Alsace and Lorraine were claimed by certain
minor German Powers; and Austria, to some extent,
supported them, looking to obtain compensation for
herself elsewhere.
Castlereagh' s first task was to convince his own
Cabinet of the unwisdom of these schemes. In
despatch after despatch he reiterated the dangers of
tearing provinces from France. ""Security, and not
revenge " must be the policy of the Allies. What was
needed was to destroy the aggressive revolutionary!
spirit in France, and prevent the return of Napoleon)
if this was assured, a strong France would be a
beneficial factor in Europe, and useful as a counter-
weight against both Prussia and Russia. If the French
were deprived of the conquests of Richelieu and
Louis XIV, England would be committed to defend
Europe against an irreconcilable and infuriated nation.
Moreover, if once a policy of spoliation were begun,
every Power would claim compensation, and another
Congress would almost be necessary. The brutality
of the Prussian soldiers produced an immense effect on
Castlereagh, and modified the views which he had held
at Vienna, while he had also detected a spirit of
Jacobinism in their army.1 In conjunction with
Wellington, he did everything possible to put a
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Aug. 24, 1815, P.O. Continent 24:
" The influence in their councils is at present almost exclusively
military. . . . You may rest assured that there is a temper in
the Prussian Army little less alarming to the peace of Europe, and
little less menacing to the authority of their own Sovereign, than
what prevails in the Armj of France."
$**
140 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
stop to the system of pillage and systematic
plundering, which they had from the first inaugurated
in the occupied provinces; and he refused to
listen to the wild schemes of dismemberment pro-
posed. He succeeded at last in convincing his Cabinet.
Having secured their assent, he pressed ~~on the
Powers his own schemes, which were meant, without
inflicting permanent injury on France, to provide
security for the future and reparation for the past.
Security he proposed to obtain through ^temporary
occupation by a European army of the ^northern
fortresses of France, as well as by the dismantling of
other French fortresses, and the cesston"~of some
frontier districts: reparation by the payment of an
indemnity and the return of the works of art of which
France had plundered Europe during the last twenty
years, and which she had been allowed to keep by the
first Peace of Paris.
Even these moderate proposals went further
than Alexander desired, but it was not difficult to
secure his consent. Metternich wTas at heart convinced
of the truth of Castlereagh's views, and was easily
satisfied as long as he could obtain some relief for the
Austrian finances. The Prussians had, therefore, to
give way; and these proposals were, with only small
alterations, proposed to Talleyrand on September 20.
He refused to accept them, but his position had already
been made untenable by the Royalist reaction. Fouche
had already been dismissed, and the King forced Talley-
rand's resignation. He was succeeded by the Due de
Richelieu, an emigre, but a loyal and upright French-
man, as well as a close friend of Alexander. He
accepted the conditions, and secured, by the influence
of the Tsar, some further modifications. Alexander,
indeed, tried to claim all the credit for thwarting the
Prussians; and the necessity for preventing him from
obtaining too great an influence at Paris was urged by
Castlereagh to his Cabinet as a reason for his own
policy. But the real battle was fought by the British
Ministers, for, if they had joined the Prussians, there
SECOND PEACE OF PARIS 141
can be no doubt that the scheme of dismemberment
would have been carried.
The final result was that France surrendered a small
strip of frontier to the Netherlands; portions of terri-
tory to Prussia; which included the fortresses of
Saarlouis and Landau; and a part of Savoy to Pied-
mont, besides demolishing the fortress of Huningen,
which threatened Bale. An indemnity of 700,000,000
francs, the payment of which was regulated by a special
convention was levied on her, while sjie had also to
agree to pay the claims of private creditors for injuries
inflicted by the French armies. Part of this indemnity
was to be used in erecting fortresses on her borders. An
army of 150,000 men was to occupy the northern
departments of France for five years, which might
possibly be reduced to three. This army was placed
under the command of the Duke of Wellington; and
the ambassadors of the four Powers were to form a
council of Ministers at Paris to regulate its relations
with the French Government. Its expenses were esti-
mated at 150,000,000 francs for each year of occupation.
There was thus a heavy financial burden. Efforts
were indeed made by Prussia and the German States to
make it overwhelming. The total of private claims
submitted amounted to 1,200,000,000 francs, but
Richelieu refused to consider such a sum. England
and Russia supported him ; and, after a long series of
negotiations, the matter was settled in April 1818 for
240,00fl,000 francs. Some relief was also obtained by
the fact that the army of occupation was reduced by
30,000 men in 1817, and removed altogether after the
Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle in October 1818. Since
Napoleon had left France without a debt, having made
Europe pay for the wars he had waged, she was well
able to bear the penalties thus inflicted on her, and
found no difficulty in raising the money necessary from
European financiers. The final result was, therefore,
to leave her still a strong and vigorous State, which had
suffered less materially than any of the Continental
Powers.
142 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
But, though the statesmen at the time scarcely
realised it, the balance of power in Europe had been
permanently modified by the result of the Napoleonic
regime. The male population of France had been
seriously reduced in numbers. France had lost
colonies, and, while all the other Great Powers had
received large additions of territory, her own frontiers
were substantially the same as in 1789. Even more
important was the fact that the system of conquest
pursued by Napoleon had been a complete failure, and
only served to strengthen the enemies of France.
Though there still existed an aggressive faction in the
French nation, these results produced a permanent;
effect on the national spirit, which was to influence
events in 1830, 1840, and even during the revival of the
Empire under the third Napoleon.
Section 30. The Renewal of the Quadruple Alliance.
The " Holy Alliance." — In the opinion of all the four
Powers, the peace of Europe needed some further safe
guard than the treaties with France. This was to be
found in a renewal of the Treaty of Chaumont, which
had already been reaffirmed at Vienna. Castlereagh
regretted that some guarantee had not been made
against Napoleon's return at the first Peace of Paris ;
and his intention from the first was that treaties should
now be signed which would " make a European invasion
the inevitable and immediate consequence of Bona-
parte's succession or that of any of his race to power
in France/'1 He secured the approval of his Cabinet,
and submitted the proposal to the Allied Powers.
Alexander received the idea with alacrity, and ordered
Capo d'Istria to draft a treaty. This draft met, how-
ever, with grave objections from Castlereagh. It would
have pledged the allies to support the Bourbon dynasty
on the throne of France, as well as the Constitution
which Louis XVIII had again granted to his subjects,
a policy which Castlereagh thought bad in itself ; while
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, July 17, 1815, F.O. Continent 21.
QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE 143
no British Minister could sign a document which
showed
" too strong and undisguised a complexion of interference on
the part of the Allied Sovereigns in the internal affairs of
France, without sufficiently connecting such interference with
the policy which a due attention to the immediate security of
their own dominions prescribed."
He prepared a draft himself in which his object was
" to keep the internal affairs of France in the background, and
to make the colour of our political attitude and of our con-
tingent interference as European as possible."1
With a few small alterations, this draft was adopted.
The treaty signed on November 20 consisted of seven
Articles only, which affirmed the determination of the
Powers to maintain the stipulations of the Treaty of
Paris signed on the same day, and to exclude Napoleon
or any of his family from the throne of France. It was
this treaty that was the basis of the " Alliance " of the
Great Powers which now assumed the control of
European affairs ; and all the efforts of Metternich and
Alexander in the following years to extend its scope
were defeated by the tenacious opposition of Castle-
reagh and the open defiance of his successor. But,
though confined to the specific case of guarding against
the dangers of a Napoleonic regime in France, it
marked definitely the ascendency of the Great Powers
and the principle of the European Concert. Castle-
reagh throughout his career was an enthusiastic
advocate of the system of diplomacy by which the
Ministers of the Great Powers met together at frequent
1 Castlereagh to Liverpool, Oct. 25, 1815, F.O. Continent 29,
enclosing the Russian and English projets. Liverpool objected to
the phrase " souverain legitime " in Castlereagh 's draft, and sub-
stituted " Louis XVIII ou ses heritiers successeurs." There is a
note in his hand on the document: " The right of the people to
choose their King will become the subject of debate in Parlia-
ment if '■ le souverain legitime ' remains in the treaty." He
insisted on the same deference to public opinion in the phraseology
of the treaty with France.
144 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
intervals to discuss international affairs, and he was
only too ready to incorporate the idea in the treaty. It
was expressed in Article VI, which ran as follows: —
To facilitate and to secure the execution of the present
treaty, and to consolidate the connections which at the present
moment so closely unite the four Sovereigns for the happiness
of the world, \ the High Contracting Parties have agreed to
renew their meetings at fixed periods, either under the imme-
diate auspices of the Sovereigns themselves or by their re-
spective Ministers, for the purpose of consulting upon their
common interests, and for the consideration of the measures
which at each of these periods shall be considered the most
salutary for the repose and prosperity of nations and for the
maintenance of the peace of Europe."
This was a real recognition of the advantages of a
permanent Concert of the Great Powers. France was
admitted to this Concert in 1818, when a union, and
consequently the ascendency, of the Great Powers was
at the highest point. But unfortunately the Con-
tinental Powers were to use these reunions to assert the
rights of legitimacy against liberal and constitutional
ideas; and the Concert, from which at one time much
— and with reason — had been hoped was soon dissolved.
, On September 26, 1815, the sovereigns of the three
' Eastern Powers had signed the Treaty of the Holy
Alliance. This notorious and much misunderstood
document was simply the expression of Alexander's
mystical religious beliefs, which, under the influence of
Madame de Krudener, had grown daily stronger during
the campaign of 1815 and the stay at Paris, though, as
has been stated, the idea was first suggested to him by
Castlereagh' s project of guarantee at Vienna. The docu-
ment simply stated that the sovereigns would regulate
their public acts according to the benign principles of
the Christian religion. This " piece of sublime mysti-
cism and nonsense," as Castlereagh called it/was
meant to be signed by the Christian Sovereigns
of Europe.. The position of Great Britain was
difficult — "what may be called a scrape" wrote
Castlereagh — and it was eventually solved by the
Prince Regent sending a personal letter which
TREATY OF HOLY ALLIANCE 145
did not commit his Ministers. The Pope and the
Sultan were also excluded from participating in the
Christian fraternity. The Holy Alliance had no
influence on affairs, except to produce in the minds
of the peoples the suggestion that the sovereigns were '*
leagued together against them. This suspicion was trans-
ferred to the real Treaty of Alliance signed on November
20, and in later years with truth. But the two instru-
ments signed at Paris can in no way be considered as
open to the reproaches which were later justly levelled
at those who tried to use them for their own purposes.
Both expressed in different form the longing for a i
period of peace after a generation of warfare. On this '
point there were few optimists among the statesmen;
and scarcely one expected that the peace of Europe
would long remain undisturbed.
Section 31. General Observations. The work of the
Congress of Vienna was dealt with faithfully by the
publicists of its own time, and has been severely
handled by historians in the century that followed.
The spectacle of «a-_jdQ2eR~~statesmen transferring
" souls...1' by the 100,000 from one sovereign to another
has inspired many mordant pens; and in the light of
the history of the nineteenth century the validity of
these criticisms cannot be disputed. Such criticisms,
however, neglect the fact that the Congress was the
close of one epoch as well as the beginning of another.
J&Hie main object of the statesmen of the day was to
myeHnTow"l^ie ' Napoleonic Empire completely; and in
that object they succeeded to a much greater degree
than they expected. The settlement _of_JLE141lB15
was^goxerned by thejexpeoTients necessary to gain this
enpl^Which couldnot be ignored when the final decisions
had/pt^^
substitute forthe wnTractsTwritten anoTHmwrltten,
/which had united Europe ^ against Napole^i^ilije vague
/ principles~oTnationality and democracy, so imperfectly
f understood /^aliKeTy the p^pTes~~ana~the statesmen.
the result would certainly have been disastrous. The
v^^3^i9~n — — — __—-___„_ L
ffa
i.
146 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
primary need of Europe, once the Napoleonic tyranny
| wa^aver thrown, was a period of peace; and this; the
I siatesmen~at Vienna, undoubtedly secured^ in a far
greater degree than the most sanguine of the publicists
4pi the time dared to hope.
The Congress was not without a principle ; and it is
not strange that this principle was derived from the
eighteenth century rather than from the new forces
that were springing into' life. The moving spirit of
any age is seldom judged accurately by the men of
action who live in it ; and it was not to be expected that
the principles of nationality and democracy, which
had inspired the first attacks of the Revolution and
Napoleon, should be judged fairly by the statesmen
who had the task of rescuing Europe from French
domination. */Nor were any of the dismembered
nationalities, except Poland, yet ready to receive
national institutions. The national spirit in Germany
and Italy was there, in the sense of hatred of the
foreigner, but not in the sense which made it possible
for Germans and Italians to attain to national .unity ;
the subject nationalities of Austria and Hungary had
scarcely awakened to consciousness; and, if in the
Balkans the Serbs and the Greeks were already alive,
this area did not come within the competence of the
Congress. To a generation, therefore, which had seen
the dominance of a single Power^ it is not strange that
the principle of the Balance of Power should have
appealed with great force, 1 nis, as has been seen, was
the governing motive of Castlereagh's 'policy, which
attempted to strengthen the centre of Europe against
both the West and the East; and, as during his life-
time the West and the East had almost entirely
swallowed up the dismembered and demoralised
centre, no other judgment could have been expected
from him.
Talleyrand also endeavoured to bring forward
" legitimacy: " as a governing principle; but, though
Saxony (mutilated in the process) and Naples returned
to their legitimate sovereigns, it cannot be said that
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 147
this ^principle was followed with any consistency. On
the contrary, a large number of the potentates, dis-
possessed by ~the French Revolution, never regained
their"Sovereignty, and their protests at Vienna were
unavailing. The Congress, in fact, found it necessary
to accept the faits accomglis of the Napoleonic regime ;
and this meant the suppression of a number of small
States, republics as well as monarchies — on the who!
tolfiegreat good of Europe. In-this way, though not
consciously, much progress was made towards a united
Germany and a united Italy; though, paradoxically
enough, these very changes were fiercely attacked by
many of those most in sympathy with national aspira-
tions.
More worthy of reprobation is the discouragement
of the idea of self-government, which had already comeT
to^a: f after consciousness than thai of natioiialiljyr-
Alexander alone, with some of his advisers, showed
any sympathy with it ; and it was he who secured the
" Charte " for the French with the assistance of
Talleyrand, who was also aware of the fundamental
importance of this aspect of the French Revolution.
To almost all the other statesmen democracy meant
nothing but anarchy and revolution; and among these
must be included the Tory Ministers of Great Britain, ;j
who even secretly encouraged the attacks on the consti-
tutions which had been set up with the direct con-
nivance of British representatives. It was this policy
that made the subsequent national movements take
strange paths, instead of being an expression of the
peoples' desires.
The failure of the Congress to give any adequate*
expression to the nobler ideals of universal peace may
also perhaps be condoned. As has been seen, the
statesmen, once their dissension had been adjusted,
did turn their attention to the possibilities of safe-
guarding the new Europe from aggression. But the
return of Napoleon again made them direct their
energies to preventing aggression from one quarter
only. In inventing the " Concert " they undoubtedly
[285—69] L 2
148 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
contributed in a very marked degree to the security of
Europe, for it cannot be doubted that, in spite of all
its failures^ that system did much for the nineteenth
century. " For schemes of disarmament there was in
// Europe then no articulate demand. The French had
still an inordinate pride in their army; Prussia had
just passed a universal service law which evoked a
willing response from the people; Great Britain was
not prepared, in the slightest degree, to apply the prin-
ciple of disarmament to sea-power, in which she had
attained complete and overwhelming supremacy;
the Tsar, though he initiated proposals on the subject
in 1816, appears to have had no real intention of
allowing them to affect his own vast armies ; and in no
country was there any attempt to coerce the Govern-
ments on this subject. Accusation on this score must,
in fact, be levelled against the age as a whole and not
against the statesmen.
These considerations mitigate the severity of the
judgment that history must pass on the Congress. Yet
it cannot be asserted that the statesmen concerned were
equal to the opportunity presented, to them. They were
limited in outlook, too prone to .compromise, lacking
in faith and courage. None, except Alexander— -and
he only fitfully and irresolutely — made any attempt to
do more than the obvious. They were content with
expedients. They were men of their own generation;
and, though they secured for Europe a breathing-space
of peac£, and in one or two minor points, such as the
regulation of International Rivers, did much for the
future government of Europe, they did little else to
win the gratitude of posterity.
i)
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I
DESPATCH OF VISCOUNT CASTLEEEAGH TO THE EAEL
OF LIVEEPOOL, VIENNA, SEPTEMBEE 24. 18141
My letters of the 21st instant will have apprized your lordship
of my arrival here. I found the Eussian Minister, Count Nessel-
rode, and the Chancellor, Hardenberg, reached Vienna the day but
one after. The Ministers of the Allied Powers have had four con-
ferences, which have been principally occupied in discussing the
form and course of our future proceedings. There has been but
one opinion on the point, " that the conduct of the business must
practically rest with the leading Powers "; and with the exception
of a doubt on the part of the Eussian Minister, whether the
Emperor may not press the introduction of the Swedish pleni-
potentiary, we are agreed that the effective Cabinet should not be
carried beyond the six Powers of the first order, with an auxiliary
Council of the five principal States of Germany for the special
concerns of Germany. You will observe from the Protocol [A],2
officially transmitted, as well as from that which I now inclose,
that the Allied Powers have deemed it necessary to preserve the
initiative in their own hands. I have concurred in thinking this
line expedient; but, considering the complexion of the protocol
prepared upon this subject (which is Prussian) to be rather repul-
sive against France, and a little more conclusive in its expressions
than I quite liked, I thought it right to give my acquiescence to
it with the qualification contained in the note annexed to it.3
The mode of assembling the Congress and conducting business
next occupied our attention ; and that you may see the succession
of ideas that have prevailed upon this subject, I inclose unoffi-
cially and confidentially for your perusal the memoranda which
have been given in, rather as throwing out ideas than containing
1 F.O. Continent 7.
2 Protocol of Sept. 22, 1814; D'Angeberg, 249; British and
Foreign State Papers, II, p. 554.
8 Ibid., p. 555.
150 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
a formal opinion on the part of those who prepared them.1 The
idea that first occurred naturally was to constitute the Congress,
and when constituted to propose to nominate a Committee to
prepare a Projet of Arrangement for the consideration of Con-
gress. But this course of proceeding was soon dismissed, as
involving us without previous concert in all the preliminary ques-
tions of difficulty — namely, what Powers shall be admitted to sit
and deliberate, and what only to petition and negotiate ; what are
to be the functions and attribution of the Congress; and by what
mode they are to act and conclude. This led to another view of
the question, which you will find in two papers of mine,2 the
object of which was to see whether, saving all questions in the
first instance, we might not, through a preliminary meeting of
plenipotentiaries, get the conduct of the business with a general
acquiescence into the hands of the six Powers, with their auxiliary
Council for German affairs.
The assembling of such a preliminary meeting of plenipoten-
tiaries is certainly by no means free from objection. You will
find this subject investigated in a further memorandum, prepared
by Baron Humboldt, who assists Prince Hardenberg3 ; but the
substitute he proposes has its awkwardness, as it too broadly and
ostensibly assumes the right to do what may be generally
acquiesced in, if not offensively announced, but which the secon-
dary Powers may protest against, if recorded to their humiliation
in the face of Europe.
The question remains open till the French and Spanish pleni-
potentiaries join us. Perhaps the most prudent course may be
between the two propositions, and that the declaration of the six
Powers should not contain any public avowal of what they mean
in point of form to do; but that it should state reasons why the
Congress should not be constituted till the plenipotentiaries, after
their assembly at Vienna, have had full opportunity for confiden-
tial intercourse, and till there is a prospect that by such
communications (without saying of what nature) some projet of
general arrangement may be devised, more likely than anything
that could now be hazarded, to meet the sentiments and provide
for the interests of all concerned.
I have endeavoured, as much as possible, to effect a coinci-
dence of sentiment between the French and Allied Ministers, and
I hope I have in a considerable degree succeeded; but, whatever
may be their differences with each other, the three Continental
Courts seem to feel equal jealousy of admitting France either to
arbitrate between them or to assume any leading influence in the
arrangements consequent upon the peace
1 See Appendices II and IV.
2 See Appendix III.
3 See Appendices V and VI.
APPENDICES 151
APPENDIX II
MEMOEANDUM UPON THE MEASUKES TO BE
ADOPTED PEEPAKATOKY TO THE MEETING OF THE
CONGEESS IN FOEM FOE THE DESPATCH OF
BUSINESS, VIENNA, SEPTEMBEE 18141
It appears clear, upon the first assembling of a body so
numerous as the plenipotentiaries deputed to the Congress of
Vienna, that no effectual progress can be made in business till
some plan of European settlement can be prepared and ready to
be submitted for their consideration, and, further, till the form
to be given to the Congress, and the manner in which the business
is to be conducted, shall have been previously considered and
reported upon.
It is equally clear that such plan or report cannot at once
originate advantageously with any individual plenipotentiary, un-
aided by the councils and suggestions of others, and that it can
still less be expected to originate in the body at large. If so, it
follows that a limited number of plenipotentiaries must be charged
to prepare and bring forward the same.
The Powers most competent to frame for consideration a projet
of European settlement, at once likely to meet the views and
interests of the several States, are evidently those who have borne
the principal share in the Councils and conduct of the war, and
in the formation of the several treaties, which by the first secret
article of the Treaty of Paris are recognised and declared to con-
stitute the basis of the intended arrangement.
With this view it is proposed that the plenipotentiaries of
Eussia, Austria, France, Great Britain, Spain, and Prussia should
charge themselves with this preparatory duty, and that until they
shall be prepared to report upon the same the other plenipoten-
tiaries deputed to Congress will, by temporary adjournments,
suspend all further proceedings towards opening, in form, the said
Congress.
That, in the aid of the above general Commission, a special
Commission, composed of the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia,
Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and Hanover be appointed for the con-
sideration of German affairs.
That to these Commissions should be referred all communica-
tions which may be addressed to Congress, and, in order the better
to enable them to meet the general wishes, that the several pleni-
1 F.O. Continent Archives 8. The English draft in Castle-
reagh's own handwriting, with pencilled corrections. There is a
French translation in F.O. Continent 7.
152 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
potentiaries not forming a part of the Commissions should be
invited to a free and confidential communication of their senti-
ments to the same.
That the said Commissioners shall invite the other plenipoten-
tiaries, as soon as their report is ready for discussion, to assemble
and deliberate upon the same, first determining as to the form and
mode in which the Congress shall constitute itself for despatch of
business. In which consideration it will be requisite to decide
what Powers shall be admitted to sit and deliberate in the Con-
gress and what Powers shall only be permitted to appear before the
Congress to seek restitution of territories of which they have beeu
dispossessed during the war, or for the confirmation of titles to
possessions [of] which, being acquired during the war, the
sovereignty has not as yet been regularly ceded upon a peace by
the lawful sovereigns.
It is conceived that no doubt can exist as to the indispensable
necessity of a preliminary proceeding of this nature. The six
Powers in Europe most considerable in population and weight have
been suggested for the reasons above stated, as, upon the whole,
the most competent to execute this duty.
Were the number of six to be materially extended the business
of such a Commission must be proportionately retarded, and were
any addition to be made a selection, in some measure invidious,
would become necessary, unless an entire class of Powers of
nearly equal dimensions should be included, to which there
appears the strongest objection.
It is proposed that the above six Powers should be charged ad
interim with arranging the police necessary for the Congress, and
with the organization of a bureau for the receipt and preservation
of papers and for the giving copies of the same to the plenipoten-
tiaries who may require them.
APPENDIX III
TWO PROJETS OF CASTLEEEAGH ON THE METHOD OF
OPENING CONGEESS, VIENNA, SEPTEMBEE 18141
I
. . . . A notice to be published in the Court Gazette of
Vienna, desiring the several plenipotentiaries now at Vienna to
assemble at the on the
to consider of the measures proper to be adopted preparatory to
1 F.O. Continent 7. The English draft is in F.O. Continent
Archives No. 8. Article XXXII of the treaty was to be quoted at
the beginning of the document.
APPENDICES 153
the formal opening of the said Congress for the despatch of
business, in conformity to the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris.1
A list of the persons presenting themselves for admission to
the said meeting, to be taken on their entrance, describing on the
part of what sovereign or State they allege to be charged with
full powers, and no person to be admitted who does not claim to
be so authorised.
When the meeting is assembled the Austrian Minister to
announce to the persons there presenting themselves as pleni-
potentiaries the arrangements made by command of the Emperor
His Master for the accommodation of the intended Congress, the
local assigned for its sittings, the guard of honour and the officers
to be in attendance upon it, and that the emplacement so assigned
for the assembling of Congress would be considered by His
Imperial Majesty as possessing all the privileges, &c, attached to
an ambassadorial residence, with the police th'ereof subject to
the direction of the Congress itself.
The said Minister, or any other selected for that purpose, may
then call the attention of the meeting to the situation in which
they find themselves, and to the necessity of taking some measures
preparatory to the meeting of Congress, for the purpose of ascer-
taining with more precision than is set forth upon the face of the
article above referred to the nature and functions of the proposed
Congress, and also of bringing before the Congress when regularly
constituted the business on which they are called to deliberate, in
such a form as may best admit of deliberation and of a final
decision.
He may state that this subject having occupied the attention
of certain of the plenipotentiaries then present, a memorandum
had been prepared for the consideration of the meetings, which he
might then desire leave to read.
The memorandum in question, being previously approved by
the six Powers, it would be for them to communicate it privately
and confidentially to [such of2] the other plenipotentiaries now at
Vienna [as they can confide in3], so as to secure their support of
its contents at the intended meeting.
The proposition is so reasonable in itself as to render opposition
from any quarter improbable; it must, at all events, be futile if
the six Powers and their connections support it.
The advantage of this mode of proceeding is that you treat
the plenipotentiaries as a body with early and becoming respect.
You keep the power by concert and management in your own
1 F.O. Continent 7 has: " and also to secure the means of
bringing before them the business, etc."
2 Not in F.O. Continent 7.
3 F.O. Continent Archives 8.
154 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
hands, but without openly assuming authority to their exclusion.
You obtain a sort of sanction from them for what you are deter-
mined at all events to do, which they cannot well withhold and
which cannot, in the mode it is taken, embarrass your march;
and you entitle yourselves, without disrespect to them, to meet
together for despatch of business for an indefinite time to their
exclusion, having at the same time the option to confer with any of
the plenipotentiaries separately upon the points in which they are
more immediately interested.
The further advantage is that, as you meet informally in the
first instance as plenipotentiaries and not as a Congress, nothing
is prejudged and nothing admitted till the leading Powers have
had full time to weigh all questions well and to understand each
other. It is quite impossible this measure can meet with any
serious opposition.
If such a temper should exist in any of the plenipotentiaries,
it is better it should be compelled to show itself openly, in order
that it may be met and suppressed at the outset.
II
Should the preliminary form of proceeding be approved, it
remains to adjust the course of business to be observed in the
Commission of Six.
As the happy result of the Congress will depend on the spirit
of justice, moderation, and accommodation which shall really sub-
sist among the leading Powers towards each other, it is submitted
that all definitions which seem at the outset to draw a distinction
between them should be avoided. That the four Powers which
have hitherto acted together should, upon the first meeting,
endeavour to impress the two others with a conviction that they
desire to act cordially and confidentially with them for the
common interest, and anything marking a different sentiment can
only be justified by some attempt on the part of the latter to
disturb the course of policy on which the Allies were agreed, and
which they still consider themselves as confederated to carry into
execution.
That they should confer with the French and Spanish Ministers
on the nature and division of the business, and the order in which
it is most convenient that the questions should be taken for de-
liberation; and, as having been the parties to originate the several
treaties which are recognised as the basis of the proposed arrange-
ments, and to conduct down to the period of the peace the
Councils growing out of them, the four Powers should declare their
intention of bringing forward for the consideration of their col-
leagues such propositions on the questions in succession as appear
to them best calculated to satisfy the spirit and provisions of their
treaties.
APPENDICES 155
This, without bearing the character of offence or distrust, will
secure to them an initiative which neither France nor Spain can
complain of. In order to put into form these several propositions,
they must meet apart, and such meeting will afford them a
facility for concert without appearing to act upon a principle of
dictation. When they bring forward their propositions they will
hear the arguments of their colleagues, and if a separate recon-
sideration is necessary it can always be secured by any individual
member, without putting forward any offensive reason for the
postponement. The good sense of the proceeding will establish
its own purposes as we advance, the understanding being honestly
to tranquillise Europe, and by every reasonable and becoming
sacrifice to preserve the concert between the four Powers, which
has hitherto saved Europe.
APPENDIX IV
BARON HUMBOLDT'S PROJET FOR THE REGULATIONS
OF THE CONGRESS, VIENNA, SEPTEMBER 18141
On est convenu dans les conferences precedentes :
Que la multiplicite des objets rend necessaire de les diviser,
et de les traiter separement;
Que le nombre des Cours qui prennent part au Congres et la
situation des choses exigent qu'un petit nombre dirige et surveille
la negociation.
L 'application de ces principes demande que la division des
objets se fasse d'apres un systeme fixe et general.
Qu'on eloign e toute idee d'un pouvoir usurpe ou arbitraire que
l'exclusion de certaines Puissances de la direction de la negocia-
tion pourrait faire naitre, meme dans la partie la plus impartiale
du public; qu'on tache, ce qui plus est (sic), de menager l'amour-
propre des Puissances et des Princes moins considerables.
Enfin, qu'on evite que des Puissances qu'on ne peut ni ne
veut exclure de la direction generale de la negociation ne prennent
par la une part directe a des affaires auxquelles, d'apres la nature
des choses, elles ne peuvent point intervenir d'une maniere
principale.
II est indispensable apres cela qu'a l'ouverture du Congres
meme, on s'explique d'une maniere franche et precise vis-a-vis des
autres Puissances et a la face de 1 'Europe, dont les regards atten-
1 F.O. Continent 7 and F.O. Continent Archives 8. The copies
of a document of which the French is execrable have been rather
carelessly made. There is also another Prussian memorandum
which appears to be a shorter form of this one.
156 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
tifs sont fixes sur une reunion aussi extraordinaire, sur la nature,
le but et la forme du Congres.
C'est de ces considerations que sont nees les idees suivantes,
qui, en renfermant des propositions sur la forme a dormer au
Congres, pourraient en meme terns faire le fonds de la Declaration
qui doit preceder son ouverture, et qui pourraient y entrer, quoique
seulement en partie et avec de certaines restrictions.
Le Congres de Vienne n'est pas un Congres de paix, car la paix
est faite : il se distingue des Congres de Minister et d'Osnabriick,
de Ryswick, d 'Utrecht, etc., non seulement par le plus grand
nombre, ou la plus grande variete des objets, mais aussi par la,
qu'il n'a point du tout un but unique, fixe et determine. Le
Congres de Vienne n'est point une assemblee deliberante de
l'Europe. Car 1 'Europe ne forme pas un ensemble constitution -
nel, et, pour qu'il put y avoir une pareille assemblee, la part que
chaque Puissance devrait y prendre a la decision devrait etre fixee.
ce qui n'est, ni ne saurait etre le cas.
Qu'est-ce done que le Congres de Vienne? Ceci ne peut
s'expliquer qu'historiquement. La Revolution franchise et le
regime de Napoleon avaient change presque toute la face politique
de l'Europe. La guerre actuelle a mis fin a l'un et a l'autre, mais
les differents rapports politiques des Puissances n'ont ete fixes
qu'en egard a la France, et que par le Traite de Paris. II reste
encore a completer cette pacification generate, a remplacer par de
nouvelles, les institutions que les evenements des dernieres annees
ont renversees et deraciner quelques restes de l'Usurpation Napo-
leonienne qui menacent d'inquieter l'Europe. Pour parvenir a ce
but, on a appelle a un meme endroit les Plenipotentiaires de tous
les Princes et Etats qui, de part et d 'autre, ont pris part a la
guerre. On evite par la que les negociations particulieres de
Puissance a Puissance ne fassent pas naitre des malentendus dan-
gereux; on s 'assure que les arrangemens qui resultent de ces
negociations ne soyent point contraires a 1'interet general et leur
donne plus de force par la sanction, ou du moins la reconnaissance
commune; on peut enfin convenir de certains arrangemens
generaux contribuant a la tranquillite ou au bonheur de l'Europe.
Par une pareille marche on supplee en quelque facon a l'institution
d'une republiqueEuropeenne a jamais et parelle-meme impossible.
Le Congres de Vienne n'est done pas une negociation seulement,
pas meme un ensemble de negociations etroitement liees par un
meme but, mais simplement un complexe de negociations dif-
ferentes qui conduisent a autant de trait^s particuliers et qui n'ont
d'autre rapport ensemble que Tinte'ret general de l'Europe. La
question Europeenne se retrouve dans toutes, mais du reste elles
se sont plus ou moins etrangeres. II resulte de la que toutes les
Puissances qui y interviennentdoivents'abandonner mutuellement,
avec la confiance commandee par la grandeur des circonstances.
le soin de faire entre elles les arrangemens qui leur semblent con-
APPENDICES 157
venables, et de deliberer librement et isolement sur ces objets,
jusqu'a ce qu'elles viennent a s'accorder sur les memes principes,
mais aussi prendre l'engagement de proposer ce dont elles sont
convenues aux autres, de demander qu'elles le sanctionnent par
leur accession aux traites, et d'ecouter et de discuter les objections
qu'elles pourraient leur opposer. D'ou il suit de soi-meme que
chaque negociation peut etre entamee isolement, que plusieurs
peuvent marcher de front, mais que toutes doivent rentrer au
centre pour y etre munies de l'assentiment et de la reconnaissance
de l'Europe entiere rassembl^e ici dans les personnes des
differens Plenipotentiaries.
D'apres ce qui vient de se dire ici, il est impossible de deter-
miner les objets qui peuvent se presenter a la discussion. Chaque
Puissance et chaque jour peut en apporter de nouveaux.
On ne peut determiner que le genre de ces objets, et c'est aussi
le genre seulement qui influe sur la grande question qui doit etre
d^cidee ici :
Par quelles Puissances et dans quelle forme tel ou tel doit
etre traite?
II y a trois de ces genres d 'objets entierement differens l'un
de l'autre :
La distribution des Provinces qui par suite de la guerre et de
la Paix de Paris sont de venues disponibles.
La discussion sur cette distribution et la conclusion des Traites
qui la regleront appartiennent exclusivement aux Puissances
coalisees contre la France, qui en ont fait la conquete. Ce sont
leurs Plenipotentiaires seuls qui peuvent se reunir aux conferences
sur cet objet. La France et les Etats neutres en restent exclus.
Ceux a qui ces conquetes ont premierement rendu la vie y inter-
viennent, non comme des juges qui d^cident, mais comme parties
qui demandent a etre ecoutees et alleguent leurs titres.
En meme terns la France a un double inte'ret a la decision de
cet objet.
Elle a le droit d'y juger la conformite avec le Traite" de Paris
et la question Europ^enne. Cette derniere question y inte"resse
tous les Etats neutres ; des que la negociation est parvenue jusqu'au
moment de la conclusion, la France et ces Etats doivent par
consequent en recevoir connaissance et etre ecoutees, s'ils trouvent
a y objecter.
Les Princes qui ont pris part a la guerre ne peuvent pas non
plus etre appell^s tous simultan^ment k cette distribution ; il y en
aurait evidemment qu'on aurait ^galement tort d'admettre et
d'exclure sans distinction. II faut done s^parer la distribution:
de la Pologne,
de l'Allemagne,
de l'ltelie.
158 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
(1J
La distribution de la Pologne et la forme qui doit etre donnee
a la partie qui deviendra Eusse sont du ressort de la Prusse, de
l'Autriche et de la Eussie, les seules Puissances qui peuvent signer
comme Parties principales le traite qui la reglera.
L'Angleterre y intervient pour la question Europeenne, mais
elle y intervient aussi d'abord puisque les trois autres Puissances
sent interessees a se prevaloir de son intervention.
(2)
•"tjuant a la distribution de l'Allemagne, il faut distinguer entre
la discussion sur les bases et les principes qui doivent les diriger,
et sur l'application de ces principes, et le detail qui en resulte.
II faut considerer ensuite, qu'outre la question gen^ralement
Europeenne, la distribution de l'Allemagne interesse (a) les
Princes de l'Allemagne sous le rapport de leurs forces respectives,
et de leur organisation interieure. (b) L'Angleterre, par l'im-
portance qu'elle doit attacher a fortifier la Hollande, et a empecher
un agrandissement excessif de la France. La Eussie, par 1 'ex-
perience qu'elle a faite qu'elle peut etre inquietee jusques dans son
sein, si l'Allemagne n'est point independante, sans parler des
autres Etats limitrophes.
L'Autriche et la Prusse sont dans tous ces rapports a la fois
et ont par consequent eminemment le droit d'attendre qu'on ait
egard a leurs propositions.
Or, la discussion sur les bases et les principes ne peut appar-
tenir parmi les Puissances appellees en general a cette discussion
qu'a celles qui peuvent se placer et se maintenir dans un point de
vue Europeen.
Ces Puissances sont la Prusse, l'Autriche, la Eussie, et
l'Angleterre.
II faut en exclure :
La France, la Hollande, le Dannemarc, la Suisse, puisque,
quoiqu'ayant un grand interet a l'objet, ils n'ont, par differentes
raisons, aucun droit d'y intervenir;
La Suede, puisque quoiqu'ayant sans contredit le droit d'inter-
venir comme Puissance alliee et belligerante, elle n'y a plus aucun
interet direct, ayant ^chang^ la Pom^ranie, et s'etant concentr^e
dans le Nord.
La Baviere et le Wurtemberg doivent intervenir a cette dis-
cussion, puisqu'ils y ont et droit et interet, mais il ne faut les
ecouter que lorsqu'on sera deja d'accord, puisqu'ils n'ont point
de point central hors de la question et ne sauraient jamais la
juger d'une maniere grande et impartiale.
Les questions qui se lient a cette discussion sont, pour en citer
quelques exemples, celle de la Saxe, celle si la Eive gauche du
Bhin doit appartenir exclusivement a de Grandes Puissances? Si
APPENDICES 159
la Belgique et meme toute la Hollande doit faire partie int£grante
de 1'AUemagne? Si les Princes aggrandis par les Mediatisations
doivent conserver toutes leurs acquisitions ou si Ton veut leur
demander des sacrifices?
Les principes une fois fixes, l'application en detail doit
appartenir aux Princes Allemands exclusivement, car une bonne
constitution exige une certaine repartition des forces respectives,
et la division des cercles demande de certains arrondissemens.
(3)
La distribution de l'ltalie est etrangere aux Puissances du
Nord, et a la Prusse.
Elle est du ressort de l'Autriche, de la Sicile, de l'Espagne, de
1'Angleterre, comme Puissance maritime eminemment interess£e a
la situation politique des cotes de la Mediterranee et ayant une
possession importante dans cette mer.
Le Eoi de Sardaigne et le Pape y interviennent, comme Etafcs
formant des pretentions.
Le Eoi de Naples est par la nature des choses exclu de toute
part au Congres, auquel ne peuvent etre admis que des Souverains
qu'on veut generalement reconnaitre.
Comme ces trois divisions de la distribution des provinces con-
quises sont, malgre leur separation, pourtant, liees par des rapports
generaux, il est a savoir s'il ne faudrait pas creer pour cette partie
si importante de la negociation un comite dirigeant general, qui,
sans entrer dans les n^gociations particulieres, surveillerait et
reglerait l'ensemble. Si Ton he croyait pas trop compliquer la
chose par la, la Eussie, 1'Angleterre, l'Autriche et la Prusse pour-
raient seules le former.
II
Second genre d'objets : Les arrangemens particuliers que
quelques Puissances peuvent faire entr'elles, et qu'elles soumet-
tent seulement aux autres pour etre reconnus d'elles. Ces
arrangemens peuvent etre de dirferente nature et il est meme
impossible de les pr^voir a present.
Mais il y en a un infiniment important qui appartient a cette
classe. L 'organisation interieure de TAllemagne, ou une nouvelle
ligue doit remplacer l'Empire qui a disparu.
La discussion sur cette affaire interieure et domestique appar-
tient exclusivement aux Princes de l'Allemagne. Meme la Eussie
et 1'Angleterre ne voudront point intervenir a une affaire a laquelle
elles ne peuvent prendre qu'un interet general, et ou l'interet
particulier qu'elles y prendraient naitrait tou jours seulement de
considerations ^galement particulieres, et par consequent etran-
geres au bien-etre commun.
La Hollande, le Dannemarc, la Suisse pourraient y etre
appelles, la premiere pour s'unir en partie ou en entier a l'Alle-
160 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
magne; le second, y rattacher le Holstein; et la troisieme puis-
qu'une alliance a perpetuite entre l'Allemagne et la Suisse serait
on ne peut pas plus desirable.
Ill
Troisieme et dernier genre d'objets, arrangemens communs
pour le bien de l'Europe.
Les objets qui se rangent sous cette classe sont les suivans :
1. Les dissensions interieures dans la Suisse. Les Puissances
ne peuvent point permettre une guerre intestine dans le centre de
l'Europe, et la confederation Helvetique elle-meme demandera
probablement la mediation des Grandes Puissances. Si elle
s'adresse au Congres, c'est-a-dire a toutes, ou si les Puissances
sont forcees a se declarer mediatrices sans sa demande, la dis-
cussion sur cet objet sera du ressort des Puissances a qui il
appartient de deliberer sur cette classe d'objets en general.1
Si la confederation ne s'adresse qu'a quelques-unes des Puis-
sances, le cas rentre dans la seconde classe des objets : c'est-a-dire
des arrangemens particuliers faits de gre a gre. Mais aussi alors
les resultats devront toujours etre soumis a toutes les Puissances
pour juger de la question Europeenne.
2. Le Koyaume de Naples actuel. Les Puissances ne peuvent
souffrir qu'il continue a exister en Europe un Souverain que quel-
ques-unes des plus considerables entr'elles se refusent a recon-
naitre; on ne saurait souffrir non plus que Naples et la Sicile
restent dans une attitude continuellement hostile.
3. Le sejour de Napoleon a l'lle d'Elbe, et les individus de
sa famille. On ne peut plus nier que Napoleon et les individus de
sa famille inor^btent l'ltalie, la Suisse et la France. La Conven-
tion du 11 fevrier2 ne peut pas etre un obstacle a lui assigner
meme, malgre" lui, un autre sort. Car l'Angleterre et la France
n'y ont accede que pour certains points qui ne les lient pas envers
Napoleon, et si Ton veut parler impartialement d'apres les
principes de la justice, les Puissances contractantes n'avaient
aucunement le droit de placer au sein meme des autres une cause
et un pretexte de troubles. Quant aux individus de la famille,
rien n'empeche de les faire aller ou Ton voudra.
4. L 'abolition de la trait e des Negres.
5. La navigation libre des grandes riviferes sur la quelle la dis-
cussion a £te* express^ment reserved dans le Traits de Paris.
1 Note by Humboldt: " M. le Prince de Metternich a observe
que d'apres le Traite* de Paris, la France n'a pas le droit d'inter-
venir dans les affaires de la Suisse, et je me range entierement de
son opinion."
2 The Treaty of Fontainebleau of April 11, 1814, is meant.
APPENDICES 161
6. Le rang entre les Ministres de difterentes cours, objet dont
il a deja ete parle dans les Conferences de Paris.
La discussion sur les objets de cette classe appartient a toutes
les Puissances sans exception.
C'est la question Europeenne qui y est principalement, pour
no pas dire uniquement, agitee. Mais toutes les Puissances ne
peuvent point deliberer a la fois, ni avec une egalite parfaite; il
faudrait done abandonner la discussion sur ce point, et [laisser] la
fixation des principes aux six Grandes Puissances, rAngieteire,
l'Autriche, l'Espagne, la France, la Prusse et la Kussie, qui
ecouteraient apres les autres, sur les principes qu'elles auraient
poses.
Une reunion telle que le Congres actuel, meme avec la division
la plus exacte de tons les objets, ne saurait travailler sans etre
dirigee; le cas se presentera d'ailleurs qu'on s'adressera au Con-
gres, et que le Congres, comme tel, devra repondre a des de-
mandes. Pour le pouvoir, il faut qu'il ne soit pas simplement un
etre ideal, pas seulement un complexe d'un grand nombre de
Plenipoten£iaires .
II fauTen consequence au Congres un Comite dirigeant, et ce
Comite doit etre forme par les memes Puissances qui decident la
question eminemment Europeenne qui forme la troisieme classe
des objets de la negociation. Car le Congres lui-meme
est une affaire Europeenne et une des plus importantes.
Ce Comite forme le centre du Congres; le Congres n'existe qu'en
autant que ce Comite s'est constitue : il est termine lorsqu'il se
dissout. Toutes les negociations particulieres et les traites qui en
resultent doivent rentrer dans lui, et c'est lui qui doit les proposer
a la discussion generale de toutes les Puissances, et y soigner
leur accession. II doit encore avoir le droit de presser les negocia-
tions particulieres pour ne pas laisser devenir le Congres inter-
minable.
Comme les negociations particulieres doivent etre soumises k
l'accession et a la reconnoissance de toutes les Puissances Euro-
peennes, il faut encore determiner :
Le nombre des Etats et des Princes qu'on veut admettre,
comme siegeant dans le Congres Europeen ;
Le mode de les consulter.
II a d£ja ete observe que les Etats qu'on se refuse de recon-
naitre, et aupres desquels la continuation de l'existence est mise en
doute, ne peuvent point entrer dans ce nombre. Ceux qui venant
d'etre retablis, ne sont par la point encore reconnus generalement,
sont dans le cas diam^tralement opposed lis commencent, tandis
que les autres finissent. lis ont un int^ret manifeste a chaque
question Europeenne, et leur voix ne saurait etre exclue.
En ayant £gard au degre de forces et d'independance, on ne
peut admettre aucun Prince de l'Allemagne qui n'a point des poa-
[285—69] M
162 CONGEESS OF VIENNA
sessions hors de ce pays, a l'exception seulement de la Baviere
(et du Wurtemberg). Les raisons de cette exception tombent
sous ies yeux; d'apres ces principes il siegerait done dans ce
Congres les seize Etats suivants : le Portugal, l'Espagne, la
France, l'Angleterre, la Prusse, l'Autriche, la Baviere (le Wur-
temberg), la Hollande, la Suisse, la Sardaigne, le Pape, la Sicile,
le Dannemarc, la Suede, la Eussie.
La marehe tres simple pour chaque objet en particulier serait
la suivante :
Qu'il fut discute jusqu'a la redaction approuvee et paraph^e
du Traite, entre et par les Puissances qu'il concerne directement ;
Que le Traite fut porte aux Comite dirigeant, discute et
paraphe par lui;
Que ce Comite convoquat les Plenipotentiaries des Etats qui
resteraient encore a consulter, et que le Traite fut aussi approuve
par eux.
La marehe du Congres lui-meme serait:
De dresser et publier la declaration sur sa forme ;
De convoquer et de constituer le Comite dirigeant qui s'occu-
perait incessamment, et de ses fonctions comme tel, et des objets
de la troisieme classe.
D'^tablir les conferences sur les objets particuliers, et nom-
m^ment :
1. Celles pour la distribution des Provinces conquises;
2. Celles sur rorganisation interieure de rAllemagne.
(Signe) Humboldt.
APPENDIX V
PEOPOSAL OF BAEON HUMBOLDT TO PUBLISH A
DECLAEATION, VIENNA, SEPTEMBEE 18141
La piece approuvee dans la conference d'hier2 forme l'ouver-
ture du Congres pour les Grandes Puissances. Pour l'ouvrir egale-
ment avec et vis-a-vis de tous les autres Princes et Etats, on peut
adopter la mode d'une reunion de tous ceux qui pretendent etre
munis de plein-pouvoirs, ou celui d'une declaration adressee par
les six Puissances a tous les autres Gouvernemens et leurs Pleni-
potentiaires indistinctement.
1 F.O. Continent 7; F.O. Continent Archives 20.
2 Apparently the Protocol of September 22.
APPENDICES 163
Je proposerais de s'en tenir a ce dernier.
Le premier a l'inconvenient d'agiter des le premier abord la
question de l'admission ou de la non-admission de certaines Puis-
sances. Car si Ton appuye fortement sur la circonstance, qu'on
n 'examine dans cette reunion les titres de personne, ceux qui ont
mauvaise conscience sentiront ce que cela veut dire. Si Ton n'y
appuye pas, ceux, qui voudraient exclure d'autres, comme la Sicile
est disposee ainsi contre Naples, les Princes souverains de l'Alle-
magne contre les Princes mediatises, deviendront inquiets et
chercheront des eclaircissemens. Or, il est de l'interet des Puis-
sances alliees d'eviter cette question jusqu'au moment ou Ton
pourra f rapper emcacement ceux qui sont a exclure.
Une reunion ou tout le monde est admis, ou chacun retrouve
son antagoniste et ou tous sont congedies sans apprendre bien pre-
cisement quand leur tour d'agir arrivera, trompera l'espoir qu'il
vaut mieux de ne pas reveiller par une invitation personnelle.
La legitimite du Comite preparatoire enfin n'y gagnerait
gueres beaucoup.
Car on dirait tou jours qu'il n'avait eu aucunmoyen de s'opposer
dans une Assemblee ou ni le nombre des personnes admises, ni leur
droit de votes, ni celui de ceux qui n'auraient pas pu paraitre, rien
enfin n'est fixe.
Une pareille reunion ne saurait, selon moi, etre bonne, que si
elle avait le but d 'examiner les pouvoirs et le droit de comparaitre
de chacun; mais c'est precisement ce qu'on ne veut pas. II ne
faut point se dissimuler que le Congres actuel est de nature a
rendre egalement impossible d'inventer et de puiser dans l'experi-
ence du passe une forme entierement bonne et convenable.
Mais une declaration imprimee au nom des six plus Grandea
Puissances de 1 'Europe obvie au moins a plusieurs des inconveniei£3
d'une reunion personnelle.
Elle ne prejuge rien; elle rassure le grand public, qui, confiant
plus volontiers les interets de l'Europe a 6 qu'a 16 Puissances, est
tranquille de voir travailler les premieres entr'elles; elle n'inquiete
point les Plenipotentiaires, mais leur montre meme que, selon les
objets, ils seront appeles successivement a plaider leur cause.
C'est dans ce sens que la declaration devrait etre ecrite. Le fonds
en serait le contenu de la piece d'hier,1 les deux series d'objets ; les
deux comites preparatoires ; on ferait entrevoir que l'edifice de la
reconstruction de l'Europe repondra aux plans concus par les
Grandes Puissances alliees des le commencement de la guerre ; on
s'y arreterait surtout sur le grand but du Congres, le completement
de l'ceuvre de la paix; la fixation de grands principes tendrait au
bonheur general de l'Europe; on ne pr^ciserait rien sur la
marche des affaires en detail, mais, en parlant de la multiplicite
1 F.O. Continent Archives 8,
[285—69] N
164 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
des objets et de la n^cessite" de terminer bientot, on ferait voir
que chaque objet qui est de nature a le permettre, sera traite pour
lui seul et entre les Gouvernemens qui y sont interesses.
Cette declaration devrait etre ecrite d'un style simple, et plutot
raisonne que declaratoire, pour que, quelque soit Tissue du Con-
gres, on ne fut pas reste au-dessous de ce qu'on aurait annonce.
Immediatement apres la publication, le travail serait commence et
presque tout le monde serait trop occupe pour glosser ou
manceuvrer.
Les six Puissances entreraient en discussion sur des objets
generaux, dont quelques-uns, comme l'abolition de la traite de
Negres, exigeraient d'y appeller d'autres Puissances pour etre
<6cout£s.
Les quatre en deliberant sur la distribution des territoires dis-
ponibles en Allemagne ne pourraient se dispenser d'y admettre
dans 1 'occasion, la Hollande, la Baviere, le Wurtemberg et
d'autres Princes Allemands, meme le Danemark et la Suede.
Le meme cas existerait dans les discussions sur la Constitution
de l'Allemagne. La Sardaigne et les autres cours d'ltalie auraient
enfin egalement bientot leur tour.
Quant a la legitimite du Comite preparatoire, mon opinion est
la suivante : L 'Europe ne forme qu'un ensemble ideal et la poli-
tique n'est point astreinte a des normes constitutionnelles. La
seule mode dont les Puissances Europeennes peuvent agir en
commun est, en consequence, que les plus grandes conviennent
entr'elles, et se mettent en avant; que les autres y consentent
tacitement; qu'on laisse la liberte a chacun parmi ces dernieres
d'enoncer son opinion contraire, et qu'on prenne meme l'engage-
ment de discuter cet avis avec elle.
Or, c'est la exactement ce qui se fait a present par les six
Puissances.1
APPENDIX VI
PROJET OF BAEON HUMBOLDT : MODE OF PUBLISHING
THE DECLAKATION OF THE OPENING OF CONGRESS1
Pour obvier au double inconvenient de faire signer la declara-
tion des six Puissances par tous leurs Plenipotentiaires, ou de la
laisser sans signature, et par la sans toute marque d'authenticite,
on pourrait adopter le mode suivant :
On dirait a la fin de la declaration que, pour eviter qu'une
declaration qui n'avait pas pu etre remise individuellement et
qu'il avait fallu publier par la voye de l'impression ne soit point
falsinee, on avait r^solu de n'emettre aucun exemplaire sans le
faire vidimer auparavant par un des six Cabinets.
1 F.O. Continent 9.
APPENDICES 165 .
Chaque exemplaire porterait pour lors au bas la phrase :
Pour copie conforme et la signature des Plenipotentiaries d'une
des six Puissances.
On regarderait de cette maniere la declaration comme une piece
arretee et redigee par tous les six Cabinets en commun, mais
rendue publique par chacune des six en particulier. On se tirerait
aussi par la de la question embarrassante : dans quel ordre on doit
placer dans la declaration meme les six Puissances. Car il serait
naturel que dans chaque exemplaire la Puissance dont les Pleni-
potentiaires en auraient atteste l'authenticite parait a la tete des
autres, puisque cet exemplaire serait regarde comme une piece
emise par son Cabinet. II n'y aurait enfln, en adoptant ce mode,
aucun inconvenient qu'un des six Cabinets communiquat, s'il le
jugeait a propos, la declaration a une puissance qui n'eut pas 6t6
reconnue par les autres.
APPENDIX VII
VISCOUNT CASTLEBEAGH'S PROJET FOR THE FORMA-
TION OF A COMMISSION TO VERIFY STATISTICAL
CALCULATIONS
There appearing a great Discordance in the Statistical Calcula-
tions furnished by the different Cabinets, Lord Castlereagh sug-
gests that the 5 Principal Powers who< take the chief interest in
the Territorial Arrangements on the side of Germany: viz.,
Austria, Prussia, Great Britain, France, and Russia, or, if it is
thought better in the first Instance, that the 4 Powers in execution
of whose Treaties these arrangements are to be made, should each
appoint a Person to verify conjointly these Calculations, and to
settle by a common accord at what rate of Population the respec-
tive Possessions should be taken in the Distribution to be made.
It seems also of pressing importance to have a combined
statement made of all the disposeable Territories and of all un-
satisfied Claims upon them, distinguishing those Claims that rest
upon the Faith of Treaties, &c, from those that rest upon Grounds
of Conscience and Favor.
That this Commission should be especially required to report:
What the Nature of the Engagements are with respect to the
reconstruction of Austria and Prussia.
What progress has been made in Execution of the same.
To what further Possessions that Power lays Claims.
What Territories can be conveniently assigned in satisfaction
of the same.
That a Similar Report be made under their respective Treaties,
compared with their actual State of Possession for Prussia,
Hanover, Bavaria, Holland, and Wirtemberg.
166 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
That a further Eeport be made distinguishing how the other
German Powers, whose Territorial Eights were by their Treaties
at Frankfort less beneficially secured to them than was the Case
with Bavaria and Wirtemberg, are likely to be affected by any
arrangement which may be proposed in favor of the six Powers
specially named.
APPENDIX VIII
MEMOKANDUM ON THE TREATIES OF 1814 AND 1815
SUBMITTED BY THE BRITISH PLENIPOTENTIARIES
AT THE CONFERENCE OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE,
OCTOBER 18181
The benign principles of the Alliance of September 26, 1815/
having been either formally or substantially adhered to by all
Powers, may be considered as constituting the European system
in matter of political conscience.
It would, however, be derogatory to this solemn act of the
Sovereigns to mix its discussion with the ordinary diplomatic
obligations which bind State to State, and which are alone to be
looked for in the treaties which have been concluded in the
accustomed form.
The present diplomatic position of Europe may be considered
under two distinct heads : Firstly, the treaties which may be said
to bind its States collectively; secondly, the treaties which are
peculiar to particular States.
Under the first head may be enumerated the Treaty of Peace,
signed at Paris, May 30, 1814; the Act of the Congress of
Vienna, signed June 9, 1815 ; and the Treaty of Peace signed at
Paris, November 20, 1815.
These transactions, to which all the States of Europe (with the
exception of the Porte) are at this day either signing or acceding
parties, may be considered as the Great Charte, by which the
territorial system of Europe, unhinged by the events of war and
revolution, has been again restored to order. The consent of all
the European States, France included, has not only been given to
this settlement, but their faith has been solemnly pledged to the
strict observance of its arrangements.
These treaties contain some few regulations not strictly terri-
torial, but it may be asserted that the general character of their
provisions is of that nature, and that they contain in no case
^.0. Continent 35.
2 The •' Holy Alliance.
APPENDICES 167
engagements which have been pushed beyond the immediate
objects which are made matter of regulation in the treaties them-
selves.
It is further to be observed that none of these three treaties
contain any express guarantee, general or special, by which their
observance is to be enforced, save and except the temporary
guarantee intended to be assured by Article 5 of the Treaty of
1815, which regulates the army of occupation to be left in France.
There is no doubt that a breach of the covenant by any one
State is an injury which all the other States may, if they shall
think fit, either separately or collectively resent, but the treaties
do not impose, by express stipulation, the doing so as matter of
positive obligation.
So solemn a pact, on the faithful execution and observance of
which all nations should feel the strongest interest, may be con-
sidered as under the protection of a moral guarantee of the highest
nature ; but as those who framed these Acts did not probably see
how the whole Confederacy could, without the utmost incon-
venience, be made collectively to enforce the observance of these
treaties, the execution of this duty seems to have been deliberately
left to arise out of the circumstances of the time and of the case,
and the offending State to be brought to reason by such of the
injured States as might at the moment think fit to charge them-
selves with the task of defending their own rights thus invaded.
If this analysis of these treaties be correct, they cannot be said
to form an alliance in the strict sense of the word. They no doubt
form the general pact by which all is regulated, which at that
moment was open in Europe to regulation ; but they can hardly be
stated to give any special or superior security to the parts of the
European system thus regulated, as compared with those parts
which were not affected by these negotiations, upon which, conse-
quently, those transactions are wholly silent, and which rest for
their title upon anterior treaties or public acts of equal and
recognised authority.
Under the second head, viz., that of treaties which are peculiar
to particular States, may be enumerated the Treaties of Alliance
of Chaumont and Paris, as signed by the four Great Allied Powers.
There was a Treaty of Alliance, deriving its principle from that of
Chaumont, intermediately signed at Vienna, viz., on March 25,
1815, by nearly all the Powers; but as the stipulations of t^"
treaty are declared to have been satisfied by the Treaty of Peace
of November 1815, and to have thereby become extinct, it will
make the statement more clear to omit the further mention of it
in the present discussion.
The treaties anterior to that of Chaumont between the same
Powers may be usefully referred to, as explaining the events
which first gave birth to this combination between the four prin-
cipal Powers of Europe, as opposed to France, at a moment when
[285—69] Q
168 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
the great mass of those States, who afterwards joined the Allies
and constituted with them the coalitions which, in the years 1814
and 1815, operated against France, were yet under the yoke of
that Power.
The treaties of Quadruple Alliance concluded at Chaumont and
Paris may be considered as treaties of alliance in the strictest
and most enlarged sense of the word. They have a professed
object; they define the steps to be taken in pursuit of that object,
and they declare the stipulated force by which that object is to
be attained and secured. These two> treaties form one system,
consistent in its purpose, but varying in its means.
The restoration and conservation of Europe against the power
of France may be stated to be the avowed principle and object
of both treaties.
The Treaty of Chaumont, in 1814, aimed at effectuating an
improvement in the state of Europe as the preliminary condition
to a peace with France, and at defending, by the force of the
Alliance, the terms of that peace, if made. The Treaty of Paris,
in 1815, had only to place the state of things, as established by
the Treaties of Paris and Vienna, under the protection of the
Quadruple Alliance.
The Treaty of Chaumont gave to this Alliance that character
of permanence which the deep-rooted nature of the danger
against which it was intended to provide appeared to require, viz.,
twenty years from March 1814, with an eventual continuance.
This character of permanence was additionally recognised by
the language of the Paris Treaty,1 the whole of the provisions of
which proceed not only upon the admission of a danger still
existing, but upon the necessity of keeping alive the precautionary
arrangements of the treaty, even after the army of occupation
shall have been withdrawn.
The Paris Treaty also aimed at specifying with precision, as far
as possible, the casus foederis upon which the contracting parties
should be bound to furnish their stipulated succours.
Where that could not be done the object was to provide a mode
by which the case in doubt might be decided at the time it should
arise.
Three distinct cases are provided for in Articles 2 and 3 of the
treaty. The two first, being cases of fact, are clear and specific ;
the third being a case of a mixed nature, dependent for its just
solution upon the circumstances of the event which shall be
alleged to give occasion to it, is left to be decided in concert by
the Allied Courts when the moment shall arrive.
In construing the obligations of this treaty, the recital which its
preamble contains is, no doubt, to be held in view. It serves to
Of November 20, 1815.
APPENDICES 169
show the degree in which the order of things then established in
France operated as a motive with the Allies in making the treaty,
and the deep interest they felt in their consolidation as a means
to the general tranquillity ; but as it was not required that France
should bind herself, in the enacting part of her treaty, to maintain
inviolate the political order of things then existing, it does not
appear competent for the Allies to consider an alteration in that
order of things, whether legally effectuated or brought about by
indirect means, as in itself constituting such an infraction of the
peace as the Allies are entitled to take notice of, independent of
the consideration of how far that change goes immediately to
endanger their own repose and safety.
The principle of guaranteeing to both King and people the
established order of things was much talked of at the time. By
some it was contended that a species of guarantee having been
given to the King by the arrangement for placing an army of occu-
pation in France, coupled with the instructions to the Duke of
Wellington for the employment of the troops whilst they should
remain there, that the Allies should give the nation the same
security for their liberties by guaranteeing the Charte ; but neither
alternative was adopted and no guarantee was given beyond what
grew out of the circumstances above alluded to; a guarantee
which was, in its nature, temporary, and was expressly limited to
a period not exceeding five years by the provisions contained in
Article 5 of the general treaty of peace.
The four Powers, it is true, took further measures of precaution
in their Treaty of Alliance, signed the same day, as will appear
by reference to the Fifth Article; but this article proceeds upon
the principle that after the army of occupation should be with-
drawn the Allies could only justify an interference in the affairs of
a foreign State upon the ground of considering their own safety
compromised, and that, independently of such a consideration,
they could not justly claim any right of interference, or in
prudence charge themselves with the task of redressing violations
of the internal Constitution of France ; in this sense the latter
part of Article 3 is framed, being the only article in either treaty
which touches the question. The true point, therefore, for con-
sideration under this article must always be, Is the safety or
interest of the Alliance so far compromised by the event as to
justify recurrence to war; or is it a case, if not for actual war, at
least for defensive precautions; or, finally, is it a case which,
though more or less to be disapproved or regretted, neither justifies
the former nor requires the latter alternative? The case admits in
good sense, as well as according to the words of the treaty, of no
other solution. It would have been impossible to have proposed
to France an express article to preserve inviolate the order of
things as therein established, for no state of things could be
more humiliating than that of a State which should be bound to
170 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
its neighbours to preserve unchanged its internal system, and
that any fundamental change in it, without their consent first
had and obtained, should in itself be cause of war. If such a
principle cannot be maintained for a moment in argument, the
qualification of it, that the change to be tolerated must be legally
made, is not less so; for how can foreign States safely be left to
judge of what is legal in another State, or what degree of intrigue
or violence shall give to the change the character which is to
entitle them to interfere? The only safe principle is that of the
law of nations : that no State has a right to endanger its neigh-
bours by its internal proceedings, and that if it does, provided
they exercise a sound discretion, their right of interference is clear.
It is this right upon which the latter part of Article 3 expressly
founds itself, and not upon any covenant supposed to be made by
France.
The Allies are presumed to have a common interest in judging
this question soundly when it arises, if they are of opinion that
the circumstances of the case, prudentially considered, constitute
the existence of the danger, against which the article intended to
provide. Then they are bound to concur in furnishing the stipu-
lated succours; but till the case arises none of the contracting
parties are engaged for more, under this branch of the article, than
an eventual concert and decision.
Having discussed and endeavoured to state with precision
what the existing treaties have really done, there will remain
open to fair discussion the question, Have they done enough, or
does not much remain yet to be done ? No question can be more
proper for examination, and no Government more disposed to
consider it, than that of Great Britain, whenever any clear and
specific proposition shall be brought forward, always holding in
view the inconvenience of agitating in time of peace questions
that presuppose a state of war or disturbance.
The desire of the Prince Kegent always is to act cordially with
his Allies; but, in doing so, to stand quite clear in the view of his
own engagements not to be supposed to have taken engagements
beyond the text and import of the treaties signed.
The problem of an universal Alliance for the peace and happi-
ness of the world has always been one of speculation and of hope,
but it has never yet been reduced to practice, and if an opinion
may be hazarded from its difficulty, it never can ; but you may in
practice approach towards it, and perhaps the design has never
been so far realised as in the last four years. During that event-
ful period the Quadruple Alliance, formed upon principles
altogether limited, has had, from the presence of the Sovereigns
and the unparalleled unity of design with which their Cabinets
have acted, the power of travelling so far out of the sphere of
their immediate and primitive obligations, without, at the same
time, transgressing any of the principles of the law of nations or
APPENDICES 171
failing in the delicacy which they owe to the rights of other States,
as to form more extended alliances, such as that of March 25,
1815, at Vienna, to interpose their good offices for the settlement
of differences subsisting between other States, to take the initia-
tive in watching over the peace of Europe, and finally in securing
the execution of its treaties in the mode most consonant to the
convenience of all the parties.
The idea of an " Alliance Solidaire," by which each State
shall be bound to support the state of succession, government,
and possession within all other States from violence and attack,
upon condition of receiving for itself a similar guarantee, must be
understood as morally implying the previous establishment of
such a system of general government as may secure and enforce
upon all kings and nations an internal system of peace and justice.
Till the mode of constructing such a system shall be devised the
consequence is inadmissible, as nothing would be more immoral
or more prejudicial to the character of government generally than
the idea that their force was collectively to be prostituted to the
support of established power without any consideration of the
extent to which it was abused. Till, then, a system of adminis-
trating Europe by a general alliance of all its States can be
reduced to some practical form, all notions of general and un-
qualified guarantee must be abandoned, and States must be left
to rely for their security upon the justice and wisdom of their
respective systems, aided by such support as other States may
feel prepared to afford them, and as circumstances may point out
and justify without out-stepping those principles which are to be
found in the law of nations as long recognised and practised.
The beneficial effects which may be expected to be produced
by the four Allied Powers consulting together, and interposing
from time to time their good offices, as they have hitherto done,
for the preservation of peace and order, is considered as equally
true with respect to five Powers, the introduction of France into
such a system not rendering it too numerous for convenient
concert, whilst it must add immensely to the moral weight and
influence of such a mediating Power
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(A) Treaties, Protocols, &c. :
D'Angeberg, Comte. Le Congres de Vienne et les Traites
de 18ir>, 4 parts. Paris, 1864. With an introduction by
J.-B. Capefigue.
British and Foreign State Papers, vol. I, 1812-1814; vol. II,
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Kluber, J. L. Acten des Wiener Congresses 9 vols. Erlan-
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Gentz, F. von. Depeches inedites aux Hospodars de
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Klinkowstrom, A. F. von. Oesterreichs Theilnahme an den
Befreiungskriegen. Vienna, 1887. Containing Gentz's
letters.
Metternich-Winneburg, C. W. N. L., Prince. Memoires,
Documents et Ecrit* divers, vols. I and II. Paris, 1880.
Also German and English editions.
(2) British.
Castlereagh, Viscount. Correspondence , edited by his
brother, vols. IX, X, XL London, 1852.
Jackson, Sir George. Diaries and Letters, edited by Lady
Jackson, 2nd series, vol. II. London, 1873.
Wellington, Field-Marshal the Duke of. Despatches, edited
by Col. Gurwood; vol. XII. London, 1847.
Wellington, Field-Marshal the Duke of. Supplementary
Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda, edited by
his son; vols. VIII, IX, X, XL London, 1860-1864.
(3) French.
Talleyrand-P^rigord, C. M. de. Memoires, vols. II and III.
Paris, 1891.
Talleyrand-Perigord, C. M. de. Correspondance ineditc
pendant le Congres de Vienne, edited by G. Pallain. Paris,
1881.
Jaucourt, Comte de. Correspondance avec le Prince de
Talleyrand pendant le Congres de Vienne. Paris, 1905.
(4) German.
Pertz, G. H., and Delbruck, H. Leben des FeldmarschaUs
N. von Gneisenau, vols. Ill and IV. Berlin, 1864-81.
Authorities 173
Pertz G. H. Leben des Ministers Freiherr von Stein, vols.
IV, 'v, VI. Berlin, 1850-55.
(5) Russian.
Martens, F. de. Recueil des Traites et Conventions conclus
par la Russie avec les Puissances etrangeres, vols. Ill, IV,
VII, XI, XIV. St. Petersburg, 1875, &c.
Mikhailovitch, Le Grand Due Nicolas. L'Empereur
Alexander le1', 2 vols. St. Petersburg, 1912.
Sbornik of the Imperial Russian Historical Society, vols.
XXXI, CXII. St. Petersburg, 1880, 1904.
(6) Miscellaneous.
Gagern, Freiherr H. C. E. von. Mein Antheil an der Politik,
5 vols. Stuttgard, Tubingen, and Leipzig, 1823-1845.
Munster, E. F. H., Count von. Political Sketches of the
State of Europe, 1814-1867. Edinburgh, 1868. Fuller
than German edition. Leipzig, 1867.
Fournier, August. Die Geheimpolizei auf dem Wiener Kon~
gress. Vienna and Leipzig, 1913.
Weil M. H. Les Dessous du Congres de Vienne} 2 vols.
Paris, 1917.
(C) Histories, Monographs, &c. :
Bernhardi, T. von. Oeschichte Russlands und der Euro-
paischen Politik im XlXten Jahrhundert, vol. I. Leipzig,
1863.
Cambridge Modern History f vol. IX. Cambridge, 1906.
Duvergier de Hauvanne, P. Histoire du Gouvernement
parlementaire en France, 1814-1848, vol. II. Paris, 1857.
Fournier, A. Der Congress von Chdtillon. Leipzig, Vienna,
and Prague, 1900.
Fournier, A. Historische Studien und Skizzen, 2e Reihe.
Vienna and Leipzig, 1908.
Fyffe, C. A. A History of Modern Europe, vol. I. London,
1880.
Oncken, W. Das Zeitalter der Revolution, des Kaiserreichs,
und der Befreiungskriegc, vol. 2. Berlin, 1887.
Oncken, W. Lord Castlereagh und die Ministerconferenz zu
Langres am 29 Januar, 1814; Eaumer's Historisches
Taschenbuch, VI, 3. Leipzig, 1884.
Oncken, W. Die Krisis der letzten Fricdensverhandlung mit
Napoleon I; Eaumer's Historisches Taschenbuch, VI, 5.
Leipzig, 1886.
Phillips, W. Alison. The Confederation of Europe.
London, 1914.
Eain, P. L'Europe et la Restoration des Bourbons. Paris,
1905.
Salisbury, Marquess of. Biographical Essays. London,
1905. Contains an essay on Castlereagh published in the
Quarterly Review in 1862.
174 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
Schaumann, A. F. H. Geschichte des 2er Pariser Friedens.
Gottingen, 1844.
Sorel, A. L'Europe et la Revolution frangaise, vol. VIII.
Paris, 1904.
Sorel, A. Essais d'Histoire et de Critique. Paris, 1883, 1894.
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Viel-Castel, Baron L. de. Lord Castlereagh et la Politique
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For fuller list, see the Cambridge Modern History, vol. IX.
Printed by His Majesty's Stationery Office at the Foreign Office Press.
»*
M
uf.a.airH
DC Webster, (Sir) Charles Kingsley
249 The Congress of Vienna,
W4 18J4-1815.
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